BARNES, J.
The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) and H.L.W., Sr. (“Father”) appeal the trial court’s granting of an adoption petition filed by L.M.D. and D.P.D. (“Foster Parents”) regarding H.L.W., Jr. (“Child”). We reverse.
DCS raises several issues, which we consolidate and restate as:
I. whether the trial court had jurisdiction to grant the adoption petition after the trial court also approved a CHINS permanency plan for reunification of Child with Father;
II. whether the trial court erred when it found that DCS was not acting in Child’s best interest when it withheld consent to the adoption; and
III. whether the trial court erred when it found that Father’s consent to the adoption was unnecessary because he failed to pay child support to DCS on behalf of Child for one year.
. . . .
. . . Given our supreme court’s holding in K.S., DCS’s arguments are more accurately described as a “legal error” rather than a jurisdictional error.
. . . .
Here, we are again tasked with harmonizing the statutes and appellate opinions regarding simultaneous CHINS and adoption proceedings. Although our supreme court held in T.B. that courts may simultaneously consider CHINS and adoption revocation proceedings, E.B. holds that courts cannot simultaneously consider CHINS and adoption proceedings. Some of T.B. and E.B.’s progeny hold that CHINS proceedings and adoption proceedings may be considered simultaneously if the goals of the proceedings are the same. Here, the goal of the CHINS action was reunification of Child with Father while the goal of the adoption proceeding was adoption of Child by Foster Parents. Thus, the goals of the proceedings were not the same. However, we conclude that the statutory analysis found in Infant Girl W. is more persuasive and compatible with our supreme court’s opinion in T.B. As in Infant Girl W., we are persuaded that the consent statutes, found at Indiana Code Chapter 31-19-9, enabled the trial court to consider the adoption proceeding despite the pending CHINS action.
DCS points out that the results here – the trial court approving a CHINS permanency plan of reunification with Father but also granting Foster Parents’ petition to adopt Child – appear inconsistent. We conclude that the CHINS plan of reunification is relevant in determining whether DCS’s refusal to consent to the adoption was reasonable. Any inconsistency in the proceedings can be resolved by consideration of whether the trial court’s rulings regarding consent to the adoption were proper.
. . . .
DCS refused to consent to Foster Parents’ adoption of Child. However, the trial court found that DCS’s consent was not required because DCS was not acting in Child’s best interest by withholding consent. . . . On appeal, DCS argues that the trial court applied the wrong standard by requiring DCS to show that the Foster Parents were “not fit.” Id. We agree with DCS.
The standard here is not whether DCS proved the Foster Parents unfit. Rather, the standard is whether DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that its withholding of 17
consent to the adoption was in Child’s best interests. On that issue, the trial court found that DCS proved only “father had (reluctantly) complied [with] most of the requirements of the CHINS dispositional decree and because the child would be with family. Mere biological relationship is not sufficient to support the burden of proof which the DCS must meet.” Id.
Although evidence of a mere biological relationship may be insufficient to meet DCS’s burden, our review of the record reveals that DCS and Father presented significantly more evidence than just a biological relationship. . . .
Here, DCS and Father presented evidence that, although Father was initially resistant to comply with the DCS’s requirements and had one positive drug test, he eventually began complying with DCS’s requirements and participated in services. He found appropriate housing, completed drug and alcohol treatment, participated in parenting education, complied with visitations, completed a psychological and parenting assessment, and maintained contact with his DCS family case manager. His visitations with Child increased from supervised to unsupervised and, by early 2009, Father had unsupervised visitation with Child each week from Saturday through Tuesday. The CHINS plan recommended by DCS was reunification of Child with Father, and the trial court approved that plan in both March 2008 and March 2009. At the adoption hearings in August 2009, DCS noted that Father and Child are bonded. In fact, Child was often upset when he had to leave Father’s residence. The DCS family case manager testified that Father had a long history of supervised and unsupervised visitation leading up to the current overnight visitations. She had no concerns for “the child’s safety and wellbeing” in Father’s care. Tr. p. 218.
Here, Father substantially complied with DCS’s requirements to gain custody of his child. Child was living with him for a significant portion of each week, and the CHINS case was progressing toward Father having full-time custody. The trial court had repeatedly approved DCS’s proposed permanency plan of reunification with Father. Despite Father’s progress and DCS’s efforts, the trial court granted Foster Parents’ petition to adopt Child. Under these circumstances, we conclude that DCS met its burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that its withholding of consent to the adoption was in Child’s best interests. The trial court’s finding to the contrary is clearly erroneous.
Because DCS was Child’s legal custodian, its consent to the adoption was required. I.C. § 31-19-9-1(a)(4). DCS did not consent to the adoption and its withholding of consent to the adoption was in Child’s best interests. Given the evidence presented at the adoption hearings, we conclude that DCS met its burden of proof. As a result, we must reverse the trial court’s grant of Foster Parents’ petition to adopt Child.
We conclude that the trial court had the ability to consider simultaneously both the CHINS action and the Foster Parents’ petition to adopt Child. However, we conclude that the trial court erred when it determined that DCS’s withholding of consent to the adoption was not in Child’s best interest. Because we reverse based upon DCS’s lack of consent to the adoption, we need not determine whether the trial court erred when it found that Father’s consent to the adoption was unnecessary. We reverse the trial court’s grant of Foster Parents’ petition to adopt Child. Reversed.
BAILEY, J., and MAY, J., concur.