BARNES, J.
Vanderlinden also alleges that the State failed to prove the element of endangerment as necessary to elevate the conviction from Class C to Class A misdemeanor OWI. The element of endangerment can be established by evidence showing that the defendant’s condition or operating manner could have endangered any person, including the public, the police, or the defendant. Staley v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1245, 1249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Blinn v. State, 677 N.E.2d 51, 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)). Endangerment does not require that a person other than the defendant be in the path of the defendant’s vehicle or in the same area to obtain a conviction. Id. at 1251 (citing State v. Krohn, 521 N.E.2d 374, 377 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)).
To prove endangerment, the State presented evidence that Vanderlinden was speeding and that she was intoxicated. The State carried its burden to prove intoxication. Nonetheless, the State cannot claim that this same evidence proves the additional element of endangerment. In 2001, the Legislature substantially altered the OWI statutes by redefining intoxication and establishing two separate misdemeanor classes for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. I.C. § 9-13-2-86; P.L. 175-2001 § 1 (eff. July 1, 2001); I.C. § 9-30-5-2; P.L. 175-2001 § 6 (eff. July 1, 2001). The effect of these changes was to remove the “endangerment” requirement from the general definition of intoxication and create the new offense of Class C misdemeanor OWI without an endangerment requirement. The statutes retained the Class A misdemeanor OWI offense, which requires a showing of endangerment. Indiana Code Section 9-30-5-2(b) now states, “An offense described in subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor if the person operates a vehicle in a manner that endangers a person.” By definition the statute requires more than intoxication to prove endangerment.
To the extent that our decisions have suggested that a showing of intoxication without more is adequate to prove endangerment, the amended statutes supplant those holdings. For example, the State cites Slate v. State, 798 N.E.2d 510, 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), for the proposition that endangerment “indicates the level of impairment and the extent of lost faculties that must be shown to establish intoxication and to obtain a conviction.” This definition of endangerment conflates it with intoxication. Moreover, Slate acknowledged that “under the pre 2001 statutory scheme, we have held that proof that the defendant’s condition rendered operation of the vehicle unsafe is sufficient to establish the endangerment element of the offense.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing State v. Rans, 739 N.E.2d 164, 168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)). Moreover, Slate references Krohn and a line of cases that pre-date the 2001 statutory amendments for its assertion that endangerment can be established by showing that the defendant’s condition (i.e., intoxication) could have endangered any person. See, e.g., Weaver v. State, 702 N.E.2d 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Rans, 739 N.E.2d 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Kremer v. State, 643 N.E.2d 357 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Blinn v. State, 677 N.E.2d 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
Slate involved a challenge to a jury instruction that defined endangerment in reference to the defendant’s impaired condition. Slate, 798 N.E.2d at 514. Because the instruction was focused on Class A misdemeanor OWI, we found that it did not misstate the law and rejected the appellant’s argument. Id. at 516. Consequently, Slate held, “The element of endangerment is still appropriate for determining the offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a Class A misdemeanor.” Id. Though true, this holding does not address whether evidence of intoxication by itself can establish endangerment.
More recent decisions have noted the distinction in the revised statutes and the evidence needed to establish endangerment. For instance, in Wells v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1133, 1147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied, cert. denied, we clarified that “[t]he argument could be made that driving a vehicle while intoxicated always endangers someone. However, it might not always be possible to prove such endangerment beyond a reasonable doubt to a fact-finder’s satisfaction . . . .” Thus, we hold that the State is required to submit proof of “endangerment” that goes beyond mere intoxication to obtain a conviction for Class A misdemeanor OWI. See Outlaw v. State, No. 49A02-0904-CR-340 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2009) (holding the same). Although the only independent evidence of endangerment presented by the State was Vanderlinden’s warning for speeding, that evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. For example, in Boyd v. State, 519 N.E.2d 182, 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), we held that speeding “alone demonstrate[d] impaired judgment and ability of such a nature as to endanger others,” despite a lack of external signs of intoxication such as slurred speech, lack of dexterity, or failed sobriety tests. See also Hughes v. State, 481 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (observing that defendant was driving in the proper lane, was not weaving, had no speech problems, satisfactorily performed dexterity tests, passed field sobriety tests, and other than speeding exhibited no aberrant driving). Thus, the excessive speed is evidence that Vanderlinden’s manner of operating her vehicle could have endangered a person. [Footnote omitted.] Accordingly, Vanderlinden’s excessive speed, regardless of the driving conditions or her proximity of others, is sufficient to establish endangerment of a person and support her conviction.
NAJAM, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.