BARNES, J.
On February 13, 1991, Damron pled guilty to one count of Class D felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated. On January 17, 2007, Damron filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent because the trial court did not keep a record of his guilty plea hearing.
Although the post-conviction court initially granted Damron’s petition, on April 15, 2008, it subsequently granted the State’s motion to correct error. On July 15, 2008, the post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing at which Damron testified that he pled guilty but did not remember the particulars of the guilty plea. The post-conviction court also considered affidavits from trial counsel and the trial judge who presided over the guilty plea. [Footnote omitted.] In their affidavits, they stated that they were unable to recall the guilty plea hearing. The post-conviction court also considered the affidavit of the court reporter, who stated:
1. That she is the Court Reporter for the Marion County Criminal Court #21.
2. That she is has [sic] made a due and diligent search for the record of evidence in State of Indiana vs. Mark Damron, Cause 49F06-8909-CF-109913.
3. That these tapes are only kept for a period of ten (10) years and the above tapes have since been destroyed.
4. That due to the above, she is unable to prepare the requested transcript.
App. p. 61.
Based on the destruction of the tapes, the post-conviction court concluded that “[a] destroyed record is, by its very definition, silent.” App. p. 58. The post-conviction court held that a waiver of Boykin rights cannot be presumed from a silent record and granted Damron’s petition for post-conviction relief. The State now appeals.
. . . .
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Damron argued that the destruction of the tape of his guilty plea hearing prevented meaningful review of his 1991 guilty plea. The United States Supreme Court requires that the record of a guilty plea hearing must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that the defendant was informed of, and waived, three specific federal constitutional rights: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers. Hall v. State, 849 N.E.2d 466, 469 (Ind. 2006) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969)). The Boykin court made clear that courts cannot presume a waiver of these important federal rights from a silent record. Id.
In Hall, however, our supreme court clarified that a lost record is not the per se equivalent of a silent record. The Hall court explained:
The fact that the record of a guilty plea hearing can neither be found nor reconstructed does not of itself require granting post-conviction relief. Rather, as with any claim made in a petition for post-conviction relief, a claim that the petitioner’s conviction was obtained in violation of federal or state constitutional safeguards . . . must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
Hall, 849 N.E.2d at 470.
The State argues, “There is no evidence whatsoever in this case, that the trial court received Petitioner’s guilty plea without a hearing, without advisements of constitutional rights, or without any warnings of the consequences of his guilty plea.” . . . Damron responds that “the transcript was not simply lost, or missing, but was wrongfully and intentionally destroyed in violation of the Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure.” . . . Indiana Criminal Rule 10 provides in part:
If a transcription of the recorded matters has not been prepared, certified and filed in the criminal proceeding, the electronic recording of all oral matters, together with a log denoting the individuals recorded and the meter location of crucial events, shall be maintained as a court record for ten years in all misdemeanors or fifty-five years in all felony cases.
. . . [T]he question before us is whether the premature destruction of a tape of a guilty plea hearing by court staff renders the record silent for purposes of Boykin. We conclude it does not.
. . . .
. . . Damron is collaterally attacking his guilty plea. See Hall, 849 N.E.2d at 472 (“[O]ur courts have long deemed post-conviction proceedings collateral.”). Also, the destroyed record is not “suspiciously silent.” The untimely destruction of a tape does not in and of itself indicate that the State—the county prosecutor or the Attorney General—acted improperly. See id. (observing there was “no suggestion that the cause of the missing record is the result of misconduct by the State.”). It appears that the trial court had a policy of destroying tapes after ten years, and without more we cannot equate this policy, although in contravention of the Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure, to governmental misconduct. Given these facts, we cannot conclude that the presumption of regularity should not apply here.
Further, Damron presented no evidence that he was not informed of his Boykin rights at the time of his guilty plea. . . . To establish that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary, Damron was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not informed of his Boykin rights. See Hall, 849 N.E.2d at 470. Damron did not carry his burden of proof.
NAJAM, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.