BROWN, J.
Anthony Harris (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s decree of dissolution of the marriage of Husband and Teasha Harris (“Wife”), in which the court awarded custody of the minor child of the parties to Wife, ordered that Husband pay child support and a spousal allowance to Wife, and ordered the distribution of the marital property of the parties. . . .
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The first issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Husband’s motion to correct errors upon the basis that Husband failed to properly preserve his claim that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. . . .
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Here, the chronological case summary shows that no attorney filed an appearance to represent Husband in the trial court proceedings. In addition, Husband sent a notice letter to the trial court dated October 3, 2008, which was file-stamped on October 7, 2008, informing the trial court that he “decline[d] to accept voluntary service” under “§ 516.12(c) of 32 CFR 516.” See Appellant’s Appendix at 16. Also, the record shows that Husband was served by a sheriff in New Hanover County, North Carolina, on November 26, 2008. On March 2, 2009, Husband filed a motion to correct errors, an affidavit in support of the motion, and an emergency motion to suspend support payments. Husband’s motion argued that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over Husband, that a default judgment could not be rendered against him because he was a member of the United States military stationed overseas, and that he was not properly served. Neither Husband’s letter nor the fact that he was served in North Carolina demonstrates a waiver. See Stidham, 698 N.E.2d at 1155-1156 (concluding that the trial court erred in finding the defendant’s motion was barred and that the defendant did not waive his defense of lack of personal jurisdiction where the defendant had received service of process in another state by certified mail); see also Laflamme v. Goodwin, 911 N.E.2d 660, 666-667 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that the fact that the appellant did not contest personal jurisdiction when the Indiana court domesticated a divorce decree of another state did not serve as a valid waiver of the appellant’s right to subsequently contest the Indiana court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over him); Hill, 744 N.E.2d at 512 (observing that the motion for continuance filed by an attorney on the defendant’s 9 behalf did not demonstrate a waiver as that attorney never entered an appearance for the defendant).
Therefore, the trial court erred in denying Husband’s motion to correct errors upon the basis that Husband failed to properly preserve his claim that the court lacked personal jurisdiction to issue the decree.
The next issue is whether the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Husband to enter judgment as to child support, spousal allowance, and distribution of marital property. Husband argues that “[t]he trial court lacked jurisdiction to do anything except simply to dissolve the parties’ marriage.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. Specifically, Husband argues that Ind. Trial Rule 4.4(A)(7) does not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction and that he “has insufficient contacts with Indiana for the trial court to have exercised in personam jurisdiction over him for the incidences of marriage.” Id. at 16.
We address separately the trial court’s jurisdiction over Husband for the purposes of: (A) dissolving the marriage of the parties; and (B) adjudicating the incidences of the marriage and child support.
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We initially note that a dissolution of marriage proceeding has historically contained two principal elements: (1) the divorce, that is, the changing of the parties’ status from married to unmarried, and (2) the adjudication of the incidences of marriage, that is, affecting a nonresident respondent’s interest in property. Rinderknecht v. Rinderknecht, 174 Ind. App. 382, 388, 367 N.E.2d 1128, 1133 (1977). The changing of the parties’ status from married to unmarried has been denominated as an in rem proceeding, and the trial court may, upon ex parte request of a resident party, dissolve a marriage without obtaining personal jurisdiction over the other party. Id.; Persinger v. Persinger, 531 N.E.2d 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that in personam jurisdiction over one spouse is not a prerequisite to the entry of a dissolution decree). The residency of one party satisfies the minimum contact necessary for the exercise of such in rem jurisdiction. Rinderknecht, 174 Ind. App. at 391, 367 N.E.2d at 1133-1135; Persinger, 531 N.E.2d 502 (noting that in rem jurisdiction gives the court jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage). However, in personam jurisdiction over both parties is required to adjudicate the parties’ property rights. Rinderknecht, 174 Ind. App. at 388, 367 N.E.2d at 1133.
Here, it is uncontested that Wife was a resident of Marion County, Indiana. Thus, the Marion County Superior Court had in rem jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage and return the status of the parties from married to unmarried. See id.
In addition to dissolving the marriage of Husband and Wife, the trial court ordered Husband to pay $239 per week as child support, $500 per month to Wife as spousal allowance, delinquent automobile payments in the approximate amount of $1,050 and the balance owed on the vehicle of $14,216.70, to transfer title to the vehicle to Wife, and awarded thirty-two percent of Husband’s military retirement to Wife.
In order for a trial court to have jurisdiction over marital property, the court must have in personam jurisdiction over both parties. . . . Additionally, a support order is incident to marriage and requires in personam jurisdiction of both parties. Johnston v. Johnston, 825 N.E.2d 958, 963 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). A court obtains such jurisdiction if “minimum contacts” exist between the state and the party over whom the state seeks to exercise control. . . .
[Because the husband never lived in Indiana during the marriage,] we conclude that the personal jurisdiction of the Marion County Superior Court over Husband is not established under Ind. Trial Rule 4.4(A)(7). See Rinderknecht, 174 Ind. App. at 393, 367 N.E.2d at 1136 (holding that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant where the only evidence was that the defendant was a resident of another state and observing that “TR 4.4(A)(7) is not broad enough in its scope to encompass the situation which is present in the case at bar”) . . . .
