NAJAM, J.
. . . [A] man who identified himself as Brandon Shockley called police and reported that the burglary suspect was a “tall black male wearing [a] black shirt and black shoes.” . . . Dispatch relayed that tip to Officer Cantrell. When he was driving approximately two blocks away from Chisolm’s house, Officer Cantrell saw a pedestrian, later identified as L.W. Officer Cantrell thought that L.W. “fit [the suspect’s] description to a ‘T’”, so he stopped his car and approached L.W. Officer Cantrell said to L.W., “Hey, come here.” . . . L.W. stopped, but, according to Officer Cantrell, L.W. “looked like he wanted to run but he didn’t.” . . . So Officer Cantrell ordered L.W. to get down on the ground, and L.W. complied.
Officer Cantrell helped L.W. stand up again and he asked him where he had come from. L.W. replied that he had just been playing basketball at his cousin’s house. At that point, Officer Cantrell considered the encounter with L.W. a Terry stop, and he patted L.W. down “for weapons only.” Id. During the pat down, Officer Cantrell did not feel anything like a weapon, but he did feel what seemed like a large number of coins in L.W.‟s front pockets, and he could hear what sounded like coins “moving around.” Id. After Officer Cantrell learned that the burglary suspect had stolen a large quantity of change, he arrested L.W. Thereafter, Officer Cantrell found some of Chisolm’s jewelry and coins in L.W.’s pockets.
. . . .
Here, the dispositive question is whether the tip Shockley provided to police was sufficient to support a determination of reasonable suspicion to perform an investigatory stop of L.W. The dissent maintains that “the fact that the tipster’s identity was known to police was sufficient, by itself, to justify Officer Cantrell’s stop.” But this contention is contrary to our opinion in State v. Glass, 769 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied, where we recognized that, “The fact that a named caller with an untested reputation called the police does not in itself establish reasonable suspicion.” Indeed, both the United States Supreme Court and the Indiana Supreme Court have consistently held that the totality of the circumstances test applies to a determination of reasonable suspicion, even where a tipster identifies himself.
The dissent’s reliance on Kellems v. State, 842 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ind. 2006), rev’d on reh’g on other grounds, 849 N.E.2d 1110 (Ind. 2006), also goes too far. In Kellems our Supreme Court stated that the United States Supreme Court “has indicated that while a tip from an identified or known informant may not be sufficient to support a probable cause finding, such tips are sufficiently reliable to justify an investigatory Terry stop.” 842 N.E.2d at 355 (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). But this language from Kellems is misleading when taken out of context.
What the Supreme Court actually meant in Alabama was not that such tips necessarily are—but that such tips may be—sufficiently reliable to justify a Terry stop. The Court observed that in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972), the Court had found a tip made by an identified tipster sufficient to support reasonable suspicion, but not probable cause. 496 U.S. at 330. In Adams, the Court noted that the informant was personally known to the police officer and had previously provided the officer with information. 407 U.S. at 146. And the Court also noted that the informant “came forward personally to give information that was immediately verifiable at the scene” and that the informant subjected himself to arrest for false complaint. Thus, the Adams Court held that the tip “carried enough indicia of reliability” to justify the stop. Id. In Alabama, the Supreme Court summarized the formula for reasonable suspicion as follows:
Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors–quantity and quality–are considered in the “totality of the circumstances–the whole picture,” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981), that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion. Thus, if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable.
Alabama, 496 U.S. at 330; see also, Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-47.
Likewise, in Kellems, our Supreme Court held that while a tip made by a so-called “concerned citizen” has greater indicia of reliability than that made by a professional informant, the ultimate test is “one of the totality of the circumstances.” See 842 N.E.2d at 356. And while a concerned citizen who has identified himself makes himself susceptible to prosecution for false reporting, which “heightens the likelihood of the report’s reliability,” that is only one factor “bearing on the reasonableness of suspicion.” See Id. at 355-56. The Court concluded that:
[w]hile we agree with the logic that the prospect of prosecution for making a false report heightens the likelihood of the report’s reliability, we think the State pushes the envelope too far to say that the prospect of prosecution for making a false report, standing alone, will in all cases constitute reasonable suspicion.
Id. at 355. In sum, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Indiana Supreme Court has held that a tip from a tipster whose identity is known to the police is sufficient per se to establish reasonable suspicion. Thus, our analysis does not end with the fact that Shockley identified himself to dispatch.
Here, there is no evidence in the record that law enforcement had verified Shockley’s identity or that his reliability was known prior to the investigatory stop of L.W. On this record, while Shockley identified himself, he was nonetheless a virtual stranger. Neither Officer Cantrell nor the police department knew whether he was “a concerned citizen, a prankster, or an imposter.” See Glass, 769 N.E.2d at 643. And there is no evidence that Shockley identified himself in such a way that would place his credibility at risk or subject himself to criminal penalties. See Id. Nor is there any indication that the tipster indicated that he had inside knowledge about the burglary or the suspect. [Footnote omitted.] Shockley merely described the suspect’s general build, shirt, and shoes. That same information was available to the general public and did not provide the police with sufficient information to corroborate Shockley’s assertions. See Kellems, 842 N.E.2d at 356. This case is easily distinguishable on its facts from Kellems, where the tipster not only identified herself but was a person known to the police and accurately predicted future behavior.
