NAJAM, J.
. . . Count 4 of the State’s charging information alleged that “Williams, while within 1000 feet of a public park . . . did knowingly or intentionally possess Vicodin ES listed in Schedule III . . . .” Appellant’s App. at 15. And Count 5 of the State’s charging information alleged that “Williams, while within 1000 feet of a public park . . . did knowingly or intentionally possess Anexsia listed in Schedule III . . . .” Id. at 16.
During the trial, the State introduced evidence seized from Williams’s house, pursuant to the State’s search warrant, which showed that Williams had Vicodin and Anexsia in his possession inside his house. The State’s forensic expert testified that she tested the two Vicodin pills and the seven Anexsia pills separately. For both sets of tests, she determined that the pills each contained dihydrocodeinone and acetaminophen. She then testified that “[d]ihydrocodeinone is a controlled substance in Schedule III.” Transcript at 382-83; see I.C. § 35-48-2-8(e)(4). The forensic expert did not testify as to the respective concentrations of dihydrocodeinone in Vicodin and Anexsia, [footnote omitted] and neither “Vicodin” nor “Anexsia” appears in Schedule III. See I.C. § 35-48-2-8.
There is no dispute on appeal that, since the State charged Williams twice under the same statute, the statutory elements of those two offenses are identical. The parties also do not dispute that the jury used the same evidence to establish each element of Count 4 with the corresponding element of Count 5, with the exception of the “controlled substance” element. Thus, the only dispute on appeal is whether the State used the same evidence to twice show a Schedule III controlled substance. We hold that it did.
Again, it is a crime in Indiana to, “without a valid prescription . . . , knowingly or intentionally possess[] a controlled substance . . . classified in schedule I, II, III, or IV . . . .” I.C. § 35-48-4-7(a). The amount of the controlled substance that is possessed is not an element of that crime; rather, the offense is committed by mere possession of a controlled substance. Here, the controlled substance Williams possessed was dihydrocodeinone. It was not “Vicodin” or “Anexsia.” That Williams possessed dihydrocodeinone in one pill or nine, or under one brand name or two, is irrelevant to the question of whether he possessed dihydrocodeinone. Further, there is no dispute that Williams possessed dihydrocodeinone in one place and at one time. That is one crime.
Hence, the actual evidence presented at trial demonstrates that Count 4 and Count 5 were not established by separate and distinct facts. Rather, the State relied on the same evidence to establish both of its allegations that Williams had illegally possessed a controlled substance. As such, Williams has demonstrated more than “a reasonable possibility” that the evidentiary facts used by the jury to establish all of the essential elements of one offense were also used to establish all of the essential elements of the other offense, because the exact same facts were used against Williams on both charges. See Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 53. Thus, by entering convictions on both of the State’s Class C felony possession charges, the trial court impermissibly punished Williams twice for the same offense. We, therefore, vacate his conviction and sentence under Count 4 of the State’s charging information. [Footnote omitted.]
BROWN, J., concurs.
VAIDIK, J., concurs in result with separate opinion on another issue.