BAKER, C.J.
A juvenile facing charges of delinquency and her mother were given a form apprising them of the rights, but not waiving those rights. They signed the form. They never retained an attorney during the delinquency proceedings. The trial court never inquired into their ostensible decision to proceed pro se, nor did it advise them regarding the perils of self-representation. Indeed, there are no discussions in the record whatsoever regarding the right to an attorney, the advantages of retaining one, or their ability to represent themselves. Under these circumstances, we find that A.S. and her mother did not knowingly and voluntarily waive their right to counsel.
. . . Prior to the May 28, 2008, initial hearing, A.S. and her mother (Mother) were presented with a document entitled “Advisement of Rights for Juvenile Hearing” (Advisement), which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
I understand that I have the following rights: to know the nature of the allegation(s) against the juvenile; to be represented by an attorney; to a speedy trial; to confront all witnesses; to subpoena witnesses; to introduce evidence on my own behalf; to refrain from testifying against myself; and to have the State of Indiana prove that I committed the offense by a preponderance of the evidence if a petition to modify or to prove that I committed the offense beyond a reasonable doubt if a delinquency petition.
I understand that I may hire an attorney of my own choice, waive my right to an attorney, or ask the Court to appoint an attorney to represent me.
. . . . Both A.S. and her mother signed the Advisement.
At the initial hearing, the trial court confirmed that A.S. and Mother had signed the Advisement but did not ask A.S. if she wanted legal representation, inquire as to whether she desired appointed counsel, or advise her as to the hazards of proceeding pro se. . . . .
. . . .
Prior to the May 28, 2008, initial hearing, A.S. and her mother (Mother) were presented with a document entitled “Advisement of Rights for Juvenile Hearing” (Advisement), which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
I understand that I have the following rights: to know the nature of the allegation(s) against the juvenile; to be represented by an attorney; to a speedy trial; to confront all witnesses; to subpoena witnesses; to introduce evidence on my own behalf; to refrain from testifying against myself; and to have the State of Indiana prove that I committed the offense by a preponderance of the evidence if a petition to modify or to prove that I committed the offense beyond a reasonable doubt if a delinquency petition.
I understand that I may hire an attorney of my own choice, waive my right to an attorney, or ask the Court to appoint an attorney to represent me.
. . . . Both A.S. and her mother signed the Advisement.
At the initial hearing, the trial court confirmed that A.S. and Mother had signed the Advisement but did not ask A.S. if she wanted legal representation, inquire as to whether she desired appointed counsel, or advise her as to the hazards of proceeding pro se. . . . .
. . . .
In the context of adult criminal proceedings, the right to counsel is essential to the fairness of those proceedings. Drake v. State, 895 N.E.2d 389, 392-93 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Because a defendant gives up many benefits when the right to counsel is waived, the accused must knowingly and intelligently waive that right. Id. When a defendant asserts his right to self-representation, the trial court should advise the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Id. Although there are no specific “talking points,” our Supreme Court has adopted four factors to consider when determining whether a knowing and voluntary waiver occurred:
“(1) the extent of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s decision, (2) other evidence in the record that establishes whether the defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, (3) the background and experience of the defendant, and (4) the context of the defendant’s decision to proceed pro se.”
Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1127-28 (Ind. 2001) (quoting United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 2001)).
In the context of juvenile adjudications, “the State bears a heightened burden in securing the juvenile’s waiver of his or her right to counsel.” R.W., 901 N.E.2d at 543. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1(2), a parent can waive a juvenile’s right to an attorney only if:
(A) [the parent] knowingly and voluntarily waives the right;
(B) [the parent] has no interest adverse to the child;
(C) meaningful consultation has occurred between [the parent] and the child; and
(D) the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver[.]
Our Supreme Court has held that “[t]he meaningful consultation requirement of the statute is a matter peculiar to juvenile waivers; it is a safeguard additional to those requirements common to adult waivers—that they be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.” Cherrone v. State, 726 N.E.2d 251, 254 (Ind. 2000) (emphasis in original) (quotations omitted). In other words, in a juvenile context, the threshold inquiry is whether the parent and juvenile both made knowing and voluntary waivers in accordance with constitutional jurisprudence; if it is found that they did so, the next inquiry is whether there was an opportunity for meaningful consultation. . . . .
First, therefore, we must determine whether Mother and A.S. knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to counsel as guaranteed by the Indiana and United States Constitutions. As noted above, our Supreme Court has explained that there are four factors to analyze in determining whether a knowing and voluntary waiver occurred:
“(1) the extent of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s decision, (2) other evidence in the record that establishes whether the defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, (3) the background and experience of the defendant, and (4) the context of the defendant’s decision to proceed pro se.”
Poynter, 749 N.E.2d at 1127-28 (quoting Hoskins, 243 F.3d at 410).
Here, the trial court made no inquiry whatsoever into the ostensible decision of A.S. and her Mother to proceed pro se. Although they signed the Advisement, which explained their rights, including the right to be represented by an attorney, nowhere in the record do they state affirmatively that they intended and wished to proceed without representation. [Footnote omitted.] Similarly, there is no evidence in the record that A.S. and Mother understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. In fact, the undisputed evidence in the record establishes that A.S. “did not know I would be representing myself or what the implications of that were.” . . . Furthermore, A.S. was not advised “that I had a valid self defense claim and an attorney could have investigated and presented that claim for me.” . . . Likewise, there is no evidence in the record establishing the background and experience of either A.S. or Mother, and the conversation that Mother had with the trial court at the initial hearing suggests that she was confused about the procedures to be followed. Finally, there is little or no context to A.S. and Mother’s ostensible decision to proceed pro se, inasmuch as there was no discussion whatsoever about the issue on the record.
. . . .
Given this record, we simply cannot find any evidence establishing that Mother and A.S. knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to counsel. Similarly, there is no evidence that they were advised of that right and the dangers of proceeding pro se and had a subsequent opportunity for a meaningful consultation on the issue. Indeed, nowhere in the record do they actually express a desire to proceed pro se. Under these circumstances, therefore, we find that A.S.‟s adjudications are void and, consequently, she is entitled to relief from judgment.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
DARDEN, J., and CRONE, J., concur.