VAIDIK, J.
Officers Bockting and Shimp both testified at Stacey’s bench trial, but Ricky [the alleged victim] did not appear. To help establish the identity of the victim, the State introduced a certified Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department “Booking Information” printout containing a mugshot of Ricky along with his name, date of birth, and physical description. Ricky evidently had been arrested in 2005 for an unrelated theft, so the police had his picture and personal information on file. The booking card stated on the bottom that it was “FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT USE ONLY.” State’s Ex. 1. The State asked Officer Shimp if he recognized the person in the 2005 booking photo. Officer Shimp responded, “That’s the male half of the disturbance, Ricky Fowler.” Tr. p. 16. The defense objected to the State’s exhibit. The defense argued that the document was inadmissible hearsay and that its introduction violated Stacey’s constitutional confrontation rights. The trial court admitted the exhibit over objection. The trial court also noted, “State’s Exhibit #1 is cumulative really. . . . The officers have testified credib[ly] that they in fact identified Mr. Fowler by his own [I.D.] They knew who he was. They knew exactly who she allegedly battered. And so, State’s Exhibit #1 is cumulative at best.” Id. at 24.
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The public records [hearsay] exception still excludes investigative police reports when offered against the accused in criminal trials. See id. “[T]he reason for this exclusion is that observations by police officers at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as reliable as observations by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal cases.” S. Rep. No. 93-1277, at 17 (1974).
However, this exclusion does not bar admission of police records pertaining to “routine, ministerial, objective nonevaluative matters made in non-adversarial settings.” 30B Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure § 7049 (Interim ed. 2006). “Due to the lack of any motivation on the part of the recording official to do other than mechanically register an unambiguous factual matter . . . , such records are, like other public documents, inherently reliable.” United States v. Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1985).
Accordingly, courts have held that the public records exception permits admission of police records created in connection with routine booking procedures. . . . .
Here the State used a certified booking information printout to help establish the identity of the victim. Officer Shimp testified that the man pictured on the booking information sheet was the same person who was battered by Stacey in this case. The booking printout identified the man pictured as Ricky Fowler. The document thus constituted hearsay evidence because it was offered for its truth—i.e., to prove that the man in the mugshot was indeed Ricky. The booking card was created by law enforcement, but the biographical information on the printout was obtained and recorded in the course of a ministerial, nonevaluative booking process. In line with the foregoing, we find that the exhibit fell within the ambit of Evidence Rule 803(8) and was not subject to the police reports exclusion.
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The booking information printout introduced in this case was not testimonial evidence within the purview of Crawford. Ricky’s booking card recited biographical and physical identification information obtained solely for custodial purposes. The printout was not created to prove some fact at trial. We thus conclude that the document did not constitute testimonial hearsay, and the introduction of the information did not implicate Stacey’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. See Johnson v. Renico, 314 F. Supp. 2d 700, 707 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
NAJAM, J., and BROWN, J., concur.