KIRSCH, J.
Edwin G. Buss (“Buss”), Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”), appeals from the trial court’s order in an action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by Michael L. Harris (“Harris”), a former inmate at the Miami Correctional Facility in Miami County, Indiana, requiring the DOC to update the sex offender registry to remove the term “SEX PREDATOR” and the statement “Lifetime Notification” from Harris’s offender detail and type on the Indiana Sheriffs’ Sex and Violent Offender Registry web site, and determining that Harris’s reporting obligation should be for ten years following the date of his release from incarceration. Buss raises the following consolidated and restated issue for our review: Whether the trial court erred by finding and concluding that Harris should not be listed on the sex offender registry as a sexually violent predator and that Harris’s reporting obligation was limited to ten years following the date of his release from incarceration.
We affirm.
Harris pleaded guilty to child molesting as a Class B felony and was sentenced to ten years executed on April 29, 1999. Harris was released on parole on November 6, 2002, and again on May 13, 2005, but was reincarcerated after each release for parole violations. On December 17, 2007, Harris was released on parole and prior to his release was advised that he would be designated as a sexually violent predator. The notification form Harris received was dated December 19, 2007 and indicated that Harris would have to register for life as a sexually violent predator. The form also included the question “Is the offender a sexually violent predator under IC 35-38-1-8.5[,]” and the box was checked “Yes.” Appellant’s App. at 104. Harris refused to sign the form. Evidently Harris was reincarcerated for additional parole violations and was released on parole on December 1, 2008. Harris again refused to sign the notification form he received which stated that Harris was a sexually violent predator and had to register for life as such.
Harris filed his complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on September 19, 2007, and both parties filed motions for summary judgment. After our Supreme Court’s decision in Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384 (Ind. 2009), which will be discussed more fully below, both parties filed additional summary judgment motions and briefs. The trial court’s telephonic summary judgment hearing occurred on July 6, 2009. On July 7, 2009, the trial court entered its order denying the parties’ motions for summary judgment.
On August 17, 2009, the trial court conducted a bench trial, and on August 26, 2009, entered its order granting Harris’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. Buss now appeals.
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In Jensen, under the terms of SORA [“Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act”] at the time of Jensen’s sentencing, he was required to report and register as a sex offender for a period of ten years. 905 N.E.2d at 389. After his release from prison and probation, Jensen annually reported and registered as a sex offender. Id. During the ten-year reporting period, the local sex offender registration coordinator contacted Jensen and informed him that, due to an amendment of SORA, Jensen would have to register for life as a sexually violent predator. Id. Jensen filed a motion with the trial court to determine his registration status. Id. The trial court found Jensen to be a sexually violent predator who must register for life. Id.
Jensen appealed the trial court’s decision, and a panel of this court found that the application of the amendment to SORA violated state ex post facto considerations as applied to Jensen. Jensen v. State, 878 N.E.2d 400, 403 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. granted. On transfer, our Supreme Court, using the intents-effects test, determined that the amendment to SORA as applied to Jensen was not punitive in nature, and thus did not run afoul of ex post facto considerations. 905 N.E.2d at 394.
As previously stated, Buss asserts that the Supreme Court’s holding in Jensen is dispositive of Harris’s situation and that the trial court erred by failing to so find. Harris, who has proceeded pro se throughout this matter, did advance the argument in his complaint that he sought a judicial interpretation of whether the amendments to SORA as applied to him violated state ex post facto considerations. However, Harris also sought a judicial determination of whether the DOC could make the “sexually violent predator” designation where the trial court at sentencing did not make that determination and Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5 does not authorize the DOC to make that determination. The trial court’s order decided the issue by interpreting Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5 and specifically found that the issue presented by Harris is not disposed of by our Supreme Court’s holding in Jensen. We agree with that approach to the issue.
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We note at the outset that nowhere in Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5 is the DOC authorized to make the determination that an offender is a sexually violent predator. Furthermore, the trial court correctly observed that the sentencing court did not indicate on the record at Harris’s sentencing hearing that Harris had been convicted of an offense that brought him within the definition of a sexually violent predator under subsection (b). Appellant’s App. at 10. Harris’s judgment of conviction and order of commitment states that Harris’s name “be enrolled on the sex offender list.” Id. at 132. We are left with the question, once an offender’s sentencing hearing has concluded, who makes the determination that an offender’s status is now, pursuant to amendments to the statute, that of a sexually violent predator subject to lifetime registration requirements?
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If we were to adopt the State’s construction of the statutory provisions, an offender could, in theory, have completed his sentence and reporting requirement, yet without notice to him be in violation of lifetime reporting requirements by operation of law due to subsequent amendments to SORA. Nothing before us indicates that the legislature intended such a result.
The State argues that Buss and the DOC were not making the determination that Harris was a sexually violent predator with a lifelong reporting obligation, but were merely notifying Harris of his status and post-release reporting obligations. The State also notes that Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5(f)(2) requires the trial court to send notice to the DOC if a person is a sexually violent predator and uses that language to support its contention that it is not claiming authority to make the status and reporting determinations. Yet, the State does not offer a citation to the record establishing that Buss and the DOC received notification from the trial court indicating a change to Harris’s status, thus triggering their duty to notify Harris.
We hold that the trial court did not err by finding and concluding that the DOC and Buss were not authorized by statute to make a determination of and change to Harris’s status on the sex offender registry. We also reject the State’s argument that Harris’s status was changed by operation of law under Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5(b) and note that the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones supports our conclusion. We also hold that the trial court correctly determined that Harris’s reporting obligation was for ten years and not a lifelong reporting obligation, as the change to the duration of Harris’s reporting obligation would have occurred only by a finding and conclusion that his status had changed. Again, Jones is helpful in reaching that conclusion.
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and ROBB, J., concur.