RUCKER, J.
At the time Hevner committed his crime, a person convicted for the first time of possessing child pornography was not considered a sex offender and thus was not required to register as such. See Ind. Code § 5-2-12-4(a)(13) (2005) (“As used in this chapter, ‘offender’ means a person convicted of . . . [p]ossession of child pornography [ ] if the person has a prior unrelated conviction for possession of child pornography. . . .”). While Hevner was awaiting trial in 2006, the Legislature repealed Ind. Code § 5-2-12-4 and recodified the statute at Ind. Code § 11-8-8-4.5. See Pub. L. No. 140-2006, §§ 13, 41. Effective July 1, 2007 – before Hevner was convicted but after he was charged – the legislature amended the statute to require anyone convicted of possession of child pornography to register as a sex offender regardless of whether the person had accumulated a prior unrelated conviction. See Ind. Code § 11-8-8-4.5(a)(13) (2007) (“. . . as used in this chapter, ‘sex offender’ means a person convicted of . . . [p]ossession of child pornography (IC 35-42-4-4(c)).”); see also Ind. Code § 11-8-8-7 (providing among other things, “. . . the following persons must register under this chapter: . . . [a] sex or violent offender who resides in Indiana . . . .” or “[a] sex or violent offender who works or carries on a vocation or intends to work or carry on a vocation full-time or part-time” for a specified period). Thus, at the time of his conviction, Hevner was required to register as a sex offender.
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We assume without deciding that when the Legislature amended Ind. Code § 11-8-8-4.5 (2007) requiring first time possessors of child pornography to register as sex offenders, it intended a civil regulatory scheme. The question is whether the registration requirement is punitive in effect. As declared in Wallace we examine this issue by applying a seven-factor test: “[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.” Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 379 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)) (alterations in original). No one factor is determinative. “[O]ur task is not simply to count the factors on each side, but to weigh them.” Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 379 (quoting State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992)).
Applying the test we concluded that only factor number six – advancing a non-punitive interest – favored treating the registration requirement as non-punitive. “The remaining factors, particularly the factor of excessiveness, point[ed] in the other direction.” Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 384. This conclusion is equally applicable here. [Footnote omitted.]
. . . Between October and November of 2005, when Hevner committed the crime of possession of child pornography, only persons convicted of a prior possession offense were required to register as sex offenders under the Act. By the time of Hevner’s trial and sentencing the Legislature had amended the Act making it applicable to first time offenders. As applied to Hevner the Act violates the prohibition on ex post facto laws contained in the Indiana Constitution because it imposes burdens that have the effect of adding punishment beyond that which could have been imposed when the crime was committed.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur.