SHARPNACK, S.J.
Herron contends that he cannot be required to register under Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration Act (the “Act”) because the offenses he committed in Arizona are not substantially equivalent to any Indiana offense. However, it is clear that the Act requires a sex offender who is required to register in another state to register in Indiana. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-5(b)(1). Indeed, the Act defines a “sex offender” as “a person who is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction.” Id. Because he is required to register for life as a sex offender in Arizona, Herron is a “sex offender” who is required to register for life under the Act. See Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f) (noting that a person required to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction shall register in Indiana for the period required by the other jurisdiction).
Herron further contends that the trial court erred because the trial court’s order results in retroactive punishment forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Indiana Constitution. In support of this contention, Herron cites Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009), in which our supreme court held that the Act may not apply to a defendant who committed an offense before the Act was enacted.
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. . . [T]he Act is not an ex post facto law as applied to Herron. On the same day that it handed down Wallace, our supreme court handed down Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 394 (Ind. 2009), a plurality decision supporting the proposition that portions of the Act requiring lifetime registration may be applied retroactively if the offender was already required to register at the time of his offense. This is the case with Herron, who was required by Arizona to register as a sex offender when he committed his offense. Wallace, unlike Herron, was not required to register when he committed his offense and therefore could not be subjected to the entirety of the Act.
MATHIAS, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.