CRONE, J.
D.B. (“Mother”) appeals the denial of her motion to modify and terminate the parenting time of M.B. (“Father”) with their son, P.B., her petition to hold Father in contempt of a visitation order, her motion for attorney’s fees and therapist’s fees, and her “Motion to Correct Prior Order and to Establish Correct Support Arrearage.” We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Did the trial court err in imposing a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard with respect to Mother’s motion to modify and terminate Father’s parenting time?
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The clear-and-convincing standard applies in proceedings to terminate parental rights, which are initiated by the State. Id.; Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2. Here, the trial court reasoned that the clear-and-convincing standard also should apply in this case because the effect of Mother’s motion to modify and terminate parenting time, “if successful, is to essentially terminate parental rights while still maintaining the requirements of parental financial responsibility for payment of child support, health care costs, etc. AND, worse yet, cutting a child off from the parent.” Appellant’s App. at 19. Although we are sympathetic to the trial court’s concerns, we observe that the termination of Father’s parenting time would not necessarily be permanent, unlike in a termination of parental rights proceeding. We further observe that, unlike in a termination of parental rights proceeding, it is the child’s custodial parent, and not the State, that has requested the restriction of parenting time. For these reasons, and until either our legislature or our supreme court determines otherwise, we conclude that the preponderance standard is the appropriate burden of proof in this situation. See Stewart, 521 N.E.2d at 963 (holding that preponderance standard applied to party seeking to terminate visitation rights in dissolution proceeding “[b]ecause the private interest at stake, although great, is not permanently terminated and the state is not the initiator of the termination”).
Father acknowledges that the proper remedy “would be to remand the matter for judgment consistent with the proper standard” but contends that “such a remedy is empty and 13 pointless where the trial court’s order makes clear that the evidence was insufficient to show even on a preponderance that endangerment will result.” Appellee’s Br. at 20-21. We disagree. As the trial court’s order suggests, the issue of whether to terminate Father’s visitation with P.B. is essentially a credibility contest between Mother’s witnesses and Father’s witnesses. The trial court must consider and weigh the conflicting evidence and determine whether the evidentiary balance tips in favor of Mother, that is, whether it is more likely than not that visitation with Father would endanger P.B.’s physical health or well-being or significantly impair his emotional development. For that reason we must reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and BARNES, J., concur.