NAJAM, J.
Initially, we address the threshold question presented by Davidson on appeal, namely, whether we ought to consider the suspended portion of his sentence as qualitatively different from the executed portion of his sentence for purposes of determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him and whether his sentence is inappropriate. Members of this court have been unable to reach unanimous agreement on this issue. Judge May was the first to state her belief that “A year is still a year, and a sentence is still a sentence,” and that suspended sentences ought to be treated no differently from executed sentences for purposes of appellate review. Beck v. State, 790 N.E.2d 520, 523 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (Mattingly-May, J., concurring in result). The majority in Beck, however, stated its belief that a sentence is not a “maximum” sentence, even if it equals the maximum time allowed by statute for a particular crime, if part of that time is suspended. Beck, 790 N.E.2d at 522. Judge May’s position later was adopted by panels of this court in Cox v. State, 792 N.E.2d 898, 904 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied, and Pagan v. State, 809 N.E.2d 915, 926 n.9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.
In Eaton v. State, 825 N.E.2d 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), the majority followed Cox and Judge May’s point of view. Judge Kirsch dissented, stating, “a suspended sentence is not the same as an executed sentence, and time spent on work release through a community corrections program is not the same as time spent in a state prison.” Eaton, 825 N.E.2d at 1291 (Kirsch, C.J., dissenting). [Footnote omitted.]
Most recently, a panel of this court adopted Judge Kirsch’s view and held, “for purposes of Rule 7(B) review, a maximum sentence is not just a sentence of maximum length, but a fully executed sentence of maximum length.” Jenkins v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1080, 1085-86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. pending. Among other things, the Jenkins court stated, “Common sense dictates that less executed time means less punishment. That is why almost any defendant, given the choice, would gladly accept a partially suspended sentence over a fully executed one of equal length.” Id. at 1084. In addition, “[t]he ‘real possibility’ that the suspended portion of a sentence will be ordered executed is not random or dependent on the whim of a judge; a defendant can ensure that it will never become reality simply by abiding by the terms of his probation.” Id. at 1084-85.
We agree with the rationale in Beck and Jenkins and hold that, in the appellate review of sentencing decisions, we will “not simply [look] at the number of years of the sentence[,]” but will “look at the total sentence actually imposed (including whether some or all of a sentence was suspended or suspended to probation)[.]”[1] See Eaton, 825 N.E.2d at 1291 (Kirsch, C.J., dissenting). Accordingly, we reject Davidson’s invitation to review his partially-suspended advisory sentence the same as if it were a fully-executed advisory sentence.
KIRSCH, J., concurs.
BARNES, J., concurs in result with separate opinion:
I write to concur in result, noting that I am in full accord with all parts of the majority opinion, except where it agrees with another panel of this court’s opinion in Jenkins. I believe that the interpretation Judge May first gave in her concurrence in Beck, i.e. that “A year is still a year, and a sentence is still a sentence,” is the most legally sound manner in which to assess a sentence.
[1] The author of this opinion notes that he has reconsidered this issue since he concurred with the majority opinion in Eaton.