BOEHM, Justice.
We hold that inverse condemnation is the sole remedy for a governmental act that purports to exercise all rights of ownership over a parcel of land. We also hold that the six year statute of limitations for trespass applies to such a claim. As a result, the statute of limitations bars the plaintiffs’ suit in 2005 seeking to claim ownership of land leased in 1997 by the City of Lawrenceburg to a private party.
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The complaint seeks damages for the allegedly unlawful occupation of this parcel, and also seeks injunctive relief to, in effect, unwind the transactions in 1996 and 1997 that resulted in the lease to Indiana Gaming. In Dible v. City of Lafayette, 713 N.E.2d 269 (Ind. 1999), landowners sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the city regarding sewage and drainage structures built on their property. We found that “[e]quitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be brought against the government entity subsequent to the taking.” Id. at 273. In Indiana Department of Transportation v. Southern Bells, Inc., 723 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), business owners sought to enjoin the construction of a median that would prevent traffic from reaching access roads leading to their businesses. The court concluded that “[a]lthough injunctive relief may be necessary to remedy interference with landowner rights for a private purpose, where an alleged taking occurs for what is clearly a public purpose, equitable relief is generally unavailable as a matter of law where an action for compensation can be brought subsequent to the taking.” Id. at 434 (citing Dible, 713 N.E.2d at 273). These decisions make clear that injunctive relief is not available to prevent a taking for a public purpose. They proceed from the premise that inverse condemnation provides a remedy at law that adequately compensates for a taking and precludes equitable relief. Carl W. Grow, Note, Inverse Condemnation and the Right of Access of Abutting Property Owners, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 859, 860 & n.6 (1976). Although we find little direct authority on this point, we think the same reasoning applies to attempts to reverse a completed taking. Eminent domain proceedings include provisions designed to compensate the landowner but also to permit the public need to be satisfied relatively quickly and at no more than a fair price. Id. at 861 & n.9 (citing Roger Arnebergh, Recent Developments in the Law of Inverse Condemnation, in 1974 Proceedings of the Institute on Planning, Zoning, and Eminent Domain 319, 322 (1974)). To allow alternative remedies would circumvent these provisions.
Plaintiffs cite Calumet National Bank v. AT&T, 682 N.E.2d 785, 791 (Ind. 1997), which allowed a trespass action against a private utility that had constructed fiber optic cable lines using an abandoned railroad right-of-way over the bank’s land, for the proposition that “inverse condemnation is not an exclusive remedy.” The issue in that case was whether a taking had occurred. The same was true of Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. Whitley County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 160 Ind. App. 446, 312 N.E.2d 503 (1974), which Calumet National Bank cited to support the quoted language. Moreover, both Calumet National Bank and Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. were disputes between private parties. One involved a utility easement and the other turned on whether eminent domain was available for one utility to condemn a yet undeveloped franchise of another utility. Calumet National Bank also cited an article surveying the availability of pre-taking trespass claims in addition to inverse condemnation for the value of the property taken in various jurisdictions. George H. Genzel, Annotation, Award of, or Pending Proceedings for, Compensation for Property Condemned, as Precluding Action for Damages Arising from Prior Trespasses Upon It, 33 A.L.R.3d 1132 (1970). Neither Calumet National Bank nor the authorities it cited addressed an attempt to undo a governmental act after the fact, or the availability of a damage remedy for a governmental taking of ownership of land freed from the procedures of eminent domain. Moreover, as will be seen in Part B, even if a trespass claim were allowed, it would not help plaintiffs here because the same limitation statute applies to both inverse condemnation and to trespass on land. We conclude that inverse condemnation is the only remedy for government’s exercising complete dominance and purported ownership of a piece of land.
Plaintiffs also argue that inverse condemnation is inapplicable here because the taking was not for a public use. Defendants respond that providing public routes of access to a private business is a public use. Plaintiffs are correct that, if there were no public use, neither eminent domain nor inverse condemnation would apply. But we readily find a public use here. Whether a particular use is a public use is a question for the courts to determine. 11A Ind. L. Enc. Eminent Domain § 10, at 254 (2007). Specifically, in Indiana, the taking of private land to develop public access to private casinos has been held to be a public use. E.g., City of Hammond v. Marina Entm’t Complex, Inc., 733 N.E.2d 958, 962 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Other jurisdictions have also reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Detroit v. Detroit Plaza Ltd. P’ship, 730 N.W.2d 523, 527 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006); City of Atlantic City v. Cynwyd Inv., 689 A.2d 712, 713–14 (N.J. 1997).
Defendants argue that this case is barred by the six year limitation period for “Actions for injuries to property other than personal property.” I.C. § 34-11-2-7(3). Plaintiffs contend the residual ten-year limitation period applies. I.C. § 34-11-1-2(a).
No limitation period applies to an eminent domain proceeding by the state. To the extent plaintiffs have a claim, it is an inverse condemnation claim by the alleged owners. Acts constituting unlawful occupation of land by a public agency would be a trespass if committed by a private entity. In both cases, a party without an interest in the property physically disturbs and injures the property. A trespass action has long been held to be governed by the six year limitations period. E.g., Pickett v. Toledo, St. Louis & Kansas City R.R. Co., 131 Ind. 562, 31 N.E. 200 (1892) (applying the predecessor to I.C. § 34-11-2-7). In the most recent case on point, Scates v. State, the State offered the landowner compensation for land taken to build a highway, but the parties did not agree on valuation. 178 Ind. App. 624, 624–25, 383 N.E.2d 491, 492 (1978). When the landowner sued for compensation seventeen years after the action accrued, the Court of Appeals applied the residual ten-year limitation period. Id. at 625, 383 N.E.2d at 492–493. The Court noted, however, that “[i]f the State did not formally institute eminent domain proceedings,” the State’s presence on the land would be “of the nature of a trespass or inverse condemnation,” and therefore a six year limitation would have applied. Id. at 625 n.2, 383 N.E.2d at 492 n.2 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the six year limitation for trespass applies to inverse condemnation actions. See Murray v. City of Lawrenceburg, 903 N.E.2d 93, 101 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Scates, 178 Ind. App. at 625 n.2, 383 N.E.2d at 492 n.2).
Plaintiffs’ action accrued when they could have brought a claim for inverse condemnation. 18 Ind. L. Enc. Limitation of Actions § 30, at 622–24 (2003). Giving plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt, the last possible date the action could have accrued was December 1997, when Indiana Gaming began operations at the site.1 Plaintiffs did not file this suit until November 21, 2005, almost eight years after the action accrued. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claim is barred by I.C. § 34-11-2-7.
The trial court’s order denying defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is reversed. The case is remanded with instructions to enter judgment for defendants.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, and Rucker, JJ., concur.