SULLIVAN, Senior Judge
On October 31, 1994, in Noble County, Brogan pleaded guilty to two counts of child molesting, both as class C felonies. On November 14, 1994, the trial court sentenced Brogan to an aggregate sentence of five (5) years.
On August 24, 2009, Brogan filed the Motion. Brogan contended, and contends on appeal, that he cannot be required to register as a sex offender because such a requirement, as applied to him, is an ex post facto punishment in violation of Article I, Section 24 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court denied Brogan’s Motion on the same date that it was filed. In its order, the trial court concluded:
Because the Defendant has fully served his sentence in this case and is not on probation, and at no time has this Court ordered the Defendant to comply with the sex offender registry requirements, this Court does not have the authority or jurisdiction to order the removal of Defendant’s name from the sex offender registry.
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For the first time, the 2006 codification of the law contained the following provision:
“A sex offender committed to the department shall register with the department before the sex offender is released from incarceration. The department shall forward the sex offender’s registration information to the local law enforcement authority of every county in which the sex offender is required to register.”
2006 Ind. Acts 173, § 13 (emphasis supplied).
This new provision appears to contemplate registration of a sex offender before he takes up residency, employment or education in a particular county or counties. It also appears that the duty to register occurs with the conviction and with incarceration with the Department for the very offense enumerated in the Act itself. Registration is therefore not triggered by the presence of the offender in an Indiana community following release from custody but is triggered by conviction for the offense itself.
We do not construe the provision to contemplate a registration requirement with the Department for a person who, though a sex offender for a prior conviction and having been released from incarceration, or placed on parole or probation, is committed anew to the Department for a totally unrelated crime. If the offender, however, violates his parole or probation upon the original sex offense and is re-incarcerated to serve time for the original offense, a new duty to register might be required.
Suffice it to say that we are called upon to decide in what forum or forums a petitioner may seek Wallace relief.
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Brogan, who is incarcerated with the Department, although not upon the 1994 sex offense convictions, asked the trial court to immediately relieve him from the requirements imposed by the Act, and his claim is ripe for two reasons. First, Brogan is obligated to register with the Department as a sex offender before his release from incarceration. See I.C. § 11-8-8-7(f). Second, the State concedes that Brogan is incarcerated for a conviction from Huntington County for failure to register as a sex offender. [Footnote omitted.] . . . Therefore, Brogan’s claim is based on present, ongoing alleged harm, not abstract possibilities, and his appeal is fit for consideration on the merits.
It is also necessary to determine whether Brogan’s “Motion” is a cognizable vehicle for the ex post facto argument. It is not implausible to consider the Motion as a “petition” filed pursuant to Ind. Code § 11-8-8-22, as enacted in 2007 and revised by 2010 Indiana Legislative Service P.L. 103-2010, § 2 (West). That statute provides for a petition by a sex offender to have his name removed from the designation as a sex offender so as to relieve him from the duty to register as a sex offender. Id. This provision contemplates removal of the person’s name from any sexual offender registry, whether in a particular locality or in a centrally maintained registry. Id. The provision is made applicable if there has been a “change in federal or state law after June 30, 2007.” Id. We hold that the Indiana Supreme Court decision in Wallace, supra, is such a change in Indiana law. Furthermore, the provision, as recently amended, effective March 24, 2010, explicitly authorizes an offender to raise an ex post facto claim in a petition to be relieved of the obligation to register as a sex offender. See 2010 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 103-2010, § 2 (West). Therefore, Brogan appropriately presented his request to be removed from the sex offender registry in the “Motion.”
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With regard to the precise issue as to the particular Indiana forum or forums available for the granting of relief, the State contends that the Noble Superior Court lacks jurisdiction. It is argued that the court lost jurisdiction more than fifteen years ago when it entered its final judgment of conviction on November 14, 1994. [Footnote omitted.] The State further contends that because the registration law is mandatory, the trial court is without power to change the application of the Sex Offender Registry. Accordingly, it is asserted that the Noble Superior Court properly denied Brogan’s Motion.
