ROBB, J.
Mark Hicks appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of his ex-wife, Tammy Hicks, for child support arrearage. Hicks raises one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding a judgment to Tammy. Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
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Mark and Tammy are the parents of one son, Brandon, born May 2, 1985. The parties’ marriage was dissolved by decree entered August 10, 1989. Custody of Brandon was deferred and the parties agreed to a joint custody arrangement pending a court order determining custody. Prior to the trial court’s entry of an order regarding custody, Mark made numerous allegations against Tammy that required investigation and upset the joint custody agreement, delaying permanent resolution of the custody issues. On March 20, 1992, the trial court entered an order granting Tammy sole custody of Brandon effective March 22, 1992, giving Mark “reasonable and liberal visitation,” appellant’s appendix at 26, and ordering Mark to pay child support of $47.00 weekly beginning on March 27, 1992. Mark absconded with Brandon on or prior to March 22, 1992.
While Mark and Brandon were absent from the jurisdiction, Mark did not pay child support as required by the March 20, 1992, order. On Tammy’s motion, the trial court entered an order on April 30, 1993, finding Mark in contempt, holding sanctions for the contempt finding in abeyance until Mark appeared in court, and entering a judgment representing arrearage to date and attorney fees in the total amount of $3,029.00. On December 8, 1994, the order was amended to reflect a further arrearage of $4,418.00, for a total judgment of $7,447.00.
Mark was charged with a crime for absconding with Brandon. He remained a fugitive from justice until he appeared in court on August 21, 2008, to answer the pending criminal charges. Tammy subsequently filed a motion with the dissolution court seeking a decision on the sanctions stayed in the April 30, 1993, order; a motion for proceedings supplemental to collect the December 8, 1994, judgment plus interest; and a verified petition for support arrearage accrued since the December 8, 1994, judgment. Mark filed a motion for relief from the December 8, 1994, judgment and a motion in opposition to Tammy’s motion for support arrearage, alleging in both that since Brandon had been in his sole care and custody since March 22, 1992, Tammy would be unjustly enriched by an award of support arrearage.
Following a hearing at which the parties stipulated Mark had made no child support payments since March 20, 1992, and was fit and able to work during that time, the trial court sentenced Mark to 180 days in jail for the prior finding of contempt, subject to his ability to purge the contempt by paying the $7,447.00 judgment. The trial court ordered Mark to pay interest on the $7,447.00 judgment and be responsible for an additional arrearage from the date of the December 8, 1994 order to May 2, 2006, the date of Brandon’s twenty-first birthday, of $27,965.00, plus interest. The trial court also denied Mark’s motion for relief from judgment and motion in opposition to the petition for support arrearage, and further denied Mark’s “request to have any and all money paid toward satisfaction of any of said judgments held in trust for the child.” Appellant’s App. at 65-66. Mark now appeals.
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. . . It is undisputed Mark made no payments toward his support obligation since March 22, 1992, his support obligation was never modified, and he owes a sizable arrearage. It is also undisputed Brandon was exclusively with Mark from March 22, 1992, until he reached the age of majority, and Tammy expended no money in direct support of Brandon during that time. Further, there is no evidence Mark did not care for or support Brandon while Brandon was in his care. Mark’s custody of Brandon was in express disregard of a court order and was not agreed to by the parties.
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There are three people in this case to whom the arrearage could be awarded: Mark, who fully and completely supported Brandon; Tammy, who expended no money in directly supporting Brandon; and Brandon, who is now emancipated and was supported during his minority. Mark, despite having supported Brandon, is clearly not entitled to have the arrearage forgiven because of his wrongdoing in taking custody of Brandon in willful violation of a court order. The child support was supposed to be paid for Brandon’s benefit, but he was fully supported by Mark during his minority. Tammy did not provide support for Brandon but, being unaware of his whereabouts, also did not have the option to support him. Presumably, she maintained a home for Brandon should he be returned to her custody and made decisions for sixteen years based upon the possibility of his return. . . .
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. . . As between these three parties and under these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in awarding a judgment on the arrearage to Tammy.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a judgment on Mark’s child support arrearage to Tammy and denying Mark’s request to award the judgment directly to Brandon.
