BROWN, J.
. . . At a bench trial held on May 8, 2009, Hampton was found guilty of Count I, child molesting as a class A felony. [Footnote omitted.] On May 20, 2009, the trial court sentenced Hampton to twenty years in the Department of Correction.
The issue raised on cross appeal is whether the sentence imposed by the trial court is illegal. The State’s argument requires us to interpret Ind. Code § 35-50-2-2. . . . .
Ind. Code § 35-50-2-2 reads in relevant part:
(a) The court may suspend any part of a sentence for a felony, except as provided in this section or in section 2.1 of this chapter.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (i), with respect to the following crimes listed in this subsection, the court may suspend only that part of the sentence that is in excess of the minimum sentence . . . .
* * * * *
(i) If a person is:
(1) convicted of child molesting (IC 35-42-4-3) as a Class A felony against a victim less than twelve (12) years of age; and
(2) at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
the court may suspend only that part of the sentence that is in excess of thirty (30) years.
Also, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-1(c)(2) dictates that the phrase “minimum sentence” equals twenty years for class A felonies.
The State argues that the trial court failed to apply subsection (i) of Ind. Code § 35-50-2-2, “Suspension; Probation; Exceptions,” in sentencing Hampton. [Footnote omitted.] The State argues that “subsection (i) dictates that the minimum executed sentence available for this particularly aggravated form of child molesting is thirty years, rather than the generally applicable twenty year minimum [for class A felonies].” . . . The State therefore reasons that “[i]n effect, the legislature has declared that when child molesting is committed under these particularly egregious circumstances, the minimum executed sentence for that offense should be thirty years.” . . . .
We are not persuaded by the State’s argument, however, because Ind. Code § 35-50-2-2 addresses only the suspension of sentences. . . . .
Based upon the plain language of the statute, we conclude that Ind. Code § 35-50-2-2 dictates only the discretion trial courts have in designating which portions of a defendant’s sentence may be suspended and does not expressly set sentencing minimums. . . . .
Particularly in light of the fact that we strictly construe penal statutes against the State, . . . we conclude that the trial court did not illegally sentence Hampton when it sentenced him to the minimum twenty years for child molesting as a class A felony.
MATHIAS, J., and BARNES, J., concur.