Given the recency of the Wallace decision and the absence of a charted path in that case, it is not surprising that Brogan sought relief in Noble County. It was in that county that he was convicted of crimes which triggered a putative duty to register. Nevertheless, it is equally unsurprising that given the procedural posture of the case, the Noble Superior Court reached the conclusion quoted earlier in dismissing Brogan’s Motion. The trial court’s reasoning is particularly understandable in light of the fact that as the State observes, Brogan “is currently incarcerated at New Castle Correctional Facility, for failure to register as a sex offender; this is in Cause Number 35-C-02-0803-FC-00017 out of Huntington County, that he was sentenced for same on July 1, 2008
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In this case, Brogan filed his Motion under his original criminal cause number. Brogan argues that the trial court is “in the best position to determine and clarify Brogan’s sentence.” . . . However, Brogan does not dispute the trial court’s determination that the original sentencing order did not require him to register as a sex offender. Brogan also does not dispute that he has served the sentence for his child molestation convictions.
Under the new legislative enactment, the General Assembly has expressed an intention that a petition to be relieved of the obligation to register as a sex offender should be filed in a county other than the county where the offender was originally convicted of a sex offense, if the offender has no other current connection to the County. As recently amended, Ind. Code section 11-8-8-22 provides,
A petition under this section shall be filed in the circuit or superior court of the county in which the offender resides. If the offender resides in more than one (1) county, the petition shall be filed in the circuit or superior court of the county in which the offender resides the greatest time. If the offender does not reside in Indiana, the petition shall be filed in the circuit or superior court of the county where the offender is employed the greatest time. If the offender does not reside or work in Indiana, but is a student in Indiana, the petition shall be filed in the circuit or superior court of the county where the offender is a student. If the offender is not a student in Indiana and does not reside or work in Indiana, the petition shall be filed in the county where the offender was most recently convicted of a crime listed in section 5 of this chapter.
2010 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 103-2010, § 2. Under this statute, the most appropriate place for Brogan to file his Motion is the county in which he resides.
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One thing is patently clear from the Wallace decision. Brogan is entitled to have his name removed from any sex offender registry which has resulted from his 1994 convictions in Noble County. There are or may be multiple Indiana counties which have registries containing a particular individual’s name. We do not believe that such person must file a petition for removal of his name in each every such county.
We do hold, however, that Noble County is not, under the facts of this case, the appropriate forum in which to obtain judicial relief directing registry officials in another county to remove his name.
We affirm the ruling of the Noble Superior Court without prejudice to the right of Brogan to seek relief pursuant to Ind. Code§ 11-8-8-22.10 [Footnote 10: We are unable to specify the county in which Brogan must file the petition because Ind. Code § 11-8-8-22 requires Brogan to file a petition in the county where he resides. The Act defines a “principal residence” as “the residence where a sex or violent offender spends the most time.” Ind. Code § 11-8-8-3. If Brogan remains incarcerated, it appears that the county where he is incarcerated would be the proper place to file a petition to be relieved from the obligation to register as a sex offender.]
RILEY, J., concurs.
BARNES, J., concurring in result with separate opinion:
. . . I agree that the trial court properly denied Brogan’s motion and that Brogan should be required to refile his claim pursuant to the newly amended Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-22. I only concur in result, however, due to the majority’s holding that “Brogan is entitled to have his name removed from any sex offender registry which has resulted from his 1994 convictions in Noble County.” . . . It may be true that Brogan is entitled to have his name removed from the sex offender registry. That determination, however, should be made by the trial court if Brogan refiles his motion pursuant to Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-22. The procedures set out in the amended statute allow the trial court, and this court on appeal, to be fully informed of a sex offender’s circumstances, including the offender’s full criminal history, dates of offenses, and reason for being required to register. All interested parties are given notice of the proceedings. I think it is premature at this time to hold that Brogan is entitled to have his name removed from the sex offender registry. For this reason, I concur in result.