MAY, J.
The State was required to prove Tharp knowingly or intentionally violated a protective order [to prove the charged invasion of privacy offense]. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1. Tharp argues he did not knowingly or intentionally violate the protective order because he was not served with the order, and although Pitzer [the person protected by the order] told him about it, she also told him it was no longer in effect.
“If it appears from a petition for an order for protection . . . that domestic or family violence has occurred,” the trial court may “without notice or hearing, immediately issue an order for protection ex parte.” Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(a). A court issuing an order of protection must deliver the order to the county sheriff for service. Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(d).
The State argues it did present evidence Tharp was served with the order: Officer Jason Thomas testified the communication control operator told him it had been served. That statement, without more, does not prove Tharp was served. Cf. Dixon v. State, 869 N.E.2d 516, 519-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (officer testified at trial that he personally informed the defendant of the protective order). The State presented no testimony based on personal knowledge, nor did it admit any documentation of the fact that Tharp was served. [Footnote omitted.] Therefore, the State did not prove Tharp was served with the protective order.
The State argues Tharp bore the burden of persuasion on the issue of the lack of service, citing LePore v. Norwest Bank Indiana, N.A., 860 N.E.2d 632 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). . . . .
LePore is not on point, as Tharp was not trying to set aside the protective order.
Tharp was prosecuted for violating the order. Service or lack thereof goes to Tharp’s mens rea, and the State bears the burden of proof on that issue. See Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1 (a person who knowingly or intentionally violates a protective order commits invasion of privacy); Scruggs v. State, 883 N.E.2d 189, 191-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (State must prove mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
Alternatively, the State argues Pitzer’s oral statement that there was a “no contact” order was sufficient notice. (Tr. at 35.) Although Tharp agrees that oral notice can suffice, he contends the notice must come from an agent of the State. Both parties rely on Hendricks v. State, 649 N.E.2d 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), and Dixon.
In Hendricks, the Mercado family obtained an emergency protective order against Hendricks. Six days after the order was issued, Hendricks called the Mercado home. Bernadette Mercado informed him of the protective order and told him he was not to have any contact with the family. Later that day, Hendricks called the Mercado home again. An officer was present at the home and spoke to Hendricks. The officer told Hendricks of the protective order and its parameters. The next day, Hendricks came within 1000 feet of Altimease Mercado, in violation of the order. Hendricks was convicted of invasion of privacy. He appealed, arguing he did not have notice of the protective order, but we affirmed.
In Dixon, Demetrice Bruno obtained a protective order against Dixon. Later, an officer was dispatched to Bruno’s home, where Bruno and Dixon were engaged in a verbal dispute. The officer performed a warrant check and discovered there was a protective order against Dixon, but Dixon had not been served with it. Bruno showed a copy of the order to the officer and told him she had previously given Dixon a copy. The officer advised Dixon that he had been served and was not to come back to Bruno’s residence. Later that day, Dixon returned, and he was arrested.
Dixon was convicted of invasion of privacy, and on appeal, he argued he did not have sufficient notice of the protective order. We affirmed:
[Dixon] claims that the only evidence that he knew of the protective order was the hearsay testimony of Officer Gomez regarding Bruno’s claims that she gave Dixon the order. However, it is clear from Officer Gomez’s testimony that he informed Dixon of the protective order and advised Dixon that he was not to return to Bruno’s residence. Regardless of whether Bruno actually gave Dixon a copy of the protective order, Officer Gomez explicitly gave Dixon oral notice of the order and, in particular, the provision that ordered Dixon to stay away from Bruno’s residence. Dixon’s return to the home just hours later indicates that he knowingly or intentionally violated the protective order.
Dixon, 869 N.E.2d at 520.
The State argues these cases demonstrate that oral notice is sufficient. Tharp notes Hendricks and Dixon were not arrested and charged for contact with the protected person until after they received notice from an officer. If notice from a protected person were sufficient, the officers could have arrested Hendricks and Dixon upon their first contact with the police. However, neither opinion addressed whether notice from the protected person alone would have been sufficient.
We conclude the exception recognized in Hendricks and Dixon should be narrowly construed to require notice from an agent of the State. Service of a protective order is required by Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(d). In fact, the general rule in civil cases, as was Pitzer’s petition for a protective order, is that jurisdiction of the person is acquired by the service of process. See Ind. Trial Rule 4(A); Idlewine v. Madison County Bank & Trust Co., 439 N.E.2d 1198, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). The facts of this case highlight the importance of service. Although Pitzer told Tharp about the protective order, she also erroneously told him it was no longer in effect. Tharp should not have to rely on information from a lay person who is not knowledgeable about the status of a legal proceeding.
At oral argument, the State argued various facts put Tharp on inquiry notice of the protective order. [Footnote omitted.] The State offers no authority for the proposition that a person may be on inquiry notice of a protective order and have an affirmative obligation to verify whether one has been issued. As Tharp noted at oral argument, placing a burden on a person to inquire about the existence of a protective order might require the person to check multiple courts in multiple counties. Such a burden would undermine the importance of service, and we decline to hold Tharp had a burden to investigate whether he was subject to a protective order. Because the State presented insufficient evidence that Tharp had notice of an active order of protection, we reverse his conviction of invasion of privacy.
DARDEN, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.