MAY, J.
The statute governing modification of juvenile court dispositions, unlike the probation revocation statute we addressed in Weatherly, has no language addressing the evidentiary standard to be applied or any other wording to suggest the hearing is or is not “evidentiary.” It provides only that “[i]f the motion requests . . . modification [other than an emergency change in the child’s residence], the probation officer shall give notice to the persons affected and the juvenile court shall hold a hearing on the question.” Ind. Code § 31-37-22-3(b).
While the statute does not explicitly define the type of hearing required, our consideration of basic due process principles instructs us an evidentiary hearing is required. Our Supreme Court addressed the extent of a juvenile’s constitutional rights in a case involving competency to stand trial:
A juvenile charged with delinquency is entitled to have the court apply those common law jurisprudential principles which experience and reason have shown are necessary to give the accused the essence of a fair trial. Without question, these include the right to adequate notice of the charges, appointment of counsel, the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront opposing witnesses. . . . “[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”. . . Principles of fundamental fairness require that this right [not to be tried unless competent] be afforded in juvenile proceedings.
In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d at 635 (citations omitted). The court ultimately concluded: “The due process clause applies in juvenile proceedings, but a juvenile [court] must respect the informality and flexibility that characterize juvenile proceedings while insuring that such proceedings comport with the fundamental fairness demanded by the due process clause.” Id. at 637 (quoting 47 Am. Jur. 2d Juvenile Courts 6 (1995)). See also J.H. v. State, 857 N.E.2d 429, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing due process right to written notice of the claimed violation of his probation that is sufficiently detailed to allow juvenile to prepare an adequate defense), trans. denied 869 N.E.2d 455 (Ind. 2007).
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M.T.’s counsel explicitly told the court at the hearing, “I would bring to your attention the fact that a violation was filed on May 21st alleging various incidents at Kokomo Academy and we did not hear one iota of evidence as to any of those paragraphs that were alleged in the May 21st violation.” . . . Thus M.T. did not waive the issue he now raises on appeal.
Next, the State argues a requirement that it present some evidence of a juvenile’s wrongdoing before removing him from probation and sending him to the Department of Correction is “contrary to statute”3 [3 The State does not direct us to any such statute. As no statute appears to address the nature of a modification hearing in the juvenile probation context, it is not apparent that any statute is “contrary” to a requirement that evidence be presented at a modification hearing.] and inconsistent with the juvenile court’s wide latitude and great flexibility in its oversight of juveniles. . . . The standard for determining what due process requires in a juvenile proceeding is “fundamental fairness,” S.L.B. v. State, 434 N.E.2d 155, 156 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), [footnote omitted] and the process is “fundamentally fair,” the State asserts without explanation or citation to authority, when the juvenile has counsel, has notice a modification has been requested, and has an opportunity to be heard. We believe “fundamental fairness” in this setting requires more – specifically, some evidence of the wrongdoing on which the modification is premised. [Footnote omitted.]
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While the statute does not explicitly define the type of hearing required, basic due process principles and case law precedent lead us to conclude a trial court may not modify a juvenile’s disposition without a hearing at which the State presents evidence supporting the allegations listed in the revocation petition.
Finally, the State argues in the alternative that it offered sufficient evidence of M.T.’s probation violation. It did not. The State relies on an information dated May 21, 2009, in which it alleged M.T. “violated the conditions of probation/suspended commitment” by 1) committing theft and criminal mischief on May 20, 2009; 2) trying to enter an unauthorized area and grabbing a staff member’s radio on May 9, 2009; 3) hitting a staff member and throwing chairs on May 10, 2009; and 4) cursing and threatening staff on May 11, 2009. . . . .
The trial court’s dispositional order does not mention those offenses, and the record demonstrates, as M.T.’s counsel noted at the hearing “we did not hear one iota of evidence as to any of those paragraphs that were alleged in the May 21st violation” petition. . . . The State did not respond to that statement at the hearing, and in its appellate brief offers no argument that evidence was presented to support any of the allegations in the information. We decline the State’s invitation to hold mere allegations in an information serve as “evidence” of a violation justifying modification. [Footnote omitted.]
Neither will we hold, as the State requests, that the disposition is supported by a report from Kokomo Academy that M.T. placed into evidence at the hearing. Under the heading “Progress” the report states, without explanation, M.T.’s “rule violations have included not following directions, aggression toward staff and peers, being disruptive, using foul and inappropriate language, and leaving the dorm/classroom without permission.” . . . Those general allegations of rule violations are not evidence of the specific allegations of misconduct on specific dates that the State asserted as M.T.’s probation violations. And, contrary to the State’s assertion at oral argument, the general evidence of misconduct is not sufficient simply because it “fits the character” of the allegations in the petition.
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It was a due process violation to remove M.T. from probation and send him to prison when the State presented no evidence in support of the probation violations alleged as a basis for the modification. We accordingly reverse the modification.
BAILEY, J., and BROWN, J., concur.