BAILEY, J.
Adam Starr (“Starr”) appeals his conviction of Refusal to Identify Self, a Class C misdemeanor,1 presenting the sole issue of whether a vehicular passenger is subject to the same criminal penalties by refusing to identify himself when, unlike the driver of the vehicle, there was no reasonable suspicion that he had committed an infraction or violated an ordinance. We reverse.
. . . .
The next successive statutory provision, Indiana Code Section 34-28-5-3.5, under which Starr was convicted, provides:
A person who knowingly or intentionally refuses to provide either the person’s:
(1) name, address, and date of birth; or
(2) driver’s license, if in the person’s possession;
to a law enforcement officer who has stopped the person for an infraction or ordinance violation commits a Class C misdemeanor.
Starr argues that the Refusal to Identify Self statute may not logically be applied to one who has committed no infraction or violation. In seeking reversal of his conviction, he emphasizes the fact that he was merely a passenger; thus, he lacked personal culpability for a violation related to the operation of the vehicle.
The State responds that Starr was lawfully “stopped” when the vehicle was stopped, and argues that the legislative intent behind the Refusal to Identify Self statute is to encourage full compliance with an officer who has conducted a vehicular stop for an infraction or ordinance violation and has requested information so that the officer can assess the situation and perform his or her duties. We agree with the State that a vehicular stop frequently involves persons other than the driver, and we observe that the Legislature chose to describe the individual subject to the criminal statute by using the term “person” as opposed to “driver.” Thus, it would appear that passengers are not categorically excluded.
The State correctly observes that Starr was “stopped” when his girlfriend’s vehicle was stopped for an illegal turn. See Tawdul v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1211, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that once a police officer effects a lawful traffic stop, the passenger of the vehicle is also validly stopped), trans. denied. Even where a driver is “independently culpable” for a traffic violation, “the police have a limited right to briefly detain a passenger who exits the vehicle after it has been lawfully stopped.” Id. at 1216-17. The passenger may be detained so that the police may “ascertain the situation” and “alleviate any concerns the officer has for his or her safety.” Id. at 1217. If probable cause or reasonable suspicion develops during the short detention, the officer may be justified in detaining the individual longer. Id. In Tawdul, the passenger who had exited the vehicle and refused to comply with an officer’s directive to return to it was properly arrested for resisting law enforcement. Id. Here, however, the alleged criminal conduct with which we are concerned is not forcible resistance but passive refusal to provide verbal or documentary identification during a traffic stop. Certainly, a police officer is free to request identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004). As such, we do not suggest that an officer is constrained to request only the driver’s identification during a traffic stop. In the vast majority of cases, a person will choose to comply when identification is requested. Nonetheless, as a general proposition, “[c]itizens are not required to interact with police officers.” Greeno v. State, 861 N.E.2d 1232, 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000)).
In the context of a traffic stop for a vehicular violation, the Good Faith Belief statute provides for detention of a person who, in the “good faith” belief of the officer, “has committed an infraction or ordinance violation.” [Footnote omitted] Ind. Code § 34-28-5-3. The Refusal to Identify Self statute then criminalizes the refusal to comply with an officer’s lawful request under the statute authorizing detention. In this instance, although Starr was “stopped” when the vehicle in which he was a passenger was “stopped,” there is no showing that Starr was stopped as a consequence of any conduct on his part. There was no reasonable suspicion that he had committed an infraction or ordinance violation, giving rise to an obligation to identify himself upon threat of criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, Starr did not fall within the purview of the Refusal to Identify Self statute. His conviction must be reversed.
MAY, J., and BARNES, J., concur.