VAIDIK, J.
Luiz Alves appeals the trial court’s denial of his Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, which was based on newly-discovered evidence and fraud pursuant to subsections (2) and (3). Because Alves filed his Trial Rule 60(B) motion more than one year after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Old National Bank and Alves’ earlier appeal of that judgment does not toll the one-year limit applicable to motions brought pursuant to subsections (1)-(4), we find that Alves’ Trial Rule 60(B) motion is untimely. In any event, even if we consider Alves’ evidence on appeal, it does not show that Old National Bank owed a duty to Alves or that Old National Bank breached a duty by conspiring with Alves’ former business partner to remove Alves from their company. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of Alves’ Trial Rule 60(B) motion.
. . . .
Here, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Old National Bank on October 26, 2007; however, Alves did not file his Trial Rule 60(B) motion pursuant to subsections (2) and (3) until June 26, 2009, which was “more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.” Id. Nevertheless, Alves argues that while he did not file his motion within one year of the trial court’s entry of summary judgment, he did file it within one year of the June 27, 2008, opinion from this Court in his first appeal in this case. See Appellant’s Br. p. 7 (“The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Indiana on June 27, 2008. Alves motion to relief was filed on June 26, 2009, which is less than one year.”).
However, Alves presents no authority that the one-year limit is calculated from the date of any appellate decision or that an appeal extends or tolls the one-year limit applicable to motions filed pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(1)-(4). In fact, Indiana case law provides that the key date is the date that the trial court entered its judgment. See, e.g., Hovey v. Hovey, 902 N.E.2d 896, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) . . . . And although our appellate courts have not appeared to address the issue of whether an appeal extends or tolls the one-year limit, the Seventh Circuit has addressed this issue under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Bershad v. McDonough, 469 F.2d 1333, 1336 (7th Cir. 1972). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c) currently provides, “A motion made under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” In Bershad, the Seventh Circuit held: “A motion under rule 60(b)(1), by the terms of the rule itself, can only be made within one year after the judgment has been entered. . . .” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 is nearly identical to ours, and Indiana courts have looked to federal cases decided under the rule for guidance in the construction of our own rule. See Person v. Person, 563 N.E.2d 161, 163 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied. Therefore, like Federal Rule 60, we hold that an appeal does not extend the one-year limit contained in our Trial Rule 60(B). Because Alves filed his Trial Rule 60(B) motion twenty months after the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Old National Bank, his motion is untimely.
However, even if we were to find Alves’ motion timely, he would still lose on appeal. This is because none of the evidence Alves now relies on (a letter from Teixeira to own his lawyer and letters from Old National Bank to the Small Business Administration) points to a contrary judgment than that reached by the trial court on summary judgment, which was affirmed by this Court on appeal. That is, Alves submitted no evidence that Old National Bank owed a duty to Alves or that Old National Bank breached any duty by conspiring with Teixeira to remove Alves from MEG. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of Alves’ Trial Rule 60(B) motion.
Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and BROWN, J., concur.