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Published by the Indiana Office of Court Services

Miller v. Yedlowski, No. 49A02-0901-CV-78, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Nov. 10, 2009)

November 20, 2009 Filed Under: Civil Tagged With: Appeals, N. Vaidik

VAIDIK, J.
The rationale behind the rule requiring a nonmoving party to respond to a motion for summary judgment—by either filing a response, requesting a continuance under Trial Rule 56(I), or filing an affidavit under Trial Rule 56(F)–within thirty days does not vanish because the trial court has happened to grant one extension of time. That is, the nonmoving party should not be rewarded and relieved from the restriction of responding within the time limit set by the court because he or she has had the good fortune of one enlargement of time. Therefore, any response, including a subsequent motion for enlargement of time, must be made within the additional period granted by the trial court. The rationale of HomEq [Servicing Corp. v. Baker, 883 N.E.2d 95, 98 (Ind. 2008)] and the cases leading up to it are not restricted to the initial thirty-day period following the filing of a motion for summary judgment.
Here, the trial court granted Plaintiffs’ first motion for enlargement of time and gave them up until September 4, 2008, to respond to Dr. Miller’s motion for summary judgment. However, Plaintiffs did not respond to Dr. Miller’s motion for summary judgment until six days after that deadline by filing a second motion for enlargement of time on September 10, 2008. In accordance with HomEq and Thayer, the trial court lacked discretion to grant this extension because Plaintiffs’ motion was made after the time for a response had expired. Therefore, the trial court’s order granting Plaintiffs’ second motion for enlargement of time was a nullity, and the trial court was precluded from considering Plaintiffs’ response, which included Dr. Bernstein’s affidavit, to Dr. Miller’s motion for summary judgment. Because this leaves no evidence to oppose Dr. Miller’s motion for summary judgment, which includes the Medical Review Panel’s unanimous decision that he did not fail to comply with the appropriate standard of care as charged in the complaint and the conduct complained of was not a factor of the resultant damages, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying his motion for summary judgment.  [Footnote omitted.] We therefore remand for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.
BAILEY, J., BRADFORD, J., concur.

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