CRONE, J.
Crisis Connection, Inc., is a nonprofit organization that provides services, including counseling, to victims of domestic violence and sexual assault. In connection with a criminal case in which Ronald Keith Fromme is the defendant, Crisis Connection was ordered to produce records to the court for an in camera review. Crisis Connection appeals, requiring us, as a matter of first impression, to interpret Indiana’s victim-advocate privilege and to determine whether it must be limited by a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights. Concluding that an in camera review properly balances Fromme’s constitutional rights and the victims’ interest in privacy, we affirm.
. . . .
Fromme has been charged with two counts of class A felony child molesting. Fromme served a subpoena duces tecum on Crisis Connection, seeking all records relating to the alleged victims, M.Y. and D.Y., and their mother. On February 28, 2008, Crisis Connection moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the records sought are privileged. See Ind. Code § 35-37-6-9 (victim-advocate privilege). [Footnote omitted.]
On August 4, 2008, Fromme filed a motion to compel Crisis Connection to produce the records. On August 14, 2008, the trial court held a hearing on the motion and ordered the parties to file responses. On December 22, 2008, Fromme filed a renewed motion to compel, and thereafter, both parties filed their responses. Another hearing was held, and on May 27, 2009, the trial court granted Fromme’s motions in part:
1. Defendant’s above motions shall be granted as to information requested regarding any reports made to Crisis Connection by or on behalf of [redacted], subject to the restrictions below, and shall be denied as to Defendant’s request regarding similar information regarding [redacted].
2. The response of Crisis Connection shall be delivered to the Court, and the Court shall review said records to determine the relevance of any such records. The Court will then inform the parties of its decision.
3. In finding as above, the Court has determined that the items being sought are sufficiently identified, may be essential for the Defendant in determining the credibility of the complaining witnesses, and may be material to the Defendant‘s defense.
. . . .
Indiana Code § 35-37-6-9 provides, in relevant part:
(a) The following persons or entities may not be compelled to give testimony, to produce records, or to disclose any information concerning confidential communications and confidential information to anyone or in any judicial, legislative, or administrative proceeding:
(1) A victim.
(2) A victim advocate or victim service provider unless the victim specifically consents to the disclosure in a written authorization that contains the date the consent expires.
(b) A victim advocate, victim service provider, or victim may not be compelled to provide testimony in any judicial, legislative, or administrative proceeding that would identify the name, address, location, or telephone number of any facility that provided temporary emergency shelter to the victim of the offense or transaction that is the subject of the proceeding unless the facility is a party to the proceeding.
. . . .
Fromme argues that our decisions apply a three-step analysis to determine whether information is discoverable in a criminal case, regardless of whether that information is privileged. See Williams v. State, 819 N.E.2d 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Williams was charged with committing rape and criminal deviate conduct against K.W.M. Williams sought K.W.M.’s prescription records from Walgreens, which are confidential pursuant to Indiana Code § 25-26-13-15.14 The trial court denied Williams’ discovery motion. On interlocutory appeal, we outlined a three-step analysis for determining whether information is discoverable in a criminal case:
(1) there must be a sufficient designation of the items sought to be discovered (particularity); (2) the items requested must be material to the defense (relevance); and (3) if the particularity and materiality requirements are met, the trial court must grant the request unless there is a showing of “paramount interest” in non-disclosure.
Williams, 819 N.E.2d at 385 (quoting In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d [1,] at 6 [Ind. 1998]).
. . . .
The State has a strong interest in fostering the relationship between victims and advocates, and we do not doubt that confidentiality is important to that relationship. However, the scope of the victim-advocate privilege is far broader than other privileges founded on similar concerns. The psychologist-patient privilege, for example, is subject to several exceptions, including “[t]rials for homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or immediate circumstances of said homicide,” and “[c]ircumstances under which privileged communication is abrogated under the laws of Indiana,” which would include the constitution. Ind. Code § 25-33-1-17. See also Ind. Code § 25-23.6-6-1 (matters communicated to social workers acting as marriage or family counselors are privileged, subject to similar exceptions). In addition, the victim-advocate privilege applies not only to counselors, but also to volunteers acting in any capacity and participants in support groups, making it broader than even the so-called “absolute” privileges that received judicial approval in Colorado, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-22.15; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5945.1. Indiana’s victim-advocate privilege would seemingly apply even if a complainant flatly told a person volunteering in some nominal capacity that she had fabricated the allegations. The policy behind the victim-advocate privilege does not support such an illogical result.
While the State undoubtedly has an important interest in protecting the victim-advocate relationship, a defendant‘s rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment are also of great importance. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713 (“We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.”). The need to discover exculpatory evidence and effectively cross-examine witnesses is especially apparent in sex offense cases, which often hinge on witness credibility and which carry heavy potential penalties. The State clearly has a constitutional obligation to turn over to defendants material exculpatory evidence in its possession. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). There is no Brady violation here, because the information Fromme seeks has never been in the State’s possession. Williams v. State, 808 N.E.2d 652, 665 (Ind. 2004). Nevertheless, the State has, by statute, prevented Fromme from receiving potentially exculpatory information by making certain evidence categorically unavailable to him. We cannot agree that because the State has made the information equally unavailable to itself that it has avoided conflict with the defendant’s constitutional rights. [Footnote omitted.]
When a defendant’s constitutional rights are implicated, the legislature cannot shield potentially exculpatory evidence from all judicial scrutiny. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706 (holding that the president’s need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, could not “sustain an absolute, unqualified . . . privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances”). While we acknowledge that the three-step test has not always been applied to privileged information, we now conclude that it provides a useful framework for balancing the victim’s interest in privacy with a defendant’s constitutional rights. Even though Crisis Connection disputes that the three-step test is applicable in this case, it acknowledges that we have generally employed some sort of balancing test when applying privileges. See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 13 (“’In analyzing the nature and scope of any statutorily created privilege, the first step is to determine the specific interest or relationship that the privilege seeks to foster. Only by doing this can a specific claim of privilege be evaluated against the principle that the public is entitled to every person’s evidence.’”) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co., 381 N.E.2d 897, 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978)).
In Fromme’s case, the trial court has already found that Fromme has met the particularity and materiality criteria, and Crisis Connection has not disputed those findings. The interest in privacy asserted by Crisis Connection, while important, is not strong enough to bar an in camera review of its records. Requiring defendants to meet the three-step test before obtaining an in camera review creates the proper balance between a criminal defendant‘s constitutional rights and an alleged victim’s need for privacy. This approach is consistent with our decisions addressing other privileges and with the better-reasoned opinions of other jurisdictions. Therefore, we affirm the trial court‘s order.
BAKER, C.J., and DARDEN, J., concur.