BROWN, J.
. . . [A] medical review panel found:
A majority of the panel is of the opinion that the evidence supports the conclusion that [Clarian] failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care, but that it cannot be determined from the evidence whether its conduct was a factor of any resulting damage. Dr. Cefali [footnote omitted] is of the opinion that the evidence does not support the conclusion that [Clarian] failed to meet the applicable standard of care, and that its conduct was not a factor of the resultant damages.
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The issue is whether the trial court erred by denying Clarian’s motion for summary judgment. . . . .
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Clarian relies upon Malooley v. McIntyre, 597 N.E.2d 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) . . . .
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The [Malooley] court concluded:
When, as here, a medical malpractice civil suit is filed after a medical review panel has issued an opinion which finds against the complainant upon the issue of causation, and no member of the panel opines that causation does exist, the complainant proceeds in considerable peril if he rests upon the factual allegations contained in his complaint. The complainant must do more than rest upon his complaint.
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Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
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Here, the majority of the panel was of the opinion that “it cannot be determined from the evidence whether [Clarian’s] conduct was a factor of any resulting damage.” . . . This language is strikingly similar to the language in Dr. Shapiro’s opinion in Malooley that “it is not possible to determine from the evidence submitted, whether or not the conduct complained of with respect to Dr. Cure and Dr. Malooley was or was not a factor of the resultant damages.” Malooley, 597 N.E.2d at 316. As previously mentioned, the court in Malooley stated that “the Panel’s Opinion, including Dr. Shapiro’s separate opinion, logically supports only two arguments: 1) that there was no causation, or 2) that causation could not be determined.” Id. at 318. Also, like in Malooley, no member of the panel here concluded that causation existed. We cannot say that Malooley is distinguishable on the basis that the majority of the panel in the present case concluded that it could not be determined from the evidence whether Clarian’s conduct was a factor of any resulting damage.
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Based upon Malooley, we conclude that Clarian presented sufficient evidence to meet its burden by designating Dr. Cefali’s opinion that Clarian’s conduct was not a factor of the resultant damages, [footnote omitted] which shifted to Wagler the burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue as to causation. [Footnote omitted.] See Malooley, 597 N.E.2d at 317; see also Bonnes v. Feldner, 642 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ind. 1994) (holding that the opinion of one member of a medical review panel was evidence sufficiently probative to withstand a motion for judgment on the evidence). We also conclude that the opinion of the majority of the medical review panel was not evidence which tends to support Wagler’s allegation that there was a causative nexus between Clarian’s conduct and Wagler’s injuries. [Footnote omitted.] See Id. at 318. Thus, we next turn to whether Nurse Little’s affidavit was admissible.
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On appeal, Clarian relies upon Long v. Methodist Hosp. of Ind. Inc., 699 N.E.2d 1164, 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied, and Wagler argues that Long was “necessarily overruled” by Harlett v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Services, 748 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
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. . . The court in Long commented on Stryczek by observing that “[b]ased upon this analysis and the difference in education and training between physicians and registered nurses, we held that nurses are not qualified to offer expert opinion as to the standard of care for physicians.” Id.
The Long court then addressed “whether a nurse may offer expert testimony as to the medical cause of injuries generally.” Id. at 1169. . . . The court held that “nurses are not qualified to offer expert testimony as to the medical cause of injuries.” Id. The court then concluded that Nurse Parks was not qualified to offer expert testimony on whether Methodist’s conduct caused Alma’s injuries. -. The court also concluded that the trial court did not err in striking Nurse Parks’s affidavit as to the issue of causation and that Nurse Parks’s affidavit “could not have been used for the purposes of defending a motion for summary judgment on the issue of causation . . . .” Id.
In -, the court addressed whether the trial court erred in ordering the medical review panel chairman to dismiss a registered nurse panelist and replace her with a plastic surgeon. . . . The court held that the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act provides that nurses, as health care providers, are qualified to serve on a medical review panel. Id. The court held that “[i]n light of this statutory authorization, we hold that the trial court erred in expanding the specific holding of Long to exclude the nurse from the medical review panel.” Id. (emphasis added). The court noted that “[i]n so holding, we recognize that Long has implications with regard [to] a nurse’s qualification to testify as an expert witness on certain matters.” Id. The court also stated that “we believe that it is the prerogative of the legislature, and not this court, to modify the Medical Malpractice Act.” Id.
We cannot say that Harlett is in conflict with Long. Rather, the court in Harlett held that Long could not be expanded to the issue of whether a nurse could be a member of a medical review panel. [Footnote omitted.] Based upon Long, we conclude that Nurse Little’s affidavit was inadmissible for the purpose of creating an issue of fact regarding whether Clarian’s actions were the proximate cause of Wagler’s injuries. [Footnote omitted.]
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In summary, we conclude that Clarian presented sufficient evidence to meet its burden by designating the opinion of the medical review panel including Dr. Cefali’s opinion that Clarian’s conduct was not a factor of the resultant damages, which shifted to Wagler the burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue as to causation. The opinion of the majority of the medical review panel and Nurse Little’s affidavit was not evidence which tends to support Wagler’s allegation that there was a causative nexus between Clarian’s conduct and Wagler’s injuries. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying Clarian’s motion for summary judgment.
MATHIAS, J., and BARNES, J., concur.