DICKSON, J.
This appeal challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment which found privileged a restaurant employee’s statements to a passerby and a police officer that a customer had “pulled a gun” inside the store. The plaintiffs, Sanford Kelsey and Thomas Williams, respectively, the suspected gun carrier and his companion (neither of whom actually had a gun), sued the restaurant operator, Papa John’s U.S.A., Inc., and its employee, Kelly Tharp, for a variety of torts (defamation per se, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring, and negligence) seeking damages, including punitive damages. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for trial. Williams v. Tharp, 889 N.E.2d 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). We granted transfer and now affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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A qualified privilege “applies to communications made in good faith on any subject matter in which the party making the communication has an interest or in reference to which he had a duty, either public or private, either legal, moral, or social, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty.” Bals v. Verduzco, 600 N.E.2d 1353, 1356 (Ind. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a defense to defamation, the qualified privilege operates not to “change the actionable quality of the words published, but merely [to] rebut[] the inference of malice that is [otherwise] imputed.” Holcomb v. Walter’s Dimmick Petroleum, Inc., 858 N.E.2d 103, 106 (Ind. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). To merit its protection, “[t]he burden is upon the defendant in the first instance to establish the existence of a privileged occasion for the publication, by proof of a recognized public or private interest which would justify the utterance of the words.” Bals, 600 N.E.2d at 1356. Then “the plaintiff . . . has the burden of overcoming that privilege by showing that it has been abused.” Id. When speaking of abuse, “the essence of the concept is not the speaker’s spite but his abuse of the privileged occasion by going beyond the scope of the purposes for which privilege exists.” Holcomb, 858 N.E.2d at 106-07 (internal quotation marks omitted). And “[u]nless only one conclusion can be drawn from the evidence, the question of whether the privilege has been abused is for the jury.” Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 601 (Ind. 2007).
The privileged occasion implicated in this case relates to the public interest in “encourag[ing] private citizens and victims not only to report crime, but also to assist law enforcement with investigating and apprehending individuals who engage in criminal activity.” Id. . . .
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On the other hand, a reporting citizen may, out of an excess of caution or even for a nefarious purpose, make false accusations, and our citizens’ equally valid interest in having reputations untarnished by false imputations of criminal misconduct has been a cornerstone of defamation law for hundreds of years. See State ex rel. Lopez v. Killigrew, 202 Ind. 397, 401-02, 174 N.E. 808, 810 (1931). Because of the compelling public interest in encouraging citizens to re-port suspected wrongdoing, however, the law recognizes a limited defense to civil liability premised on erroneous reports of criminal conduct to police: “[I]t is well established that in Indiana, communications made to law enforcement to report criminal activity are qualifiedly privileged.” Kelley, 865 N.E.2d at 600; see id. at 599-601 (collecting cases). This Court has also noted protection for communications to private citizens that further the same end: enhancing public safety by facilitating the reporting of crime. Id. at 600-01. But the privilege is not without limits: a statement “may lose its privileged character upon a showing of abuse wherein: (1) the communicator was primarily motivated by ill will in making the statement; (2) there was excessive publication of the defamatory statements; or (3) the statement was made without belief or grounds for belief in its truth.” Bals, 600 N.E.2d at 1356.
Against this backdrop, the plaintiffs on appeal do not question that Tharp’s statements fell within the privileged occasion mentioned above, but argue that they came forward with evidence which creates genuine issues of material fact as to whether the privilege was abused. Specifically, the plaintiffs do not argue that Tharp was primarily motivated by ill will (he had never met the plaintiffs before), or was guilty of excessive publication (he told only a few people at the restaurant and responded to Officer Frolick’s investigation), but argue that they designated evidence to create a genuine issue about whether Tharp made his statement “without belief or grounds for belief in its truth.” This leads to two questions: (1) What does it mean to make a statement “without belief or grounds for belief in its truth,” and (2) would the designated evidence permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Tharp made the statement “without belief or grounds for belief in its truth”? Id.
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The scope of the qualified privilege is not amenable to a fixed or precise definition and must adapt to current societal interests and particular situations. We embrace the “broader latitude” described in Bals as to the qualified privilege applicable to communications made to law enforcement, finding that a recklessness standard is ill-suited to this aim. A reckless-disregard state of mind would subject a person reporting criminal conduct to liability not only when the speaker actually knew the statement was false but also when if it could be shown that the speaker should have known the statement was false.
