BOEHM, J.
The Indiana Tort Claims Act provides governmental units immunity from liability for losses caused by temporary weather conditions. We have previously held that this immunity applies during the period of reasonable response to a weather condition. We hold today that that period lasts at least until the weather condition has stabilized, and immunizes the governmental unit from liability for alleged flaws in its remedial steps.
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. . . The ITCA provides the following immunity to liability for breach of this duty:
A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee’s employment is not liable if a loss results from
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(3) The temporary condition of a public thoroughfare . . . that results from weather.
I.C. § 34-13-3-3(3). Immunity under subsection (3) requires that the loss result from a condition that is both “temporary” and “caused by weather.” . . .
As we explained in Roach-Walker, “when the government is in the process of responding to a weather condition, as a matter of law the immunity conferred in subsection (3) . . . extends to all claims caused by that condition during the period of reasonable response, whether the alleged injury occurred early or late in the response.” 917 N.E.2d at 1228. Here, it is undisputed that the flooding and freezing of the resulting water was attributable to the unprecedented fluctuation in the weather the few days preceding the accident. The water and ice in the road leading to the accident undoubtedly presented a condition “caused by weather.” But whether the condition was “temporary” and therefore conferred immunity is a closer question. There is some conflict in the designated evidence over how many signs were at the accident site, where they were placed, and whether King Road was “dry” the afternoon of the day before the accident. It is undisputed that the County was aware of the flooding, assessed the situation, closed the adjacent Plymouth-Goshen Trail, and sent County employees on at least three trips to the flooded area where the accident occurred to place warning signs and to salt the roads to address the icing.
The foregoing facts establish that the County had notice of the condition, had the opportunity to respond, and did in fact respond. The Buleses argue the condition was therefore no longer temporary. We do not agree. The County designated undisputed evidence that the Yellow River continued to rise after the County’s initial response on January 13 and 14. A historic crest was reached on January 15, the day of the accident. The condition caused by the weather—the flooding of the Yellow River and the subsequent icing near the flooding—had not yet stabilized.
The Buleses also argue that the County’s response was inadequate or improper. Even if the County was negligent in its initial response to warn passengers of the flooding on King Road, the accident occurred during the period of a still evolving condition. Immunity presumes duty and breach—without duty and breach, there is no need for immunity. As we held in Catt v. Board of Commissioners of Knox County, 779 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 2002), negligent maintenance of a road is irrelevant if immunity applies. The same is true of an allegedly negligent response to a weather condition. As a governmental entity responds to the temporary conditions, the statute confers immunity at least until the condition is stabilized and the responses are completed. Taking the facts most favorable to the Buleses, they establish no more than that signs were placed in inappropriate locations. But the fact that the County’s response in some of the affected area was completed or poorly done does not establish that the condition was no longer temporary.
Construing the facts most favorably to the Buleses and assuming negligent placement of warnings, the County has demonstrated that the condition causing the injuries was created by an uncharacteristic weather pattern, and the condition continued to worsen during the hours leading up to the accident and the County had begun to respond. The statute confers immunity during the “period of reasonable response” to a condition. Immunity applies even if the response is in some respects inadequate as the Buleses claim here. The window of reasonable response wherein immunity applies is at a minimum the period of time it takes the condition throughout the affected area to stabilize. In this case, after the County attempted to address the flooding and ice at the accident site, the condition continued to worsen into the early morning of the day of the accident. The “period of reasonable response” lasts at least until the condition stops worsening, in this case when the Yellow River crested. Because the accident occurred during this period, immunity applies, regardless of the alleged inadequacies in the County’s initial response at the site of the Buleses’ accident.
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The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Shepard, C.J., Sullivan, J., and Rucker, J., concur.
DICKSON, J., dissents, believing that the Court of Appeals was correct.