BAKER, C.J.
The appellants argue that the children of a parent who provides love, care, and affection, but no financial or non-financial support, should be considered dependent children pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act. Here, a father was mentally ill to the extent that he could not support himself or anyone else. He had essentially no contact with his children in the last six years of his life. After he died, his estate filed a wrongful death claim that the trial court dismissed on summary judgment. Although we do not intend to minimize the intangible value of a parent’s love and affection, the Wrongful Death Act is based on pecuniary value—and pecuniary loss. Here, the father never did, and never would, be able to support his children; thus, there was no pecuniary loss. Summary judgment was properly entered in the defendant’s favor.
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Our Supreme Court has explained that “[p]ecuniary loss is the foundation of the wrongful death action. This loss can be determined in part from the assistance that the decedent would have provided through money, services or other material benefits.’” Estate of Sears, 771 N.E.2d 1136, 1139 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Luider v. Skaggs, 693 N.E.2d 593, 596-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)). . . .
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In contending that love, care, and affection are sufficient to establish dependency, the Estate directs our attention to Necessary. In that case, however, this court explicitly stated that “[t]he question of whether non-monetary services standing alone are sufficient to establish dependency of adult children is not presented, and we do not reach it.” Id. at 77. The Deaconess court also confronted Necessary, explaining as follows:
[The daughter] also relies upon Necessary v. Inter-State Towing, 697 N.E.2d 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), reh’g denied, trans. denied. There, in dicta, the court stated that “[d]ependency can also be established through love, affection, and services, rather than just financial contribution.” Id. at 76. However, the court went on to hold genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the decedent made a financial contribution to her son and grandson. Id. at 78. Thus, the issue of whether dependency can be established through love, care, and affection was not addressed. Moreover, to the extent that Necessary holds that love, affection, or care may establish dependency, we disagree. Consequently, we find no support for [the daughter’s] assertion that dependency can be established by love, affection, or care.
Deaconess, 791 N.E.2d at 847-48. We agree with the Deaconess court’s analysis and decline to apply the Necessary dicta herein.
The Estate also argues that the fact that Donald owed child support merits a finding of dependency. In support of this position, the Estate directs our attention to Estate of Ash v. Ash, 661 N.E.2d 24 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). . . .
We find Ash to be distinguishable from the instant case because here, unlike in Ash, the decedent never had the ability to pay. An obligation to pay does not always translate to an ability to pay, and according to the Estate’s own evidence, Donald’s mental illness was always and would always be a complete roadblock to his ability to make child support payments of any kind. Thus, unlike in Ash, there was no loss. Donald’s children were never going to receive child support payments from him—not because of his incarceration, not because of a recalcitrance to pay, but because he was mentally ill and unable to support himself or anyone else. See Chamberlain v. Parks, 692 N.E.2d 1380, 1383 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that “[t]he purpose of the Wrongful Death Act is to compensate surviving next of kin for pecuniary losses”).
It is well established that “dependency must be actual, amounting to a necessitous want on the part of the beneficiary and a recognition of that necessity on the part of the decedent, an actual dependence coupled with a reasonable expectation of support or with some reasonable claim to support from the decedent.’” Estate of Miller v. City of Hammond, 691 N.E.2d 1310, 1312 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Bowyer, 131 Ind. App. 86, 169 N.E.2d 409, 412 (1960)). Here, the minor children were not actually dependent on Donald—either partially or fully. There was no showing that there was a “necessitous want” on the part of the children. Moreover, given his mental illness, there was simply no reasonable expectation of support, regardless of the reasonableness of their respective claims.
The Estate directs us to Wilson v. Redinbo, 519 N.E.2d 568, 569 (Ind. 1988), in which our Supreme Court stated that “[t]he degree of dependency and amount of contribution are issues for the jury.” The court went on, however, to explain that, “[w]hile the jury in this case might well have concluded that the monetary value of [the decedent’s] contribution was not great and the financial loss suffered by the . . . children was low, the evidence of dependency looked at most favorably to the administrator would allow reasonable persons to conclude that some loss had occurred.” Id. at 569. In contrast, in this case, there is simply no evidence of dependency that warrants putting the issue in front of a jury. As noted above, love, care, and affection are insufficient, and Donald never provided any financial or nonfinancial support to his children. Thus, we agree with the trial court that, as a matter of law, Donald’s children were not his dependents within the meaning of the Wrongful Death Act.
In sum, to prevail, the Estate was required to establish that Donald’s children had a need for his support and actually received that support. It has failed on both accounts, inasmuch as its own evidence establishes that Donald was never capable of providing financial support or nonpecuniary services to the children. He may have provided emotional support to the children—a difficult task, inasmuch as he was prohibited from having contact with them during at least six of the final six and one-half years of his life—but it is well established that emotional support is insufficient to establish dependency. The touchstone of the Wrongful Death Act is pecuniary loss, and here, there was none. Therefore, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in Stephens’s favor.
Finally, the Estate argues that this application of the Wrongful Death Act violates Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides that “the General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” Specifically, the Estate argues that “[t]he minor children of mentally disabled persons . . . should not be unconstitutionally discriminated against by being prohibited from pursuing wrongful death claims on the sole ground that no financial support was paid by their disabled parent during their lifetimes.” Appellants’ Br. p. 13.
Initially, we note that the Estate has provided no authority whatsoever in support of this argument. It has, therefore, waived the issue. See, e.g., Loomis v. Ameritech Corp., 764 N.E.2d 658, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding argument waived for failure to cite authority or provide cogent argument).
Waiver notwithstanding, we note that the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute based on a purported improper classification must negate every reasonable basis for the classification. . . .
The Estate essentially argues that the statute draws an impermissible line between children whose parents are able to provide support and those whose parents are unable to provide support. As already explained, however, the legislature intended to permit recovery only to those who were financially dependent on the decedent. Children cannot be financially dependent on an adult, like Donald, who is wholly incapable of supporting himself or anyone else. Thus, there was no pecuniary loss. We find that limiting the statute in this way is rational.
The Wrongful Death Act also satisfies the second prong of the Collins test, which requires any privileged classification to be open to any and all persons who share the inherent characteristics which distinguish and justify the classification. The Wrongful Death Act permits all “dependent children” to avail themselves of the privilege of recovering damages. Therefore, both prongs of the Collins test are satisfied, and we conclude that the Wrongful Death Act does not violate Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
KIRSCH, J., and DARDEN, J., concur.