BRADFORD, J.
Appellant/Defendant Joey Wilson appeals his convictions for Receiving Stolen Auto Parts, a Class C felony, and Driving While Suspended, a Class A misdemeanor. Upon appeal, Wilson contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the charging information on the day before his trial was scheduled to begin. Wilson also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting his complete Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) record without first requiring the State to redact substantial evidence of unrelated prior misconduct. We affirm.
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Here, unlike in Fajardo and Fuller, it is uncontested that the State’s request to amend the charging information was timely under the amended version of Indiana Code section 35-34-1-5 because the amendment was made before Wilson’s trial commenced. Thus, the only question is whether the amendment prejudiced Wilson’s substantial rights. As such, we conclude that this case is more akin to Riley and its progeny than Fajardo and Fuller. We further conclude that under the amended version of Indiana Code section 35-34-1-5, a defendant’s failure to request a continuance after a trial court allows a pre-trial substantive amendment to the charging information over defendant’s objection results in waiver. Here, Wilson had the opportunity to request a continuance for the purpose of giving himself the opportunity to prepare his defense after the trial court allowed the State to amend the charging information over his objection but chose not to pursue that course. Therefore, Wilson has waived this issue for appellate review. See Riley, 506 N.E.2d at 478.
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Initially, we observe that any unrelated character evidence contained in Wilson’s BMV record should have been redacted from Wilson’s record before it was admitted at trial. Nevertheless, Wilson has failed to prove that the admission of the unredacted record made it impossible for him to receive a fair trial. Unlike in Rhodes, the State did not present a “flood” of evidence about Wilson’s prior crimes, wrongs, or bad acts. Wilson’s BMV record was the only evidence presented by the State that related to Wilson’s character and the State did not highlight any unrelated character evidence in its argument at trial. Wilson did not challenge the State’s allegation that he had received a prior driving while suspended conviction at trial making it unlikely that his lengthy BMV record would have been unfairly influential with respect to that single act. In light of the unchallenged evidence that Wilson was driving on a suspended license after having received a prior driving while suspended conviction, we do not believe that the admission of Wilson’s BMV record, in and of itself, rose to the level of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence discussed in Rhodes, nor do we believe that the admission of Wilson’s BMV record, without any other irrelevant character evidence, was so prejudicial that it made it impossible for Wilson to receive a fair trial.
Moreover, to the extent that Wilson relies on Dumes and Jones v. State, 708 N.E.2d 37 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, in support of his claim that the admission of his complete BMV record constituted fundamental error, we conclude that both Dumes and Jones are unpersuasive because in both Dumes and Jones, this court concluded that the admission of the defendants’ unredacted driving records constituted reversible error, not fundamental error. Again, a finding of fundamental error “requires a defendant to show greater prejudice than ordinary reversible error.” Purifoy, 821 N.E.2d at 412. Although we believe that the trial court erred in admitting Wilson’s unredacted BMV record, we conclude that Wilson has failed to prove that its admission subjected him to any greater prejudice than ordinary reversible error. Thus, Wilson has failed to prove that the admission of his complete BMV record constituted fundamental error.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
DARDEN, J., and BROWN, J., concur.