CRONE, Judge.
This appeal arises out of insurance liquidation proceedings involving a disputed claim (“DC 83”) submitted by Allvest, Inc., to Classic Fire & Marine Insurance Company (“CFM”) for indemnification allegedly provided under an insurance policy. In its bankruptcy proceeding, Allvest sold its rights to DC 83 to Brett von Gemmingen, attorney for J.W., P.B., K.S., C.S., A.W., and C.L. (“the J.W. Claimants”), who had obtained tort judgments against Allvest in an Alaska court. The trial court found that the J.W. Claimants were not entitled to payment from CFM’s liquidation estate and dismissed the claim. The J.W. Claimants appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
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On or about August 14, 1995, CFM, an Indiana insurance company, issued a general liability insurance policy to Allvest, an Alaska corporation, covering the time period from August 1, 1995, to August 1, 1996. On or about May 28, 1996, Allvest sent notice of potential claims against it to CFM. On August 27, 1997, six women filed suit against Allvest (“the Lawsuit”) in Alaska, alleging that Allvest’s employee had sexually molested them. Allvest notified CFM of the lawsuit and tendered its defense to CFM.
In December 1997, the Department of Insurance of the State of Indiana filed a petition for rehabilitation of CFM with the trial court, which it approved. Accordingly, Allvest began discussing the tender of its defense in the Lawsuit with the Indiana Commissioner of Insurance (“the Liquidator”). In April 1998, the Liquidator accepted Allvest’s tender of defense. The Liquidator, on behalf of CFM, hired counsel to defend Allvest in the Lawsuit. Allvest also hired its own attorney. On December 15, 1998, the attorney hired by the Liquidator withdrew from the Lawsuit, the reason for which the parties dispute.
On October 29, 1998, the Department of Insurance filed a petition for liquidation against CFM, which the trial court granted on December 18, 1998. On December 28, 1999, in CFM’s Indiana insolvency proceedings Allvest filed a proof of claim based on the Lawsuit for indemnification under the insurance policy.
On April 3, 2001, following a jury trial, five of the six women who had filed the Lawsuit obtained final judgments against Allvest. These five women are the J.W. Claimants. Together, the J.W. Claimants were awarded judgments against Allvest totaling $1,227,337.56.4 One of the six women in the Lawsuit settled her claim before trial.
On November 4, 2002, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Alaska placed Allvest in involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy. On December 1, 2003, the Alaska bankruptcy court approved a distribution of $437,773.77 to the J.W. Claimants.
Meanwhile, the Liquidator offered to pay Allvest’s bankruptcy estate $25,000 on Allvest’s claim in CFM’s insolvency proceedings. The trustee for Allvest’s bankruptcy estate objected to the Liquidator’s offer, and Allvest’s claim for indemnification from CFM under the insurance policy was then identified as DC 83. On July 25, 2005, the Allvest bankruptcy estate sold DC 83 to the J.W. Claimants’ attorney, Brett von Gemmingen. Appellants’ App. at 277 n.1 (“Report of Parties’ Pre-hearing Conference”).
As part of CFM’s liquidation and upon the Liquidator’s recommendation, the trial court established the procedure for resolving disputed claims.5 Pursuant to this procedure, the trial court set DC 83 for prehearing conference, and on June 3, 2005, the Liquidator issued a notice of prehearing conference on DC 83.
On October 31, 2005, von Gemmingen filed an appearance in CFM’s Indiana insolvency proceedings as to DC 83, stating that he was appearing in the case for the J.W. Claimants. Id. at 210 (“Appearance by Attorney in Civil Case”). The J.W. Claimants filed a demand for jury trial, which was denied on September 18, 2006. The J.W. Claimants also filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the Alaska judgments against Allvest were entitled to full faith and credit in the Indiana insolvency proceedings. Id. at 215.
