BOEHM, J.
The Worker’s Compensation Act provides that if an employee has received worker’s compensation benefits and then recovers damages from a third party for the same injury, the employee is to reimburse the amount of benefits. The trial court held that under the instructions in this case the jury had already deducted the amount of worker’s compensation payments from its award and there was therefore no recovery for injuries previously covered by worker’s compensation. The Court of Appeals reversed, taking the view that the jury’s award included amounts to be repaid. We agree that both interpretations are plausible but hold that the trial court’s reading in this case should be affirmed. The employee is therefore not required to repay his employer’s worker’s compensation carrier after receiving a judgment against a third party tortfeasor. However, in future trials where the trier of fact finds that the evidence establishes that the plaintiff has received payment for some of the damages from other sources, the award should include those damages, but only to the extent that the evidence establishes an obligation to repay.
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The common law collateral source rule prohibited presentation of evidence that a plaintiff in a personal injury action had received payments from sources other than the defendant. See, e.g., Pendleton, 827 N.E.2d at 620. In 1986 Indiana enacted the Collateral Source Statute, Indiana Code § 34-44-1-1 et seq. (2004). The stated purposes of the statute are to enable an accurate assessment of the “prevailing party’s pecuniary loss” and to provide “that a prevailing party not recover more than once from all applicable sources for each item of loss sustained.” I.C. § 34-44-1-1. The statute specifically addresses worker’s compensation benefits, and provides that presentation of evidence of worker’s compensation benefits is permitted to establish “proof of the amount of money that the plaintiff is required to repay.” I.C. § 34-44-1-2(2). The statute expressly allows proof of payments from some collateral sources, including worker’s compensation, and also directs the trier of fact to “consider” the payments allowed to be admitted into evidence. I.C. § 34-44-1-3. In these respects the statute departs from its treatment of other collateral sources—for example any plaintiff’s insurance that might cover some element of damages—that are not presented to the trier of fact. The Collateral Source Statute’s treatment of worker’s compensation fits with the Worker’s Compensation Act’s provision for repayment of benefits to the employer or its insurance carrier in the event that an injured employee recovers from a third party for the employee’s injuries that also qualify for worker’s compensation. See generally I.C. § 22-3-2-13.
If the jury is to consider evidence of collateral source payments such as worker’s compensation that the plaintiff is required to repay, the only plausible interpretation of these provisions is that the jury should include the amount of any collateral source payments that the plaintiff is required to repay in its award to the plaintiff. If, however, there is no evidence of an obligation to repay, then the jury should not include the amount of collateral source payments in its award. The defendant, therefore, is benefited by evidence of the collateral source payments, and the plaintiff gets the benefit of proof of obligation to repay.
In this case, the trial court gave the pattern jury instruction with the addition of the last sentence, which is not in issue here (the “Collateral Source Instruction”):
If you find that Jerry Jarrells is entitled to recover, you shall consider evidence of payment made by some collateral source to compensate Jarrells for damages resulting from the accident in question. In determining the amount of Jarrells’ damages, you must consider the following type of collateral source payments:
Payments for worker’s compensation.
In determining the amount received by Jarrells from collateral sources, you may consider any amount Jarrells is required to repay to a collateral source and the cost to Jarrells of collateral benefits received. Jarrells may not recover more than once for any item of loss sustained.
See Indiana Pattern Jury Instructions—Civil No. 11.07 (2d ed. 2007). This instruction was tendered by Jarrells and was accepted by the court without objection relevant to any issue before us.
The parties dispute whether, under this instruction, the jury deducted the amount of worker’s compensation benefits that Jarrells had received from the total damage in arriving at its $925,000 damage figure, or, in the alternative, fixed the damages on the assumption that Jarrells would repay Travelers out of the proceeds of the judgment. Because we agree that both parties present plausible interpretations, we find this instruction confusing and hold that it should not be used in future trials. If Travelers had participated in the trial and objected to the instruction, this ambiguity would warrant a new trial. T.R. 51(C); see Penn Harris Madison School Corp. v. Howard, 861 N.E.2d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2007). But there was no objection to the instruction, and Travelers, as a post-trial intervenor, takes the trial as it finds it. T.R. 24; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 808 N.E.2d 112, 116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Panos v. Perchez, 546 N.E.2d 1253, 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]he intervention of a party after judgment binds the intervenor to all prior orders and judgments in the case.”).
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This case turns on how the jury valued Jarrells’ injuries at $925,000. We presume the jury followed the instructions. See Tipmont Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Fischer, 697 N.E.2d 83, 90 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). But by directing the jury to “consider” the worker’s compensation benefits paid and also to “consider” the obligation to repay, the instruction is less than clear how the jury is to take these payments into consideration. The jury could have interpreted this instruction in at least two ways. The trial court concluded that the jury deducted the amount of worker’s compensation payments from the amount of Jarrells’ damages in order to prevent Jarrells from “recover[ing] more than once for any item of loss sustained.” The Court of Appeals found that the amount of worker’s compensation payments should be included in the jury’s value of damages to permit Jarrells to fulfill the obligation to repay. Travelers, 906 N.E.2d at 919.
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First, the trial court is in the best position to determine what the jury may have intended. . . .
Second, the jury was informed of the amount of the worker’s compensation payments necessary to deduct from its judgment for Jarrells to avoid a double recovery. That amount, $66,135.67, was presented at trial, but as Travelers’ calculation of its lien demonstrates, the rules for calculating a post-judgment lien are complex. See I.C. § 22-3-2-13. Here, no evidence was presented to the jury regarding the actual amount that Jarrells would be required to repay to Travelers if Travelers asserted a lien, and there was no instruction as to the rules governing this calculation. The jury therefore could not have determined how much to add to the judgment if it wanted to provide for Jarrells’ repayment to Travelers as opposed to “considering” it by eliminating the damages already covered by worker’s compensation benefits.
Finally, the stated purpose of the Collateral Source Statute is to prevent double recovery. I.C. § 34-44-1-1. This purpose was emphasized to the jury in the final sentence of the Collateral Source Instruction. It is therefore plausible that the jury followed the instruction by deducting the amount of the worker’s compensation payments from its verdict for Jarrells. It also appears the parties assumed that the jury’s award would not include amounts already compensated by worker’s compensation benefits. In closing argument R.D.J.’s attorney pointed out that Jarrells may be required to repay worker’s compensation benefits in an amount he estimated as $68,000.00. It was presumably in the defendant’s interest to obtain a lower judgment by deploying the repayment obligation to reduce the award. This argument reflects the assumption that the jury would award the lesser amount after “considering” the worker’s compensation benefits.
The trial court’s order denying Travelers’ motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of Jarrells is affirmed.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, and Rucker, J.J., concur.