MAY, J.
Koenig’s hearsay and foundational objection was sufficient to preserve the Confrontation Clause argument he now raises. [Footnote omitted.] Our Supreme Court has noted the close relationship between hearsay and confrontation: “Crawford [v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)] makes clear that in a criminal prosecution any hearsay permitted under the rules of evidence is also subject to the defendant’s right ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him’ under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 449 (Ind. 2005), rev’d and remanded on other grounds by Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 824 (2006). The Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay. Davis, 547 U.S. at 824. Hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are “generally designed to protect similar values” and they “stem from the same roots.” White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353 (1992).
The Confrontation Clause is violated when hearsay evidence is admitted as substantive evidence against a defendant with no opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant at trial. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987). In Giles v. California, __ U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2686 (2008), the Court noted “courts prior to the founding excluded hearsay evidence in large part because it was unconfronted.” The lab report should not have been admitted [footnote omitted] and Koenig did not lose his ability to challenge the error just because he presented his objection in terms of hearsay and foundation.
CRONE, J., and BROWN, J., concur.