ROBB, J.
[T]he trial court extended Mogg’s probation and imposed a further condition that she continuously wear a Secure Continuous Remote Alcohol Monitor (“SCRAM”) bracelet. Following subsequent allegations of probation violations, the trial court revoked Mogg’s probation on the basis of findings she consumed alcohol as evidenced by positive readings while on SCRAM. Mogg now appeals the revocation of her probation, raising a single issue that we expand and restate as: 1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Mogg’s alcohol consumption generated by the SCRAM system; and 2) whether sufficient evidence supports the revocation of Mogg’s probation. We conclude the trial court, based upon the uncontroverted expert testimony and evidence before it, did not abuse its discretion in determining the SCRAM readings were sufficiently reliable to be admissible as evidence of Mogg’s alcohol consumption for purposes of a probation revocation. As a result, sufficient evidence supports the revocation of Mogg’s probation, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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On December 8, 2008, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on both informations. The State called Jeffrey Hawthorne, whom the trial court qualified as an expert witness based on his training as an electrical engineer, his experience in research and development of a hand-held alcohol breathalyzer, his position as co-founder and chief technology officer of Alcohol Monitoring Systems, Inc. (“AMS”), where he co-invented the SCRAM system, and his prior qualification as an expert witness in numerous jurisdictions. According to Hawthorne’s testimony, the SCRAM system, which AMS manufactures, measures concentrations of transdermal alcohol, that is, alcohol perspired through a person’s skin as sweat or vapor. Transdermal alcohol concentration (“TAC”) rises and falls on a curve that lags four to five hours behind the curve of blood alcohol concentration, as it takes longer for alcohol to be perspired through a person’s skin than to be absorbed into the bloodstream. The SCRAM bracelet, attached to the person’s lower leg or ankle, uses a fuel cell to detect alcohol in vapor drawn into a collection chamber, and this alcohol detection technology is similar to that employed in many breath-testing devices.
Hawthorne testified the SCRAM bracelet electronically transmits, every thirty minutes, transdermal alcohol readings through a modem in the person’s residence to an AMS central computer. An AMS technician monitors the flow of data, AMS analyzes the data, and AMS and its local service provider (here, Total Court Services, Inc.) notify the probation office supervising the person when the data indicate alcohol consumption of more than one drink per hour for an average person. The SCRAM system “does not ‘flag’ an event until three consecutive readings exceed [TAC of] 0.02%,” which the average person reaches only with “more than one drink in his or her system. This gives the wearer the benefit of the doubt.” Transcript at 299. When an alcohol consumption event is indicated, the person is given an opportunity to provide AMS with an alternative explanation for the positive readings, such as an environmental “interferant” or other non-beverage alcohol exposure. Id. at 312. AMS technicians are trained to distinguish the TAC curve resulting from a true drinking event from one that is the result of an interferant. According to Hawthorne, the SCRAM system is not designed to measure a precise amount of alcohol in the body, rather, it is a “semi-quantitative” screening device for determining “whether a person consumed a small, moderate or large amount of alcohol.” Id. at 290. AMS protects against mechanical error by testing all SCRAM bracelets before shipping them, calibrating each bracelet before placing it online, and running remote diagnostic checks. AMS has tested the accuracy of the SCRAM system in a study involving 839 total events, which registered 62 true positive drinking events and one false positive.
The State also called Joe Cook, an employee of Total Court Services who fitted Mogg with the SCRAM II device. According to Cook, he had received twenty-four hours of training from AMS on both SCRAM I – the original version of the SCRAM bracelet – and SCRAM II, including how to properly fit a person with the SCRAM II bracelet. Cook testified he fitted Mogg’s bracelet in accordance with his training, initialized the bracelet, and at that time the bracelet was working properly. The State also offered, and the trial court admitted over Mogg’s objection, the violation report from the SCRAM system showing, based on Mogg’s TAC graphs for the dates in question, two confirmed alcohol consumption events by Mogg on June 13-14, 2008, and October 31-November 1, 2008.
As a foundation for the reliability of the SCRAM results, the State offered, and the trial court admitted, two published studies. The first study (the “Sakai study”) was published as Joseph T. Sakai et al., Validity of Transdermal Alcohol Monitoring: Fixed and Self-Regulated Dosing, 30 Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research 26 (2006). The Sakai study showed that in a laboratory study involving twenty-four persons and over eighty samples from those who did not consume alcohol, the SCRAM I bracelet had no false positive readings. However, “the [SCRAM I] device consistently detected consumption of approximately 2 standard drinks.” Tr. at 226. The Sakai study was funded in part by a grant from AMS. The second study (the “NHTSA study”) was a November 2007 report of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which involved twenty-two persons who wore SCRAM I over a period averaging four weeks per person and engaged in laboratory-dosed and self-dosed drinking totaling 271 episodes. The study concluded SCRAM I had no “false-positive problems when true BAC was ˂.02 g / dL.” Id. at 241. The problems identified with SCRAM I were false negatives and that the bracelet‟s sensitivity and accuracy declined over the duration of wear. Hawthorne testified SCRAM II involves the same technology and scientific principles as SCRAM I, the only difference between the two units being the components of SCRAM II are smaller and fit “in one case rather than in two cases.” Id. at 88.