Affirmed.
MATHIAS, J., concurs.
DARDEN J., dissents with separate opinion.
DARDEN, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, but with the caveat that I fully agree that the trial court has the authority to find and hold Father in contempt of its order and to appropriately sanction him.
At the outset, I am of the opinion that Father’s conduct was criminal; that he is undeserving of sympathy; that he deserves to be punished according to the law; and that his case deserves to be reviewed in a criminal court for possible criminal charges for absconding with Brandon in the face of the trial court custody order awarding custody to Mother. It appears that Father may be tried on a criminal charge in that regard, however, and the result will surely constitute his legal punishment for committing a criminal act. However, the case before us is one of family law, and as the majority notes, is not “a typical case involving an arrearage.” Slip op. at #9. Under the circumstances of this case, I find that the trial court’s order — that Mother receive the funds as ordered – is error.
Mother argued to the trial court, as she does on appeal, that Father should be granted no relief based on “the Unclean Hands doctrine,” (Tr. 9), because he “came into the courtroom on January 9, 2009 with unclean hands.” Appellee’s Br. at 11. Yet in exercising its equitable jurisdiction, a trial court must always “seek[] to do justice, and not injustice.” 12 I.L.E. Equity § 16 (2009). Thus, “equity looks beneath rigid rules to find substantial justice and has the power to prevent strict rules from working an injustice.” Id. at § 3 (citing Doe v. Schults-Lewis Child and Family Servs., Inc., 718 N.E.2d 728 (Ind. 1999)). Accordingly, as a matter of equity, the trial court must “do the right thing,” regardless of the distasteful nature of Father’s action.
The full financial impact of the trial court’s February 2009 order is not clear from the majority opinion. In addition to the trial court’s order that Father pay the December 1994 judgment amount of $7,447.00, Father was also ordered to pay $49,810.07 in accumulated interest thereon, for a total of $57,257.07, and interest accruing after May 2, 2006 (Brandon’s twenty-first birthday) at a rate of 8% per annum. Also, in addition to the trial court’s judgment for an arrearage from December 8, 1994 through May 2, 2006 in the amount of $27,965.00, it ordered Father to pay interest accruing from that date at 8% per annum. Thus, it appears that the trial court’s February 2009 order will require that Father pay Mother more than $100,000.00 for his failure to comply with its order regarding child support. 14
Certainly the right to support lies exclusively with the child, and the custodial parent holds child support payments in trust for the child’s benefit. See Bussert, 677 N.E.2d at 71. Accordingly, it seems to me that under the circumstances herein, there must be some evidence presented by Mother of actual expenses that she incurred as a result of her custodial parent status, e.g. expenses of her living arrangements during the relevant time period as related to accommodations for Brandon; her expenditures for food, medical, or educational expenses during the relevant time period on Brandon’s behalf; etc. The majority postulates that Mother may have “maintained a home for Brandon should he be returned to her custody and made decisions for sixteen years based upon the possibility of his return,” slip op. at *9, but there is no evidence in this regard. At the outset of the hearing, the trial court offered Mother the opportunity “to present . . . evidence.” (Tr. 4). She did not, and the majority notes that the trial court heard no evidence whatsoever as to any expenditure by Mother on behalf of Brandon. (“[Mother] expended no money in support of Brandon” from March 22, 1992 until he reached the age of majority. Slip op. at *8).
Although I cannot find that the trial court’s order exceeds the parameters of black-letter law, likewise I cannot find it to be an equitable order based upon the circumstances here. It is undisputed that Father fed, clothed, sheltered, and cared for Brandon for all the years they were missing, and while it may not be proper to fully credit him for those expenses in the ultimate determination of his legal liability for child support, I find the order appealed to constitute an unwarranted windfall for Mother. As a result, I would reverse and remand for the trial court to hear evidence of actual expenses and/or expenditures that Mother incurred on Brandon’s behalf as the custodial parent during the relevant time period, or to further consider Father’s argument that past-due child support should be deposited into a trust for the benefit of Brandon.