DICKSON, J.
Each of these two consolidated appeals [footnote omitted] presents the same question: whether the State must comply with Indiana Criminal Rule 25, which imposes a stay pending preliminary appellate review of a warrant authorizing interception of telephonic or telegraphic communications, notwithstanding the legislative repeal of the statutory provision requiring such review. We hold that the State was not authorized to disregard its obligations under Rule 25, which was in effect and had not been repealed or modified. Under the facts of these cases, however, the failure to seek preliminary appellate review does not require reversal because the defendants have not demonstrated that the State’s failure affected their substantial rights.
In each of the cases, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of police wiretapping purportedly authorized by a warrant issued pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-33.5-1-1 et seq. When first adopted in 1990, the statute required the prosecuting attorney, before the wiretap warrant was implemented, to apply to the Indiana Court of Appeals “for an ex parte de novo review of the issuing court’s decision” under rules adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court. Ind. Code § 35-33.5-3-3(a) (repealed 2007). Such rules were adopted by this Court later that year, designated as Criminal Rule 25. Seventeen years later, in 2007, the statutory requirement for preliminary appellate review, Section 3, was repealed. [Footnote omitted.] This occurred prior to the dates relevant to the present cases. But Rule 25 was not modified in response and remained in effect when the wiretap warrants in these cases were issued. The trial court suppressed the evidence in these cases solely because of the State’s failure to comply with the preliminary appellate review requirement of Rule 25. The State appealed [footnote omitted] and, pursuant to Appellate Rule 56(A), immediately sought emergency transfer to this Court, which we granted.
. . . .
We first observe that the statutory requirement for automatic review, before its repeal, prescribed “an ex parte de novo review of the issuing court’s decision.” Ind. Code § 35-33.5-3-3 (repealed 2007). Section 3 instructed that the Court of Appeals “shall review the reasons for the issuance of the warrant and determine whether the requirements of this article5 have been met” and authorized the court to “affirm, modify, or overrule the order of the court to which the application was made.” Id. § 35-33.5-3-3(b)–(c). In contrast to these substantive directives, Criminal Rule 25 deals almost entirely with procedural matters, secrecy, and reporting. The Rule states that the implementation of the warrant “shall be stayed pending approval of its issuance by the Indiana Court of Appeals,” Crim. R. 25(B), but it does not prescribe the grounds or standard for such review. [Footnote omitted.] Clearly, Rule 25 was intended to supply the procedural framework for the automatic review detailed in Section 3 of the statute.
The legislature’s decision to repeal Section 3, however, does not automatically invalidate or vitiate a rule of criminal procedure promulgated by this Court. The Indiana Supreme Court is expressly authorized to supervise “the exercise of jurisdiction by the other courts of the State” and to “exercise appellate jurisdiction under such terms and conditions as specified by rules.” Ind. Const. art. 7, § 4. It “has authority to adopt, amend, and rescind rules of court that govern and control practice and procedure in all the courts of Indiana.” Ind. Code § 34-8-1-3. The legislature has acknowledged that once such rules are adopted, “all laws in conflict with the supreme court’s rules have no further force or effect.” Id.
While perhaps lacking in substantive content, Criminal Rule 25 nevertheless directs that “[w]here a circuit or superior court issues a warrant for a wiretap, the prosecuting attorney shall file a petition for review of the warrant for wiretap with the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days of the issuance of the warrant.” Until amended or rescinded by this Court, the validity of Criminal Rule 25 and its procedural requirements remain in full force and effect. The policy arguments presented by the State and the defendants, while relevant to whether the Rule should be modified or repealed in the future, do not affect its present validity.
In each of the present cases, the challenged evidence resulted from the same wiretap war-rants issued by Judge Craney upon her review of the probable cause evidence presented by the prosecuting authorities. The factual, procedural, and legal correctness of Judge Craney’s warrants have not been challenged at trial or on appeal by either defendant. Neither defendant asserts any basis upon which to claim that, if there had been an automatic review by the Court of Appeals as prescribed by Criminal Rule 25, the execution of the warrants would have been prevented, modified, or interrupted. In other words, neither defendant demonstrates that their substantial rights were affected by the defect represented by the prosecution’s failure to comply with Criminal Rule 25.
We find that, because the defendants did not establish that the State’s failure to seek re-view of the wiretap warrants affected their substantial rights, the trial court was required by Trial Rule 61 to disregard such error or defect. The granting of the defendants’ motions was thus contrary to law and subject to reversal.
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan and Boehm JJ., concur. Rucker, J., concurs in result.