DICKSON, J.
In this action for damages the plaintiffs allege that Deputy Brad Craven of the Cass County Sheriff’s Department discharged his taser gun into Richard Patrick Wilson three times, two of which occurred after Wilson was laying immobile on the ground. Seeking immunities under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, the defendants obtained summary judgment from the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment for the Deputy, but reversed summary judgment as to the Sheriff. Wilson v. Isaacs, 917 N.E.2d 1251, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Both defendants sought transfer, challenging the partial reversal of summary judgment. We hold that a law enforcement officer’s use of force in excess of the reasonable force authorized by statute is not shielded from liability under the “enforcement of a law” immunity provided in Indiana Code § 34-13-3-3(8) and that genuine issues of fact exist, precluding summary judgment.
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The parties do not dispute that there are contested issues of fact regarding whether the deputy’s actions constituted or exceeded reasonable force. The issue is instead whether the law enforcement immunity is available to shield the government from liability for such claims. . . .
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The resolution of this question is guided by our unanimous opinion in Patrick v. Miresso, 848 N.E.2d 1083 (Ind. 2006). Miresso did not involve a claim of excessive police force but the analogous claim of an officer’s negligent operation of a police vehicle while pursuing a fleeing suspect. Addressing the impact of Benton upon the availability of the law enforcement immunity, we noted its implicit modification of the public/private duty test but vigorously rejected the claim that Benton operated to expand the availability of the immunity. Id. at 1085–87. We con-cluded by holding that the Indiana Tort Claims Act’s law enforcement immunity “does not shield governmental entities and personnel from liability resulting from a breach of the statutory duty to operate emergency vehicles ‘with due regard for the safety of all persons.'” Id. at 1087 (quoting Ind. Code § 9-21-1-8(d)(1)).
In Miresso, the statutory immunity was construed in conjunction with the statutory requirement that emergency vehicles be operated “with due regard for the safety of all persons.” Ind. Code § 9-21-1-8(d)(1). Noting that statutes in apparent conflict should be construed harmoniously if reasonably possible, we declined to extend the immunity to claims of government negligence in operating emergency vehicles. Analogous to the statutory duty of due regard in the operation of emergency vehicles is the statutory provision authorizing a law enforcement officer’s use of reasonable force but only “if the officer reasonably believes that the force is necessary to effect a lawful arrest.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-3(b). If an officer uses unnecessary or excessive force, the officer may commit the torts of assault and battery. Crawford v. City of Muncie, 655 N.E.2d 614, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied; City of South Bend v. Fleming, 397 N.E.2d 1075, 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979), trans. not sought. As in Miresso, we find that the statutory provision restrains the statutory immunity from erecting a shield to liability for conduct contrary to the statute. Accordingly, the contrary view expressed in City of Anderson is disapproved.
Although we conclude that the law enforcement immunity of the Indiana Tort Claims Act does not shield the government from liability for excessive force by police, there remain genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Deputy Craven’s conduct was reasonable and whether he reasonably believed that the force he used was “necessary to effect a lawful arrest.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-3(b). These factual issues remain for resolution at trial.
We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to the plaintiffs’ liability claims against the Sheriff of Cass County for the conduct of Deputy Craven. As to the plaintiffs’ claims against Deputy Craven personally, we summarily affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming summary judgment.
SULLIVAN, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur. SHEPARD, C.J., dissents without opinion.