BAKER, C.J.
Today we consider the delayed ramifications of a party’s discharge of pollutants onto real property that was once farmland but subsequently became a residential subdivision. While the owner of the subdivision [“KB”] claims that it is entitled to recover damages for negligence, nuisance, and trespass, the defendant-company [“Rockville”] insists that the subdivision’s actions against it are precluded under various theories, including the economic loss doctrine. The trial court sided with the defendant-company. We believe that the owner may proceed on the theory of negligence.
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In resolving this issue, we note that the central theory underlying “economic loss” is that “the law should permit the parties to a transaction to allocate the risk that an item sold or a service performed does not live up to expectations.” Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 150, 151 (Ind. 2005). We agree with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s observation in 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 716 N.W.2d 822, 831 (Wis. 2006), where it noted that the principles underlying application of the economic loss doctrine to tort actions are “(1) to maintain the fundamental distinction between tort law and contract law; (2) protect commercial parties’ freedom to allocate economic risk by contract; and (3) to encourage the party best situated to assess the risk [of] economic loss, the commercial purchaser, to assume, allocate, or insure against that risk.”
In accordance with this doctrine, contract is the sole remedy for the failure of a product or service to perform as expected. Gunkel, 822 N.E.2d at 152. . . .
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In addition, we previously observed in Choung v. Iemma, 708 N.E.2d 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), that if the plaintiff is not seeking damages involving the benefit of the bargain or other matters governed by contract and/or related principles, the economic loss doctrine does not bar a negligence action. For example, the Choung court recognized that the damages to an automobile wrecked by reason of its own bad brakes, as well as damages to other property in the vicinity, are compensable through an action in negligence. Id. at 13. . . . Finally, to recover in negligence there must be a showing of harm above and beyond disappointed expectations. A buyer’s desire to enjoy the benefit of his bargain is not an interest that tort law traditionally protects. Jordan, 532 N.E.2d at 1181.
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In this case, it is undisputed that KB did not contract with Rockville to purchase property or a product. KB did not assert any product liability or comparable claim, and there is no showing that KB is seeking to circumvent any contractual, statutory, or other limits on the nature or scope of its permissible recovery against Rockville. Additionally, the contract claims that KB might assert against Kopetsky—the vendor—are subject to the limitations that applicable contract law might impose, which are not evaded by pleading those claims against KB under a negligence label. In other words, Kopetsky’s breach of warranty that the land was free of hazardous materials does not absolve Rockville of responsibility for its negligent conduct that may have caused the contamination. Similarly, the contract claims that KB has asserted against Patriot—the environmental consultant—have nothing to do with the non-contract claims against Rockville.
In light of these circumstances, we must conclude that the trial court erred in concluding that the economic loss doctrine precludes KB from pursuing its negligence claim against Rockville. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Rockville on KB’s negligence claim against it.
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The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for trial on KB’s negligence claim.
DARDEN, J., and CRONE, J., concur.