BOEHM, J.
Police attempting to execute an arrest warrant broke into the defendant’s home where they did not find their suspect, but happened on evidence of an unrelated crime. The police acted solely on the basis of uncorroborated information from an anonymous source, and without any immediate need to prevent ongoing crime or flight. We hold that the entry into the defendant’s home violated both the federal and state constitutions and the evidence must be suppressed.
On March 23, 2007, officers of the East Chicago Police Department attempted to execute an arrest warrant for Nelson Hernandez, an auto theft suspect. The arrest warrant listed 3902 Butternut as Hernandez’s address. When Officer David Gemeinhart went to that address to serve the warrant, Hernandez’s mother answered the door and told Gemeinhart that Hernandez was staying with her sister (Hernandez’s aunt) in “the Harbor,” a different area of East Chicago. Gemeinhart did not ask for the aunt’s name or address.
That evening, Gemeinhart and Officer Kevin Harretos happened upon Officer Samuel Maldonado at the police station. Maldonado reported that a few days earlier he had dropped Hernandez off in front of an apartment building at 2001 Broadway, which might colloquially be identified as in “the Harbor.” [Footnote omitted.] Maldonado had driven Hernandez home from the hospital after Hernandez had been released in a full leg cast as a result of injuries sustained in an accident that ended a police chase. Maldonado did not explain why he gave Hernandez a ride, but he did say that when he brought Hernandez to the apartment building at 2001 Broadway, an older woman met Hernandez outside the building and helped move his belongings inside.
Sometime after midnight, Maldonado, Gemeinhart, Harretos, and at least two other officers decided to try to serve the warrant at 2001 Broadway. The building housed both apartments and a tavern. The outer door leading to the apartments was locked, and the officers had no information suggesting which apartment within the building might house Hernandez. At some point a man emerged from the building and the officers showed him a picture of Hernandez and asked him if he knew where Hernandez was. The officers provided inconsistent accounts of whether the man came from the apartments or the tavern, what he looked like, and how he answered their questions. According to Harretos, the man came out of the apartment entryway, had long hair, and was large (over six feet tall) and “scruffy looking,” with a beard. Harretos also said that when the officers showed the man a picture of Hernandez, the man stated that he didn’t know the man in the picture but he was staying in an upstairs apartment with a green door. According to Gemeinhart, the unidentified informant came from the door to the tavern, was in his forties or fifties, had a mustache, and was 5’10” or 5’11” tall. Gemeinhart recalled that the man stated that he knew Hernandez and directed the officers to the apartment with the green door, but did not provide the officers with entry to the apartments. According to Maldonado, the unidentified informant came from the tavern and was “neat looking,” in his fifties, and was 5’10” or 5’11” tall. Maldonado said the man opened the outer apartment door for the officers and directed them to the apartment with the green door. The officers all agreed that they did not get the man’s name and did not know where he went after they spoke with him. They also all agreed that the man directed the officers to an upstairs apartment with a green door, and that there was only one apartment with a green door in the building.
The officers knocked on the green door to Luis Duran’s apartment. The officers did not agree on how they announced their presence, whether they stated their purpose, what the occupant’s response was, or how long they knocked on the door. [Footnote omitted.] They all agreed, however, that after knocking for several minutes, and after hearing some noises inside the apartment, they broke down Duran’s door, entered his apartment, and held him at gunpoint.
Hernandez was not in Duran’s apartment, but the officers found a plastic bag containing a “white rock like subject” on the bedroom window sill and what appeared to be narcotics packaging equipment on the dresser. The white substance later tested positive for cocaine. After Duran was placed under arrest, the officers knocked on another door in the apartment building and immediately found and arrested Hernandez.
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The first issue is the requisite quality of information to support entry into a home to execute an arrest warrant without a search warrant. “At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). In recognition of this principle, the police may not enter a home by force to make a “routine” arrest without a warrant. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980). An arrest warrant founded on probable cause gives the police “limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” Id. at 603. The belief is judged on the information available to the officers at the time of entry and need not prove to have been correct in hindsight. United States v. Lovelock, 170 F.3d 339, 343 (2d Cir. 1999). As one leading treatise summarized, it is “generally accepted” that reason to believe “involves something less than” probable cause. [Footnote omitted.] 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.1(a), at 265 (4th ed. 2004).
Because the “reasonable belief” required by Payton requires a lower degree of confirmation than probable cause, some commentators have likened “reasonable belief” to the “reasonable suspicion” necessary for an investigative “Terry stop.” See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); James P. Fleissner, Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey, 47 Mercer L. Rev. 765, 779 (1996); Matthew A. Edwards, Posner’s Pragmatism and Payton Home Arrests, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 299, 364–65 (2002). On the other hand, as a matter of language, more information is required to believe something is true than to suspect it. And, as a matter of policy, entry into a home to execute an arrest warrant without exigent circumstances based on “reasonable belief” may require “something more” than an investigative stop based on “reasonable suspicion.” Immediate execution of a “routine” arrest warrant, i.e., one involving no exigent circumstances, is not ordinarily necessary to prevent future crime. A Terry stop, by contrast, is justified in part by concern that there is ongoing criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (“An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.”). As explained below, we conclude that the information available to the officers here did not satisfy even the least restrictive reasonable suspicion standard. We therefore need not further explore the potential differences in the quality of information available required to meet probable cause, reasonable belief, and reasonable suspicion. For purposes of this opinion, however, we will adopt the terminology of the majority of courts and use “reasonable belief” as the quality of information available required to enter a home to execute an arrest warrant.
