SHEPARD, C.J.
A good many jurisdictions employ the “prison mailbox rule” to determine whether court filings made by prisoners are timely. Indiana has regularly used this approach as respects filings governed by its appellate rules, recognizing the unique position of pro se prisoners, though we apparently have never expressly adopted the prison mailbox rule. We do so today, still obliging the litigant provide reasonable, legitimate, and verifiable documentation. Appellant Regunal Dowell’s timing problem, however, does not center on a tardy filing under the appellate rules but rather on his attempt to file a motion to correct error under the trial rules.
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. . . [T]his Court has regularly applied the prison mailbox rule in various orders. The Court of Appeals has likewise held that the appellate rules operate to date the filing of a notice of appeal by reference to a proven date of mailing. . . . We now make explicit the rule as applied in our previous orders.
II. Evidence of Mailing
Our practice has required a pro se prisoner to provide reasonable, legitimate, and verifiable documentation supporting a claim that a document was timely submitted to prison officials for mailing. [Footnote omitted.]
For example, in the appeal of one Robert Johnson, we issued an order granting transfer and remanding to the Court of Appeals based on the mailbox rule. Johnson provided copies of a “Legal Mail Log,” an affidavit from a person identifying himself as a “law librarian” and the prisoner’s own affidavit. We concluded that this evidence taken as a whole created a presumption that the prisoner functionally filed his documents on time. Johnson v. State, No. 02S05-0311-PC-582, order (Ind. Nov. 25, 2003). The Court of Appeals later issued a memorandum decision in his case. Johnson v. State, No. 02A05-0305-PC-233, memorandum op. (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2004).
We took the same approach as regards a different step in the processes governed by the appellate rules. A record of proceedings is considered as having been filed when it is deposited in the United States mail. App. R. 12 (C) (1999). When appellant Julius C. Scott sent the record in his case, its postmark was one day late, and our clerk would not permit it to be filed. Scott thereafter tendered various proofs demonstrating that he had in fact submitted the record of proceedings to a prison employee for mailing on the due date for filing but that prison officials had not actually mailed the record until the next day. Scott provided an affidavit from the prison employee verifying that Scott presented the record to her on the date it was due but that she did not mail the record until the next day. We concluded that the delay in mailing was not due to any lack of diligence on Scott’s part and that his filing would be considered timely. Scott v. State, No. 36A04-9911-PC-485, order (Ind. Sept. 5, 2000).
Where a prisoner’s proof is lacking, however, the opposite result obtains.
Appellant Chris Naquin did file his record on time. He then faced the deadline for filing his brief. He received two extensions of time from the Court of Appeals and then asked for a third extension. He was turned down and sought relief here.
In making his argument to us, he claimed that the institution in which he was incarcerated was under lockdown conditions for substantial periods during the time allotted for his briefing. In particular, he claimed that he was scheduled to go to the prison library to finalize his brief four days before it was due but that another lockdown occurred. Naquin did not produce any documentary support for these claims. We agreed with the Court of Appeals that he had not complied with the appellate rules and that his appeal could not go forward. Naquin v. State, No. 27A02-0008-PC-557, order (Ind. Jan. 9, 2002).
A similar result occurred when appellant Antonio Carney sought to file a petition to transfer, supplying his own verified motion that he had delivered it to prison officials for mailing on the final day. Carney did not enclose any documentation that tended to support this assertion, and we denied his motion. Carney v. State, No. 49A02-0802-CR-138, order (Ind. Jan. 15, 2009). 6
If the question of Dowell’s timeliness were covered by the appellate rules, we would agree with the State that Dowell has not any verifiable documentation. Dowell never claims in his own affidavit that he deposited his motion to correct error with prison authorities on or before August 6, 2008. Dowell does provide the affidavit of fellow prisoner James Franklin, who according to Dowell “volunteered to help keep the law library afloat until the law clerks were off lockdown.” (App. at 15.) As our examples above suggest, this is not a sufficiently reliable ground on which a presumption of timeliness can rest.
III. Timing for Motions to Correct Error Is Different
The State’s cross-appeal does not take issue with any of Dowell’s filings governed by the appellate rules. Rather, the State argues that the appeal should be dismissed because Dowell’s motion to correct error was untimely.
The Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure require that a motion to correct error be filed within thirty days after the entry of a final judgment. Ind. Trial Rule 59(C). As the Attorney General points out, the trial rules define with some particularity what constitutes filing and when filings are deemed to have occurred, depending on the mode of delivery:
(F) Filing With the Court Defined. The filing of pleadings, motions, and other papers with the court as required by these rules shall be made by one of the following methods:
(1) Delivery to the clerk of the court;
(2) Sending by electronic transmission under the procedure adopted pursuant to Administrative Rule 12;
(3) Mailing to the clerk by registered, certified or express mail return receipt requested;
(4) Depositing with any third-party commercial carrier for delivery to the clerk within three (3) calendar days, cost prepaid, properly addressed;
(5) If the court so permits, filing with the judge, in which event the judge shall note thereon the filing date and forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk; or
(6) Electronic filing, as approved by the Division of State Court Administration pursuant to Administrative Rule 16.
Filing by registered or certified mail and by third-party commercial carrier shall be complete upon mailing or deposit[.]
Any party filing any paper by any method other than personal delivery to the clerk shall retain proof of filing.
T.R. 5(F).
The gist of this is that when a party transmits by an independently verifiable means (like registered mail or third-party carrier), the filing is deemed to have occurred upon mailing or deposit. When other means are used, filing occurs on the date the filing is in the hands of the clerk. . . . The principle of the mailbox rule has been applied under Rule 5 only when the court is satisfied that the prisoner had employed certified mail, return receipt requested, and deposited his mailing in the institutional mail pouch by or before the filing deadline, notwithstanding the fact that the postmark reflected a date after the deadline. Cooper v. State, 714 N.E.2d 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Baker v. State, 505 N.E.2d 498 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
Dowell used regular mail, perhaps tendering it on the last possible day. The trial court clerk thus appropriately date-stamped it on the day when it arrived in the clerk’s office, two days after the filing deadline.
When a motion to correct error is not timely filed, the right to appeal is not preserved. . . . .
Conclusion
The appeal is dismissed.
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.