In this case, there are no contacts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Husband. Husband’s only contacts with Indiana are paying a financial allotment to Wife by sending a check to her or depositing it into an account. We cannot say that this limited contact constitutes “purposefully avail[ing himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within [Indiana], thus invoking the benefits and protections of [Indiana’s] laws.” . . .
In addition, Indiana has adopted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (the “UIFSA”), which provides a mechanism for cooperation between state courts in enforcing duties of support. . . . Given the content and timing of Husband’s letter and his motion following the trial court’s decree of dissolution, we conclude that Husband’s filings with the trial court did not have the effect of waiving his right to contest personal jurisdiction under [UIFSA} subsection 2(C).
Further, as previously concluded, the trial court here did not obtain personal jurisdiction over Husband based upon “any other basis consistent with the Constitution of the State of Indiana and the Constitution of the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.” As a result, the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over Husband under subsection (8) of Ind. Code § 31-18-2-1 for the purpose of ordering child support.
Based upon the record, we conclude that the trial court’s order as to child support, spousal allowance, payment for and transfer of title to the parties’ vehicle in Wife’s possession, Husband’s military retirement, and any other incidences of marriage is void for lack of personal jurisdiction over Husband.
The next issue is whether the trial court erred in making a determination as to custody of the parties’ minor child. Initially, we note that a trial court may adjudicate custody without acquiring personal jurisdiction over an absent parent given reasonable attempts to furnish notice of the proceedings. . . .
Husband appears to argue that he “was entitled to set aside the trial court’s judgment . . . under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.” Appellant’s Brief at 16. The trial court is obligated to observe any applicable requirements of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, found at 50 App. U.S.C.A. §§ 501-596, in child custody proceedings.
Section 521(a) of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act applies to any civil action or proceeding, including any child custody proceeding, in which the defendant does not make an appearance. See 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 521(a). Section 521(b)(1) of the Act provides that before entering judgment for a plaintiff, a court shall require the plaintiff to file with the court an affidavit stating whether or not the defendant is in military service and showing necessary facts to support the affidavit, or, if the plaintiff is unable to determine whether or not the defendant is in military service, stating that the plaintiff is unable to determine whether or not the defendant is in military service. See 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 521(b)(1). The Section also provides that the affidavit may be satisfied “by a statement, declaration, verification, or certificate, in writing, subscribed and certified or declared to be true under penalty of perjury.” See 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 521(b)(4). In addition, if the defendant is in military service, Section 521(b)(2) provides that the court may not enter a judgment until after the court appoints an attorney to represent the defendant. See 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 521(b)(2).
Here, the record does not show that the trial court required Wife to file an affidavit with the court as required by 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 521(b)(1). The record also shows that no attorney made an appearance on Husband’s behalf in the trial court proceedings and that the trial court did not appoint an attorney to represent Husband. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to comply with the provisions of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act prior to entering the decree. . . .
Indiana has adopted provisions of the 1997 Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Ind. Code §§ 32-21 herein referred to as the “Act”).9 See Ind. Code § 31-21. The purpose of the Act is to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in matters of child custody. See Counceller v. Counceller, 810 N.E.2d 372, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. The Act sets forth the circumstances under which Indiana courts have jurisdiction over a child custody matter. Ind. Code § 31-21-5 contains provisions regarding jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination, exclusive and continuing jurisdiction, jurisdiction to make a custody modification, and temporary emergency jurisdiction. See Ind. Code §§ 31-21-5-1 through -4.
In addition, Ind. Code § 31-21-4-1 provides that “[a]n Indiana court may communicate with a court in another state concerning a proceeding arising under [the UCCJA].” Ind. Code § 31-21-4-2 provides that “[t]he court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If the parties are not able to participate in the communication, the parties must be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made.” Husband specifically argues that “the trial court did not give [him] an opportunity to present facts and legal arguments, as required by I.C. § 31-21-4-2, before a decision on jurisdiction was made,” and therefore that “[t]he trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction was defective.” Appellant’s Brief at 25.
Here, upon discovering at the December 4, 2008 hearing that a custody proceeding regarding the parties’ child was also pending in a court in North Carolina, the trial court communicated with that court as permitted by Ind. Code § 31-21-4-1 in an effort to determine the appropriate forum. When engaging in such a communication, however, the court must either allow the parties to participate11 or, if they do not participate, the parties “must be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments,” and it is important that this opportunity be afforded the parties “before a decision on jurisdiction is made.” See Ind. Code § 31-21-4-2 (emphasis added). The record reveals that the trial court here did not afford Husband such an opportunity to participate and made a decision on jurisdiction adverse to Husband without presenting him any opportunity to present facts or arguments. Under the circumstances, this was reversible error. . . .
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Husband’s motion to correct errors on the basis that Husband failed to properly preserve his claim that the court lacked personal jurisdiction, affirm the trial court’s decree of dissolution as to the court’s order dissolving the marriage of the parties and changing the status of the parties from married to unmarried, reverse the trial court’s decree as to those portions adjudicating the incidences of marriage as set forth herein, and reverse the trial court’s decree as to its award of custody of the parties’ minor child to Wife and remand with instructions to comply with the provisions of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act in the child custody proceedings and to make a decision on jurisdiction in accordance with the requirements of Indiana’s Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
CRONE, J., and MAY, J., concur.