NAJAM, J.
The State appeals the trial court’s October 2009 order modifying Jeffrey D. Brunner’s August 2000 conviction from a Class D felony to a Class A misdemeanor. The parties raise two issues for our review:
1. Whether the State’s appeal is authorized by law.
2. Whether the trial court erred in granting Brunner’s petition for relief.
We hold that Brunner’s request, nine years after the trial court’s entry of judgment, to reduce the Class D felony to a Class A misdemeanor was a petition for post-conviction relief, from which the State may appeal. We also hold that Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-7(b) does not authorize the relief granted. As such, we reverse and remand with instructions.
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To determine whether the State has the right to appeal the trial court’s action in this case requires that we first determine the nature of Brunner’s request for relief. Brunner’s request sought to vacate the Class D felony judgment and, in its place, entry of a judgment of conviction for a Class A misdemeanor. Brunner based his petition on facts not originally before the trial court, namely, his allegedly clean record since his 2000 conviction, his difficulty in finding a job since then due to his status as a felon, and his related inability to support his family. The trial court held a hearing on Brunner’s request and, subsequently, the court issued its judgment granting the relief sought.
If this were a civil action, Brunner’s request would be considered a petition to modify judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). See Gertz v. Estes, 922 N.E.2d 135, 138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (stating that a “petition for modification of the judgment is, in effect, a motion for relief from judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)”). But this is a criminal matter, not a civil one. See Van Meter v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1138, 1138 (Ind. 1995) (“Generally, our Trial Rules govern procedure and practice in civil cases only.”) As such, Brunner’s motion was, quite literally, a request for post-conviction relief. Thus, we turn to our rules governing such claims. See id.
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. . . Again, Brunner claimed that new facts justified the vacation of his Class D felony conviction and entry of a judgment of conviction as a Class A misdemeanor in the interests of justice, which is grounds for a petition for post-conviction relief under Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(a)(4). Further, Brunner’s petition is not a motion for relief from judgment under Trial Rule 60(B) because Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b) expressly “comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence and it shall be used exclusively in place of them.” Id. As our Supreme Court has held, “We established the special procedures set out in the Indiana Post-Conviction Rules to facilitate review of criminal convictions and sentences. Criminal defendants may not circumvent these procedures by seeking remedies under the civil law.” Van Meter, 650 N.E.2d at 1138.
Thus, we hold that Brunner’s request was a petition for post-conviction relief under Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(a)(4). Under our post-conviction rules, the State may appeal the post-conviction court’s final judgment to this court. P-C.R. 1(7). As such, we likewise hold that the State’s appeal in the instant case is authorized by law.
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. . . [W]e agree with the State that the court improperly granted Brunner’s petition for relief. Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-7(b), on which the trial court relied in granting Brunner’s request, states: “if a person has committed a Class D felony, the court may enter judgment of conviction of a Class A misdemeanor and sentence accordingly.” Applying that statute to these facts is a question of first impression and requires us to divine the intent of the legislature. . . .
We hold that, in granting authority to our trial courts to reduce Class D felony convictions to Class A misdemeanors, the General Assembly intended to limit the application of that authority to the moment the court first enters its judgment of conviction and before the court announces the defendant’s sentence. That intent is made clear in the language of the statute itself, which describes a timeframe after the finding of a Class D felony but before the entry of sentence. See I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). That intent is also supported by the differences in sentences available to persons convicted of Class D felonies and those convicted of Class A misdemeanors. Compare I.C. § 35-50-2-7(a) (stating that a person convicted of a Class D felony “shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six (6) months and three (3) years, with the advisory sentence being one and one-half (1½) years”) with I.C. § 35-50-3-2 (stating that a person convicted of a Class A misdemeanor “shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than one (1) year”). Of course, the sentence a defendant receives is dependent on the class of his criminal conviction. And the trial court must designate the crime before it can enter an appropriate sentence.
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Section 35-38-1-1.5 confirms our reading of Section 35-50-2-7(b). Again, the trial court’s decision on whether to enter judgment on a Class D felony or a Class A misdemeanor—or, since 2003, a conditional Class D felony—may be made only at the moment of the original entry of the judgment of conviction. That did not happen here. Instead, more than nine years after the trial court entered its judgment of conviction against Brunner as a Class D felony, the trial court revisited that issue, vacated the Class D felony conviction, and imposed a Class A misdemeanor conviction. The trial court’s reliance on Section 35-50-2-7(b) to grant the requested relief was contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and an abuse of discretion.
Thus, we hold that the trial court erred in granting Brunner’s petition for post-conviction relief. We reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to reinstate the original judgment of conviction.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
BAKER, C.J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.