BROWN, J.
M.M. (“Grandfather”) appeals the denial of his uncontested petition to adopt A.M., Grandfather’s biological granddaughter. Grandfather raises one issue, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court erred in denying Grandfather’s uncontested petition to adopt A.M. We reverse and remand.
. . . .
. . . Grandfather is the biological grandfather of A.M. We also observe that the record reveals that, while Mother and Grandfather are not living together, they live only fifteen minutes apart, and that A.M. stays overnight with Grandfather almost every weekend and that Grandfather has contact with A.M. about three or four times a week. Grandfather takes A.M. to church, dance class, and the park. Grandfather provides discipline and financial support. In summary, the record reveals that Grandfather and Mother are both acting as parents.
Based upon the reasoning in K.S.P., the idea that the best interests of the child is the primary concern in an adoption proceeding, the purposes of the adoption statutes as stated by the legislature, and the trial court’s initial determination that adoption was in the best interests of A.M., we conclude that preventing the adoption in this specific case on the basis of Ind. Code § 31-19-15-1 and Ind. Code § 31-19-15-2 would cause an absurd result not intended by the legislature. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Grandfather’s uncontested petition to adopt A.M. and reverse the trial court’s denial of Grandfather’s petition to adopt A.M. and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, we instruct the trial court to insure that all statutory requirements for adoption are met.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Grandfather’s uncontested petition to adopt A.M.
Reversed and remanded.
VAIDIK, J. concurs.
NAJAM, J., dissents with separate opinion.
NAJAM, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Modification of the Indiana adoption statutes requires legislative action. There is no statutory authority for a biological parent to maintain her parental rights after the adoption by a grandparent. It is beyond the authority of the trial court or this court to grant such relief. The trial court should be affirmed.
In its initial decree of adoption, the trial court stated that “[Mother] is not divested of her maternal rights due to the fact that she and [Grandfather] are not married.” The court subsequently vacated the decree concluding that it was “entered in error.” In its final order denying the adoption, the court noted that “Mother’s consent to the adoption is contingent on maintaining her parental rights,” and held correctly that, “Indeed, IC 31-19-15-1 appears to preclude this outcome.”
. . . .
The divesting provision of Indiana Code Section 31-19-15-1 applies here. There is no grandparent exception to divestiture. The terms and conditions of adoption represent policy decisions vested in the legislature. Infant Girl W., 845 N.E.2d at 251 (Najam, J., dissenting). It is the legislature’s prerogative to establish what policies are to be furthered under the adoption statutes, including whether an unmarried couple may adopt. Id.
The record clearly supports the conclusion that Grandfather’s adoption would be in the best interest of the child and that Grandfather is ready, willing and able to assume the responsibilities of a parent. But that is not the question presented. The proposed adoption is simply not authorized by statute and should, therefore, be disapproved.