BRADFORD, J.
The Association argues that the trial court properly dismissed Droscha’s action against it because it has arbitral immunity. In support of this proposition the Association points to federal authority recognizing such immunity, including Olson v. Nat. Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 85 F.3d 381 (8th Cir. 1996). In recognizing arbitral immunity for both arbitrators and organizations which sponsor arbitrations, the Olson court observed that an arbitrator’s role is “functionally equivalent to a judge’s role,” and that federal courts of appeals have uniformly extended judicial and quasi-judicial immunity to arbitrators. Id. at 382; see Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 780-81 (7th Cir. 1977). According to the Olson court, arbitral immunity, like judicial and quasi-judicial immunity, is necessary to protect decisionmakers from undue influence, and the decision-making process from attack by dissatisfied litigants. 85 F.3d at 382. As the Olson court further observed, federal courts agree that, in order to give effect to these underlying policies, it is necessary for arbitral immunity to extend beyond arbitrators themselves to organizations that sponsor arbitrations. Id. Indeed, “[w]ithout this extension, arbitral immunity would be almost meaningless because liability would simply be shifted from the individual arbitrators to the sponsoring organizations.” Id. at 383. Based upon the federal scheme, arbitral immunity protects all acts within the scope of the arbitral process. Id.
While judicial and/or quasi-judicial immunity in Indiana has not previously been extended to arbitrators and their sponsors, we see no reason why it should not be. It is well-settled that judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for all actions taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, unless those actions are taken in the complete absence of any jurisdiction. Mendenhall v. City of Indpls., 717 N.E.2d 1218, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. The underlying purpose of the immunity is to preserve judicial independence in the decision-making process. Id. The same policies that underlie the grant of absolute judicial immunity to judges justify the grant of immunity to non-judicial officers who perform quasi-judicial functions. Id. Absolute judicial immunity therefore extends to persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune. Id. In determining whether a person is entitled to the benefit of judicial immunity, we use the functional approach established by the United States Supreme Court and look to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the person who performed it. Id.
Here, there is no dispute that the Association established the panel of arbitrators. There is similarly no dispute that the basis for Droscha’s claim relates to the Association’s appointment of a panel and the panel’s performance of its official decision-making function in addressing Droscha’s fees dispute with Shepherd. [Footnote omitted.] Droscha’s claims are ultimately challenges to the Association’s decision-making function with respect to the overall arbitration process and are therefore akin to judicial or quasi-judicial functions subject to immunity. Significantly, Droscha’s claim seeks to vacate the arbitration panel’s award, a cognizable means of redress which can be achieved through his action against Shepherd alone. While Droscha seeks also to “chastise” and instruct the Association, this remedy is presumably inherent in any vacation of the award, the means of redress Droscha already seeks. See Olson, 85 F.3d at 383 (observing that arbitral immunity against claim for alleged appointment of possibly biased arbitrator did not leave the plaintiff without redress in light of remedy that arbitration decision could be vacated). Given the decision-making function at issue and the availability of alternative means of redress, we conclude that Droscha’s claim is akin to an attack on a decision-making body’s judicial or quasi-judicial function, for which Indiana law traditionally recognizes immunity. Accordingly, we follow Olson in observing arbitral immunity in the instant case. The trial court did not err in dismissing Droscha’s claim against the Association on Rule 12(B)(6) grounds.
RILEY, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.