The next issue is what the officers must reasonably believe. When the home that officers seek to enter is not that of the subject of the arrest warrant, officers must obtain a search warrant absent exigent circumstances. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 216 (1981). Most jurisdictions require that the police have a reasonable belief that the dwelling is the residence of the subject of the warrant and that the subject is present at the time the officers attempt to enter on authority of an arrest warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1263 (11th Cir. 2000); Lovelock, 170 F.3d at 343; United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 216 (8th Cir. 1996); Harasim v. Kuchar, 702 F. Supp. 178, 182 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
It is well established that a reasonable belief that a suspect lives in an apartment building does not give the police the authority to enter every apartment in that building. Flaherty v. State, 443 N.E.2d 340, 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Thompson v. State, 198 Ind. 496, 497, 154 N.E. 278, 279 (1926). Residents and owners of units in condominium and apartment buildings enjoy the same Fourth Amendment protection as people who live in single-family homes. This is equally true of large complexes and ―very small‖ apartment buildings. The officers therefore required a reasonable belief that Hernandez resided behind the green door, not merely a reasonable belief that he resided somewhere in 2001 Broadway. In view of the hour and Hernandez’s immobilized condition, if the officers’ belief as to Hernandez’s place of residence was reasonable, it was reasonable to believe he was inside. The issue therefore boils down to whether the police reasonably believed that the apartment with the green door was Hernandez’s residence.
Duran argues that even under the more relaxed view of “reasonable belief,” equating it to reasonable suspicion required for a Terry stop, the officers’ entry into his apartment violated the Fourth Amendment. The officers had reason to believe that Hernandez was residing in the apartment building at 2001 Broadway based on Hernandez’s mother’s report that he was living with her sister in that general area, and Maldonado’s having personally dropped Hernandez off with his possessions outside the building a few days earlier and seeing an older woman helping him into the building. Hernandez was on crutches and in a full leg cast, so it was reasonable to believe he had not relocated his residence in the few days since his ride home from the hospital.
Despite their reasonable belief as to Hernandez’s residence in the building, the police here lacked even reasonable suspicion that his residence was behind the green door. An anonymous tip, standing alone, does not justify a Terry stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990); Kellems v. State, 842 N.E.2d 352, 356 (Ind. 2006). The officers had only statements of an unidentified man on the street who may or may not have had any connection to the apartment building. This anonymous informant did not enjoy the credibility that is afforded to one who is identified and is thereby exposed to potential civil or even criminal consequences for false information. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233–34 (1983). In Pawloski v. State, 269 Ind. 350, 354, 380 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (1978), we noted that when a citizen volunteers information to the police, there may be more reason to believe that the information is reliable because informants who come forward voluntarily are ordinarily motivated by good citizenship or a genuine effort to aid law enforcement officers in solving a crime. Id. But the informant here was a person who responded to police questions, not a “cooperative citizen” who volunteered information. Moreover, even information volunteered by a citizen requires some corroboration. Id. at 355, 380 N.E.2d at 1233. In Trimble v. State, 842 N.E.2d 798, 803–804 (Ind. 2006), we noted that corroboration of a concerned citizen’s tip requires consideration of factors such as “whether the citizen has personally witnessed the reported crime,” “whether the police subsequently corroborate details of the citizen’s report,” “whether the citizen has identified herself and thereby subjected herself to civil liability or prosecution for false reporting,” and “the absence of circumstances casting the citizen’s reliability into question.” None of these bolstered the officers’ belief that Hernandez resided in Duran’s apartment. As a result, their entry into the apartment was not authorized by the arrest warrant and violated the Fourth Amendment.
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We have determined that the police did not have a reasonable basis for their suspicion that Hernandez was in Duran’s apartment, and thus the degree of suspicion was not high. At the same time, the degree of intrusion into Duran’s personal space was very high, and the degree of law enforcement needs was low. As such, the officers’ selection of and subsequent forceful entry into Duran’s apartment was unreasonable and violated Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
Dickson, Sullivan, and Rucker, JJ., concur.
SHEPARD, C.J., concurs in result with separate opinion:
My colleagues seem to agree that when the police are told that a suspect has recently moved from his former residence and when the police actually helped him move there, that such information suffices to indicate that the place to which the police moved him and his belongings is the location at which he may be found. Possessing a newly-issued warrant, the police went back to the very small apartment building where the suspect was living. A man whom they encountered out front looked at a photograph of the person for whom the warrant was issued, confirmed that he recognized him, and said he lived upstairs in the apartment with the green door (it turned out that he lived down the hall).
I would say that this is a sufficient basis for a belief that Duran was in the apartment where they attempted to arrest him. I join in reversing because it was not a reasonable basis for doing so in the middle of the night to arrest a relatively immobile suspect.