ROBB, J.
The City of Indianapolis appeals the trial court’s nunc pro tunc order granting plaintiff Cynthia Hicks’s motion to correct error and reinstating Hicks’s negligence suit brought against the City on behalf of her minor child. The City raises three issues for our review, which we restate as: 1) whether an initial order granting Hicks’s motion to correct error was invalid for being signed only by a magistrate; 2) whether the trial court properly used a later nunc pro tunc order to retroactively sign and grant Hicks’s motion to correct error; and 3) whether the grant of Hicks’s motion to correct error was, on its merits relative to the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”), an abuse of discretion. We conclude the City waived any challenge based on the magistrate’s lack of authority by failing to object until after time for ruling on the motion to correct error expired, and waiver notwithstanding, the trial court’s chronological case summary (“CCS”) entries provided a sufficient basis to later issue its nunc pro tunc order granting Hicks’s motion to correct error. Further concluding the grant of the motion to correct error was not an abuse of discretion because the City failed to show noncompliance with the tort claim notice requirements of the ITCA, we affirm.
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Here, the City eventually called the trial court’s attention to the defect of the October 8, 2009 order being signed only by Magistrate Caudill, but did not do so until well after the deadline for ruling on Hicks’s motion to correct error had expired. Thus, not only did the City fail to challenge at the first instance an irregularity apparent on the face of the order,5 it also failed to raise the issue until a point when the trial court could no longer correct the error by issuing an amended order bearing the trial judge’s signature. We conclude the City’s failure to timely object waived any challenge based on Magistrate Caudill’s lack of authority. However, even if the issue had not been waived, for the reasons explained below, we find no error in the trial court’s use of a nunc pro tunc order to complete the record and show that Judge Hanley did in fact timely approve and adopt Magistrate Caudill’s recommended grant of Hicks’s motion to correct error.
The trial court issued its January 22, 2010 nunc pro tunc order to remedy the defect in the October 8, 2009 order by placing Judge Hanley’s signature and approval on the grant of Hicks’s motion to correct error “as of October 8, 2009.” Appellant’s App. at 13. However, the City argues the trial court was without authority to issue such an order nunc pro tunc and specifically argues there is no written memorial indicating the court adopted Magistrate Caudill’s recommendation within the time limit for ruling on Hicks’s motion to correct error. We disagree.
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. . . [T]o provide a sufficient basis for the trial court’s nunc pro tunc entry, there must be a written memorial showing that Judge Hanley actually did approve Magistrate Caudill’s recommendation before time for ruling on the motion to correct error expired. Such evidence is provided by the CCS entries for October 8, 2009 stating:
Court approves granting Plaintiff’s motion to correct error and denying Defendant’s City of Indianapolis, motion to dismiss.
Jacket entry: Plaintiff’s motion to correct error granted. See entry.
Appellant’s App. at 9. The CCS meets the general requirements for a valid memorial, in that it is found in the records of the case, is required by the trial rules to be kept, shows actions taken by the trial court, and its entries presumably exist contemporaneously with the actions they describe. See Ind. Trial Rule 77(B) (CCS is “an official record of the trial court”); Cotton, 658 N.E.2d at 900 (sequential ordering of CCS entries “ordinarily reflects the actual point at which the entries . . . were made”).
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However, the City argues the CCS entries are not sufficient evidence, as “there is no signature by the trial judge, no judge’s notes, and no judge’s initials on the order or the jacket entry to support an entry on the CCS that the trial court approved the October 8, 2009 order.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6. Initially, we note that the statute requiring the trial court to enter a final order upon reviewing a magistrate’s findings and recommendations does not prescribe any particular method, such as signatures, notes, or initials, by which the trial judge must enter his or her approval. See Ind. Code § 33-23-5-9(a). In addition, it is well settled that the trial court speaks through its CCS or docket, Young v. State, 765 N.E.2d 673, 678 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), and this court is limited in its authority to look behind the CCS to examine whether an event recorded therein actually occurred, see Trojnar v. Trojnar, 698 N.E.2d 301, 304 (Ind. 1998) (in context of Trial Rule 72, “a proper Clerk’s notation on the CCS will presumptively establish the fact that notice was mailed”); Minnick v. Minnick, 663 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (“A challenge to the mailing of notice is precluded when the docket clearly states that notice was mailed.”).
As nothing in the record specifically contradicts the trial court’s October 8, 2009 statements in the CCS that the court approved granting Hicks’s motion to correct error, we conclude these entries are a sufficient written memorial that Judge Hanley timely approved Magistrate Caudill’s recommendation. . . .
In light of the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not err by using a nunc pro tunc order to complete the record and retroactively sign and grant Hicks’s motion to correct error. We therefore address the City’s argument that the grant of the motion to correct error, by reversing the previous dismissal of Hicks’s negligence suit brought on behalf of her daughter, was on its merits an abuse of discretion.
The City argues the trial court’s ruling on the merits was an abuse of discretion because the trial court’s original dismissal of the case was correct. In so arguing, the City relies on the tort claim notice requirement of the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) . . . . The exception in Indiana Code section 34-13-3-9 provides: “If a person is incapacitated and cannot give notice as required in section . . . 8 of this chapter, the person’s claim is barred unless notice is filed within one hundred eighty (180) days after the incapacity is removed.” The City argues, and Hicks does not dispute, that because Hicks did not file a tort claim notice with the City until October 17, 2006, well more than one hundred eighty days after the March 3, 2005 incident, Hicks did not satisfy the general tort claim notice rule with respect to the City. However, Hicks argues her daughter’s claim is saved by the tolling rule of section 34-13-3-9, due to her daughter’s status as a minor.
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The City waived any challenge based on the magistrate’s lack of authority to grant Hicks’s motion to correct error by failing to object until after time for ruling on the motion expired. Waiver notwithstanding, the trial court properly used a nunc pro tunc order to grant Hicks’s motion to correct error, as the CCS provides a sufficient written memorial indicating the trial court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation within the required time. On its merits, the trial court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion because the City failed to show that Hicks’s tort claim on behalf of her daughter is barred by ITCA.
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.