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The Indiana Rules of Evidence, except regarding privileges, do not apply in probation proceedings. Ind. Evidence Rule 101(c)(2). Rather, in probation revocation hearings, the trial court “may consider any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability.” Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 551. “Judges are not, of course, bound to admit all evidence presented to the court. In fact, the absence of strict evidentiary rules places particular importance on the fact-finding role of judges in assessing the weight, sufficiency and reliability of proffered evidence.” Id.; see also Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 440-42 (Ind. 2007) (holding, in light of due-process principles, hearsay is admissible in probation revocation hearings only if the trial court finds the hearsay is “substantially trustworthy”). Therefore, expert scientific testimony in probation revocation hearings is not subject to Indiana Evidence Rule 702(b), which provides “[e]xpert scientific testimony is admissible only if the court is satisfied that the scientific principles upon which the expert testimony rests are reliable.” However, expert scientific testimony, like any evidence in probation revocation hearings, is admissible only upon some showing of reliability. See Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 551. As in a criminal trial, the reliability of expert scientific evidence may be established by judicial notice or a sufficient foundation to persuade the trial court that the relevant scientific principles are reliable. See Malinski v. State, 794 N.E.2d 1071, 1084 (Ind. 2003).
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2. Indicia of SCRAM System’s Reliability
First, the record before the trial court established the SCRAM system both can be, and has been, tested regarding its accuracy in detecting a person’s alcohol consumption. To carry its burden of persuading the trial court the evidence generated by SCRAM rests on reliable scientific principles, the State introduced three studies based on laboratory-controlled testing of the SCRAM system: one study conducted internally by AMS and two external, published studies. Although these studies tested the SCRAM I bracelet and not SCRAM II, which was subsequently developed and worn by Mogg, Hawthorne’s uncontroverted testimony was that the SCRAM II bracelet uses the same technology and components as SCRAM I, and the trial court thereupon concluded the studies were relevant to the reliability of SCRAM II. Mogg points out that Hawthorne, as co-inventor of the SCRAM system and an employee of AMS, had a financial interest in his testimony offered to show the reliability of SCRAM. However, the credibility of an expert witness is a manner for determination by the trier of fact. State v. Vaughan, 243 Ind. 221, 184 N.E.2d 143, 147 (1962). Therefore, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in crediting Hawthorne’s testimony and concluding the reliability of the SCRAM system, including SCRAM II, had been subjected to testing.
Second, the evidence established the SCRAM system and results of its testing had been subjected to peer review and publication. The Sakai study was published in an academic journal devoted to alcoholism research, and the NHTSA study was published by a governmental body having responsibility for research related to public safety. The trial court did not err in finding the factor of peer review and publication weighed in favor of the SCRAM system’s reliability.
Third, each of the studies discussed above identified an error rate for the SCRAM system that the studies’ authors did not regard as problematic with respect to false positive readings. Specifically, the AMS internal study found one false positive and the Sakai study found zero false positives. The NHTSA study identified some false positives but concluded there was a greater incidence of false negatives: that is, the SCRAM system was more likely to err by not identifying a drinking event when one actually occurred than to err by registering a drinking event when the subject had not consumed alcohol. Thus, the NHTSA study supported Hawthorne’s testimony that the SCRAM system is designed to err, if at all, in the wearer’s favor. As Mogg points out, the AMS internal study was conducted by an entity having a financial stake in the results, and the Sakai study was funded in part by AMS. Although these facts were proper for the trial court to consider in assigning weight to the respective studies, it is well settled that on appeal we do not reweigh conflicting evidence. Smith, 889 N.E.2d at 839. As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded based on the three studies that the SCRAM system had an established error rate that supported a finding of reliability.
Finally, the State presented evidence to support a finding the SCRAM system functioned properly in Mogg’s case. Hawthorne testified SCRAM bracelets are calibrated before they are shipped to the wearer, and Cook testified he properly fitted Mogg with the SCRAM II bracelet and observed the bracelet was working properly. All of this testimony was uncontroverted by Mogg, and Mogg did not present any evidence that at any time thereafter the SCRAM system ceased to function properly or that an environmental interferant may have caused or contributed to her positive TAC readings.
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For the foregoing reasons, the trial court considered the proper factors in ruling on the admissibility of the SCRAM data, and the record supported its conclusion the SCRAM data had sufficient indicia of reliability to be admissible for the purpose of proving Mogg’s alcohol consumption. As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the SCRAM data to establish that Mogg violated the terms of her probation.
Our conclusion in this regard is not to be read for the proposition that SCRAM data are admissible in any type of proceeding or for purposes other than to prove the subject consumed alcohol. [Footnote omitted.] . . . For example, the record in this case would not support a finding that SCRAM data are reliable for purposes of showing a person’s intoxication. Moreover, we caution trial courts against admitting SCRAM data absent a sufficient foundation to show the system functioned reliably in the particular case, cf. Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5 (setting forth foundational requirements for breath alcohol tests), or upon affidavit without opportunity for cross-examination of the expert who analyzed the data and based a finding of consumption thereon. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(e) (providing right of confrontation and cross-examination in probation revocation hearings). Our conclusion in this case, based as it is on the record before the trial court and expert testimony that was largely uncontroverted by Mogg, leaves for another day whether the result would be different upon a different record where the indicia of the SCRAM system’s reliability were more closely disputed.
BAKER, C.J., and DARDEN, J., concur.