CRONE, J.
Darrell Kenton Henderson (“Husband”) appeals the marriage dissolution decree holding him in contempt of the trial court’s provisional order regarding parenting time and awarding primary physical custody of his two minor children to petitioner Brittany Lee Henderson (“Wife”). We reverse the finding of contempt, vacate the dissolution decree, and remand for a new hearing.
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At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court stated,
Um you know, it appears to me that both parties are in contempt of the court order. Um obviously um sir if you wish to exercise uh parenting time, it was specifically in the court order that you needed the proper equipment: the car seats and necessary diapers, food, clothing and other necessities for children, especially young children. Um if you did not have those she had every right to not let the children come to you if those uh- if those things were not available to you at that place. …. And apparently the two of you would rather fight and argue and victimize your children than do what the Court has ordered you and required you to do. And that means both of you. So please be advised, the Court is going to enter an order finding you both in contempt and I’m going to sentence you to one hundred and eighty days in jail. I’m going to stay that because I want something hanging over your head to enforce you because apparently nothing else will.
Id. at 81-82.
Following a recess, the trial court turned to the matter of the dissolution decree. The trial court noted that there was a provisional order in effect, which resolved most of the parties’ disagreements, and asked whether that order could be the framework for the final dissolution decree. Id. at 86. Wife supported the provisional order, whereas Husband contested physical custody of the children. The court heard a summary of each side’s position presented by counsel. Husband’s counsel then noted that allegations of physical abuse could be raised because the children’s grandmother witnessed Wife throwing one of the children to the floor. Id. at 90. However, the trial court did not hear any evidence and ordered Wife’s counsel to prepare a dissolution decree that tracked the provisional order. The dissolution decree granted Wife primary physical custody. Appellant’s App. at 7. Husband appeals.
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Here, the dissolution decree clearly states that the parties were found to be in contempt of the provisional order regarding parenting time. Appellant’s App. at 7. Generally, a person who willfully disobeys any order lawfully issued by any court of record or by the proper officer of the court is guilty of indirect contempt. Ind. Code § 34-47-3-1. As such, this is a case of indirect contempt. See In re Paternity of J.T.I., 875 N.E.2d 447, 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (concluding that mother’s interference with father’s parenting time as provided by a court order is one of indirect civil contempt).
Husband argues that the trial court erred in finding him in indirect contempt because he was not afforded the procedural safeguards for such a finding. Indirect contempt proceedings require an array of due process protections, including notice and the opportunity to be heard. J.T.I., 875 N.E.2d at 450. . . .
In the case at bar, no rule to show cause was issued. In fact, Wife did not request issuance of a rule to show cause order against Husband. If no rule to show cause is issued in compliance with Indiana Code Section 34-47-3-5, then a court generally cannot hold a person in indirect contempt. J.T.I., 875 N.E.2d at 451. However, strict compliance with Indiana Code Section 34-47-3-5 may be excused in certain circumstances [such as those discussed in Mitchell and J.T.I.].
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This case presents a factual scenario different from both Mitchell and J.T.I. Here, no information verified by oath or affirmation was filed with the court and no rule to show cause order was issued. See Ind. Code § 34-47-3-5. In Mitchell, the appellant received service of the petition alleging that she was in contempt of the trial court’s order. Thus, she had notice of the charges against her and an opportunity to directly respond to those charges. Husband, however, had no notice whatsoever because Wife did not initiate contempt charges against him. Certainly, Husband’s contempt allegations against Wife did not put him on notice that he could be found in contempt. On the other hand, unlike the appellant in J.T.I., Husband was present and testified at the hearing at which the trial court found him in contempt. Nevertheless, Husband had no inkling that he might be held in contempt until the trial court spontaneously found him to be in contempt. Therefore, he did not know that he should present evidence as to his compliance with the provisional order. Accordingly, we conclude that Husband has presented a prima facie case that, under these circumstances, noncompliance with Indiana Code Section 34-47-3-5 cannot be excused. We therefore reverse the trial court’s finding of contempt against Husband.
Husband contends that the trial court’s failure to hear evidence at the final hearing on the petition for dissolution of marriage regarding abuse of the children violated his state constitutional and statutory rights. Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution provides, “All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay.”
This Court has noted that implicit in the constitutional right to bring a civil action is the right to present one’s claim to the trial court. Zimmerman v. Hanks, 766 N.E.2d 752, 757 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). . . .
Indiana Code Section 31-15-2-15 states, in relevant part, “At the final hearing on a petition for dissolution of marriage the court shall consider evidence, including agreements and verified pleadings filed with the court.” (Emphasis added.) The statute requires the trial court to consider evidence. We conclude that Husband has made a prima facie showing that the trial court violated his state constitutional and statutory rights in failing to hear evidence at the final hearing on the petition for marriage dissolution. Therefore, we vacate the dissolution decree and remand for a new hearing.
Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
RILEY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.