On November 10, 2005, the Liquidator submitted to the trial court a report of the parties’ conference. In the report, the Liquidator acknowledged that Allvest’s bankruptcy estate sold its rights to DC 83 to the J.W. Claimants’ attorney, but stated that she was attempting to determine the legal effect of the assignment on CFM’s liquidation estate. Id. at 277 n.1. For purposes of the report, the Liquidator referred to Allvest as the claimant but acknowledged that the claim could be owned and pursued by the J.W. Claimants. Id. The prehearing conference was then held on November 14, 2005.
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The trial court concluded that the J.W. Claimants cannot recover twice on the same judgments, and therefore the trial court would reduce the amount of any award on DC 83 by the amount the J.W. Claimants recovered on their Alaska judgments from Allvest’s bankruptcy estate. Appellants’ App. at 803. Consequently, the trial court dismissed DC 83 without deciding the claim on the merits because the J.W. Claimants received the value of the Alaska judgments from Allvest’s bankruptcy estate.
The J.W. Claimants argue that a distribution by CFM’s liquidation estate on DC 83 would not constitute a double recovery. We address this issue mindful of the following circumstances of the case: (1) the trial court, the Liquidator, and von Gemmingen have conducted themselves in these insolvency proceedings based on the understanding that the J.W. Claimants are assignees of Allvest’s rights as to DC 83; and (2) the J.W. Claimants have received payment from Allvest’s bankruptcy estate for the Alaska judgments against Allvest.
The Liquidator asserts that the J.W. Claimants cannot be paid once for their claims by Allvest’s bankruptcy estate and a second time for what she asserts are the same claims from CFM’s liquidation estate, citing several cases. . . .
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. . . Here, [however,] the J.W. Claimants’ claim against Allvest and Allvest’s claim against CFM are not based on the same cause of action.
We conclude that because the J.W. Claimants’ claim against Allvest is completely distinct from Allvest’s claim against CFM, a distribution from CFM’s liquidation estate on DC 83 to Allvest’s assignee does not implicate the prohibition against double recovery. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of DC 83 and remand for further proceedings.
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Finally, we address the J.W. Claimants’ assertion that the trial court erred in denying their request for a jury trial. The question of whether a party is entitled to a jury trial for disputes concerning claims in liquidation proceedings is another issue of first impression for Indiana. We note that Article 1, Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution provides, “In all civil cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” It is well settled that this provision preserves the right to a jury trial only as it existed at common law. Songer v. Civitas Bank, 771 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Ind. 2002). Further, it has long been recognized that a party is not entitled to a jury trial on equitable claims. Id. These principles are embodied by Indiana Trial Rule 38(A) . . . .
The Liquidator asserts that as of June 1852, receiverships and liquidations were entirely equitable in nature, citing Ingersoll v. Cooper, 5 Blackf. 426 (1840), and Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Athon, 78 Ind. 10, 17 (1881). The J.W. Claimants fail to respond to this assertion or discuss these cases. We note that a “suit for the dissolution of an insurance company has been regarded as an equitable action.” 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 196 (2007). On this basis, we must conclude that the J.W. Claimants are not entitled to a jury trial.
Furthermore, Indiana Code Section 27-9-3-37(b) prescribes a hearing before a judge, not a jury . . . .
The J.W. Claimants contend that Section 27-9-3-37(b) is permissive and is insufficient to override Indiana’s strong preference for jury trials. Although Section 27-9-3-37(b) provides that the matter “may” be heard by the court, we think that “may” is used because either the court or a court appointed referee is permitted to hear the matter. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by the J.W. Claimants’ argument and find no error in the trial court’s denial of their request for a jury trial.
We conclude that the J.W. Claimants’ claim against Allvest and Allvest’s claim against CFM are two separate, distinct claims, and therefore, a distribution on DC 83 will not result in a double recovery. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding otherwise and reverse its dismissal of DC 83. Further, we conclude that pursuant to Indiana Code Section 27-9-3-34(d), the Alaska judgments have no conclusive, binding effect in CFM’s liquidation proceedings as to liability and the measure of damages, although they may be considered as evidence thereof. Finally, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the J.W. Claimants’ request for a jury trial. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
RILEY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.