This court’s opinion in State v. Glass, 769 N.E.2d at 639, is dispositive here. . . . .
. . . .
Here, again, there is no evidence that Shockley identified himself in a way that would place his credibility at risk or subject himself to criminal penalties. See Id. Nor did Shockley demonstrate any inside knowledge or provide significant information that Officer Cantrell could corroborate. See Id. And, as in Glass, the police merely knew Shockley’s name, but his reputation was untested.
We must consider both the content and reliability of the information provided by Shockley. At trial, Officer Cantrell testified that at the time that he stopped L.W., the only information that he had about the burglary suspect was that he was a “tall black male wearing [a] black shirt and black shoes.” . . . As the dissent observes, and as we stated in Glass, “an investigative stop may be based upon the collective information known to the law enforcement organization as a whole.” 769 N.E.2d at 643. Such information may be imputed to the officer in the field. But, while the police may have possessed more information about the suspect, [footnote omitted] “we must base our decision on the record before us.” See Id. at 644. Here, just as in Glass, the State merely showed that the caller described an individual sufficiently to permit Officer Cantrell to identify a similar individual.
The State contends that there was reasonable suspicion for the Terry stop “[g]iven [L.W.’s] location near the site of the burglary, his apparent unease with the presence of a police officer, and his similarity to the description of the suspect[.]” First, the evidence shows only that the burglary occurred sometime between approximately 8:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. that night. Officer Cantrell testified that he heard about the burglary and description of the suspect “after 10:00.” . . . Given the hour and a half window of time during which the crime occurred, and the lack of evidence regarding the lapse of time between the dispatch and Officer Cantrell’s encounter with L.W., the significance of L.W.’s location in the neighborhood is marginal. Indeed, while L.W. was two blocks away from Chisolm’s house at the time of the stop, he was also two blocks away from his cousin’s house, where he told Officer Cantrell he had just been playing basketball.
Second, Officer Cantrell testified only that L.W. “looked like he wanted to run but he didn’t.” . . . While a suspect’s actual flight from law enforcement may support a determination of reasonable suspicion, see Platt v. State, 589 N.E.2d 222, 226 (Ind. 1992), Officer Cantrell’s speculation about L.W.’s intention was nothing more than a hunch, which is not enough. There must be an objective basis for any such suspicion. See Moultry, 808 N.E.2d at 171 There is no evidence that L.W. made any furtive gestures or movements. L.W. did not flee, but stopped, followed Officer Cantrell’s commands, and answered his questions. And, third, Shockley’s description of the suspect lacked sufficiently distinguishing characteristics to provide a basis for meaningful corroboration. Finally, the dissent points out that L.W. “had bulging pockets,” but our review of the transcript indicates that Officer Cantrell did not notice the bulging pockets until after he had initiated the pat down search.
Reasonable suspicion requires more than mere conjecture. See Glass, 749 N.E.2d at 644. The fact that a named caller with an untested reputation called the police does not in itself establish reasonable suspicion. Id. at 643. Considering the totality of the 13 circumstances, the whole picture, including both the quantity and quality of information, see Alabama, 496 U.S. at 330, we conclude that the information the police possessed was insufficient to support an investigatory stop of L.W. Stated another way, on the record before us, the State has not demonstrated that based on specific and articulable facts Officer Cantrell had a particularized and objective basis to suspect that L.W. had committed, was committing, or was about to commit legal wrongdoing. See Glass at 644. Accordingly, we must reverse L.W.’s adjudications as a delinquent child.
FRIEDLANDER, J., concurs.
BRADFORD, J., dissents with separate opinion:
. . . I believe that the fact that the tipster’s identity was known to police was sufficient, by itself, to justify Officer Cantrell’s stop. “The United States Supreme Court … has indicated that while a tip from an identified or known informant may not be sufficient to support a probable cause finding, such tips are sufficiently reliable to justify an investigatory Terry stop.” Kellems v. State, 842 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ind. 2006) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972)). This is not, however, the only indication of the tip’s reliability, in my view.
I also believe that the fact that Shockley was apparently a concerned citizen (as opposed to a professional police informant) further indicates the tip’s reliability. . . . .
Finally, I believe that the tip indicates Shockley’s inside knowledge, bolstering its reliability even more. . . . .
In summary, I believe that Officer Cantrell’s stop of L.W. was justified by reasonable suspicion that he was involved in the burglary of Chisolm’s residence. Moreover, Officer Cantrell was justified in patting L.W. down solely on the basis that he was suspected of committing the inherently dangerous crime of burglary.