KIRSCH, J.
The Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“the BMV”) appeals the trial court’s order reinstating the driving privileges of Seth McNeil (“McNeil”), which had been suspended for ten years after McNeil was determined to be a habitual traffic violator (“HTV”). The BMV raises the following issue: whether the trial court erred when it interpreted Indiana Code section 34-11-2-4(3) to impose a statute of limitations on the BMV’s ability to impose an administrative suspension.
We reverse.
. . . .
Here, on June 14, 2006, McNeil was convicted of operating while intoxicated, which made him an HTV under Indiana Code section 9-30-10-4, because it was his third qualifying conviction within a ten-year period. He had previously been convicted of operating while intoxicated on June 30, 1999 and reckless driving on February 12, 2003. As a result of meeting the requirements of section 9-30-10-4, McNeil’s driving privileges were to be suspended for ten years under Indiana Code section 9-30-10-5. The BMV was sent an SR-16 form on June 15, 2006, notifying it that McNeil qualified as an HTV, but did not determine McNeil to be an HTV until June 17, 2008, when it sent him notification that his driving privileges would be suspended for ten years beginning on July 22, 2008. Because more than two years had elapsed from the date of McNeil’s conviction and the BMV’s determination of his status as an HTV, the trial court, applying the statute of limitations under Indiana Code section 34-11-2-4, found that the BMV’s determination occurred after the limitations period had run.
It is the substance of the claim, rather than its form, which determines the applicable statute of limitations. Cooper Indus., LLC v. City of South Bend, 899 N.E.2d 1274, 1284 (Ind. 2009). “The revocation of a respondent’s driver’s license pursuant to the Habitual Traffic Offenders Act is neither a criminal proceeding which imposes fine or punishment, nor is it a civil proceeding where the party aggrieved by the respondent’s actions (the public) can recover legal damages, but rather it is a civil proceeding which is quasi-administrative in nature.” Owens v. State ex rel. VanNatta, 178 Ind. App. 406, 409, 382 N.E.2d 1312, 1314 (1978). Indiana Code section 34-11-2-4 states, “An action for: (1) injury to person or character; (2) injury to personal property; or (3) a forfeiture of penalty given by statute must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues.” The BMV’s claim against McNeil was not for injury to person or character or injury to personal property; rather, McNeil contends that it was for a forfeiture of penalty given by statute.
McNeil claims that Indiana Code section 34-11-2-4(3) applies because the notice provision for the suspension of driving privileges after being determined to be an HTV is contained in Article 30 of the Indiana Code, entitled “General Penalty Provisions.” Initially, we note that:
The headings of titles, articles, and chapters as they appear in the Indiana Code, as originally enacted or added by amendment, are not part of the law and may be altered by the lawful compilers, in any official publication, to more clearly indicate content. These descriptive headings are intended for organizational purposes only and are not intended to affect the meaning, application or construction of the statute they precede.
Ind. Code § 1-1-1-5(f). Therefore, the title of the article does not automatically govern the content and application of the law contained thereunder.
Further, “[t]he ten year suspension for a violation of the Habitual Traffic Offenders Act is a protective device, not a punitive one.” Owens, 178 Ind. App. at 413, 382 N.E.2d at 1317. The primary purpose of suspending a person’s license for being an HTV is “to remove from the highway those drivers who have proven themselves to be unfit to drive, and who pose a substantial threat to the safety of others” and “not to impose punishment.” Owens, 178 Ind. App. at 413, 382 N.E.2d at 1316. Therefore, although the heading of the article is entitled “General Penalty Provisions,” we conclude that the determination of HTV status and the suspension of one’s driving privileges by the BMV is not an action for “a forfeiture of penalty given by statute,” and the two-year statute of limitations under Indiana Code section 34-11-2-4 does not apply. While McNeil raises several policy issues in support of a statute of limitations for determinations made by the BMV, we note that this is for the General Assembly to decide and they have not deemed to do so thus far. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order reinstating McNeil’s driving privileges.
Reversed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and ROBB, J., concur.