BAKER, C.J.
Here, the defendant is undisputedly mentally ill and mentally disabled to an extent that he is incompetent to stand trial. It is likewise undisputed—and the trial court found—that he will never recover and become competent. Under these circumstances, we find that it was a violation of his right to due process to deny his motion to dismiss the criminal charges pending against him.
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It is undisputed in the record that Curtis is incompetent to stand trial. It is also undisputed that he will never become competent, and the trial court found as much. Appellant’s App. p. 86. The trial court elected not to order Curtis committed to the State Department of Mental Health and Addictions because it found that the community is safe from Curtis while he resides in the nursing home, which is “better suited to manage the care of the defendant with terminal dementia” than a state hospital would be, and also because “the cost for [] Curtis’ care at a nursing home is less than the cost to the State of Indiana if Curtis[] [were] in the state hospital.” Id.
While we do not fault the trial court for this pragmatic approach, the rationale for declining to commit Curtis to a state hospital does not apply equally to the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to dismiss the charging information. Although our Supreme Court’s holding in Davis was partially premised on the defendant’s confinement, the court also made it plain that the mere act of “holding criminal charges indefinitely over the head of one who will never have a chance to prove his innocence,” Davis, 898 N.E.2d at 287 (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 740 (1972)), is a violation of the defendant’s due process rights. As in Davis, the indefinite prolonging of criminal charges carries the very real likelihood that Curtis would be subjected to the anxiety and scorn accompanying public accusation. 898 N.E.2d at 290.
Inasmuch as it is undisputed that Curtis is mentally ill, mentally disabled, incompetent to stand trial, and will remain incompetent for the rest of his life, we find that it is a violation of his right to due process to permit these criminal charges hanging over his head for the rest of his life. Cf. State v. Jones, 918 N.E.2d 436 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (reversing in part where trial court dismissed criminal charges pending against criminal defendant because defendant had not yet been confined longer than his maximum possible sentence, with no discussion regarding the likelihood that he could become competent in the future); Habibzadah v. State, 904 N.E.2d 367, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss because he had not been confined for longer than his maximum possible sentence and it was possible that he would be restored to competency), trans. denied. Therefore, we find that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss and discharge.
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The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the charging information.
NAJAM, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.