SHEPARD, C.J.
Appellant Brennan Baker contends that constructive discharge falls within the public policy exception to Indiana’s doctrine of employment at will. We conclude that a claim may rest on involuntary resignation, but only where the cause fits within the grounds recognized by our decisions on retaliatory discharge. Baker’s claim does not.
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Baker contends that he is entitled to judgment with respect to his breach of contract/wrongful termination claim against Tremco. (Appellants’ Br. at 26.) He argues that he was wrongfully discharged for refusing to participate in illegal activity–refusing to participate in Tremco’s scheme to sell its roofing products and WTI’s services by violating public bidding laws and defrauding Indiana public schools. Tremco argues that Baker’s employment was not involuntarily terminated, noting that Baker tendered his own resignation. (Appellees’ Br. at 20.)
“Indiana follows the doctrine of employment at will, under which employment may be terminated by either party at will, with or without reason.” Wior v. Anchor Indus., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 172, 175 (Ind. 1996). The presumption of at-will employment is strong, and we are disinclined to adopt broad and ill-defined exceptions to the employment at will doctrine. Orr. v. Westminster Village N., Inc., 689 N.E.2d 712, 717 (Ind. 1997).
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In this case, Baker argues . . . that when he refused to participate in Tremco and WTI’s unlawful activities in using the AEPA/Wilson line-item contract to violate public bidding laws and defraud public schools in Indiana, he was advised that he would be terminated. . . .
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We . . . conclude that a constructive retaliatory discharge falls within the ambit of the narrowly drawn public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine. Depending on the facts, it is merely retaliatory discharge in reverse. The constructive discharge doctrine acknowledges the fact that some employee resignations are involuntary and further prevents employers who wrongfully force an employee to resign to escape any sort of liability for their actions.
Still, the fulcrum of the discharge must fit within the exception as recognized by Frampton and McClanahan. This was certainly the case in Tony, where the employer ridiculed the employee for his workers compensation claim and the attendant work limitations.
Baker’s claim is not within the ambit of the recognized exceptions to the general doctrine of at-will employment. His constructive discharge contentions rest on Tremco’s participation in activities of one of the educational service centers the General Assembly has authorized pursuant to Ind. Code § 20-20-1-1 et seq. Each of these centers is “an extended agency of school corporations that operates under rules established by the state board of education.” Ind. Code § 20-20-1-2(1) (2007). They constitute a mechanism through which schools may undertake collective programs and services, one of which is joint purchasing and financial management. Ind. Code § 20-20-1-2(b)(7) (2007). The purchasing activities of the multiple centers proceed collectively through the Association of Educational Purchasing Agencies. As Baker notes, this Association and one or more of the regional service centers have been cooperating in the purchase of roofing supplies and services for local school corporations since 2000. (Appellants’ Br. at 4.) These efforts have proceeded under the framework enacted by the General Assembly, in accordance with the rules promulgated by the state board of education, and as audited by the state board of accounts.
At its heart, Baker’s constructive discharge claim rest on his allegation that the roofing activities conducted under this statutory regime contravene other statutes about bidding public projects. We can be agnostic on such a question of statutory construction and still conclude as a matter of common law that it is not on par with the rights and obligations recognized as a basis for discharge complaints in Frampton and McClanahan.
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We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.