This higher degree of caution in applying the qualified privilege defense would substantially impair the public good served by fostering citizens to be vigilant and promptly to report suspected criminal activity. A qualified privilege defense to defamation will shield the reporting citizen from liability for a false report unless the speaker has abused the privilege by exceeding “the scope of the purposes for which the privilege exists.” Elliot v. Roach, 409 N.E.2d 661, 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here the law seeks to “encourage private citizens and victims not only to report crime, but also to assist law enforcement with investigating and apprehending individuals who engage in criminal activity.” Kelley, 865 N.E.2d at 601. If this purpose is to be met, the privilege must offer a robust defense against liability. Protecting unverified and even speculative reports of suspected wrongdoing to law enforcement is, in our view, supported by ample reasons of social advantage. It is important that citizens not opt for inaction, chilled from communicating with police in all but the most certain of situations. “[P]ersons who suspect criminal activity,” this Court has said, should not be “reluctant to provide specific (or even speculative) information to law enforcement because of the risk of exposing themselves to civil liability.” Holcomb, 858 N.E.2d at 108 (emphasis added). Moreover, requiring citizens to evade civil liability only by first verifying their suspicions with certitude before reporting them to police raises other significant concerns, including vigilante justice and personal safety, in addition to the risk that leads will grow stale by the time citizens have sufficiently verified what they thought they saw. The better rule, it seems to us, is one that fosters open communication between citizens and law enforcement, leaving the task of investigating that information, and of deciding upon the appropriate response, to trained professionals. The “broader latitude” identified in Bals supports rejecting a “reckless disregard” as sufficient to show that a statement was made “without belief or grounds for belief in its truth.”
On the other hand, “there is no social advantage to the publication of a deliberate lie.” Weenig v. Wood, 169 Ind. App. 413, 438, 349 N.E.2d 235, 250 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, a deliberate lie in this context imposes significant costs and plainly exceeds “the scope of the purposes for which the privilege exists.” Elliot, 409 N.E.2d at 673. A citizen who reports wrongdoing to police knowing that the information is faulty fails to earn protection against a later civil action. But merely arguing about what the speaker should have known is in-sufficient to show that the speaker made a statement “without belief . . . . in its truth.” Bals, 600 N.E.2d at 1356. As for applying the “no grounds for belief” language to this situation, Bals is best understood as implicitly recognizing that the absence of any discernable basis for the truth of the matter—that something is so obviously mistaken—can serve as circumstantial evidence of a reporting citizen’s actual knowledge of falsity. This leads to the second question: would or could the designated evidence, or the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Tharp made the statement knowing it to be false? The plaintiffs label this “a quintessential issue of fact,” Appellants’ Br. at 11, and we realize that a defendant’s state of mind is ordinarily a question for the jury. See, e.g., Best Homes, Inc. v. Rainwater, 714 N.E.2d 702, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Although the facts of this case present a closer question than in Holcomb, we find that the plaintiffs have not designated sufficient evidence to give rise to a genuine issue about whether Tharp made the statement knowing it to be false. Nor was he so obviously mistaken as to support a reasonable inference that he had lied.
. . . . The plaintiffs’ most compelling piece of evidence that Tharp abused the privilege is Officer Frolick’s observation that Tharp could not have seen what he claimed from where he was standing. When taken as true, the officer’s statement supports an inference—however slight—that Tharp fabricated his account. On the other hand, it is undisputed that Kelsey was wearing a black and silver fanny pack at his waist containing a brown leather wallet and, while inside the store and while Tharp was working at the front of the store, retrieved money from his wallet. Furthermore, another employee testified to seeing the fanny pack. It is also undisputed that Tharp said Kelsey had an object on or near his waist which was silver and black or brown. As the trial court observed, “[t]he description of the alleged gun fits the characteristics of the fanny pack and the location of the fanny pack is the exact location where Tharp said the gun would be.” Tharp otherwise accurately described Kelsey’s appearance and apparel, as well as Williams’s car and license plate number. As in Holcomb, “[a]lthough there are logical possibilities,” all of these factors are too great a coincidence to support a reasonable inference that Tharp invented his de-tailed and mostly accurate report. See Holcomb, 858 N.E.2d at 107-08. We find that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Whether Tharp’s misperception was speculative, negligent, or even reckless, it was not so obviously mistaken to permit a reasonable inference that he lied. The trial court did not err in finding a qualified privilege established as a matter of law, thereby precluding the plaintiffs’ claim for defamation.
. . . . With no underlying tort, the plaintiffs’ claim against Papa John’s for negligent hiring necessarily fails. See Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion County v. Gaither, 272 Ind. 251, 260, 397 N.E.2d 589, 595 (1979) (noting “a judgment in favor of an employee requires judgment in favor of his employer when the employer’s liability is predicated solely upon the acts of said employee”).
Because no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to the defendants’ claim of qualified privilege and the privilege is here established as a matter of law, we conclude that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment as to all of their theories of liability.
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We affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, J., concur. Boehm, J., dissents with separate opinion. Rucker, J., dissents with separate opinion.
BOEHM, Justice, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Although I believe the majority adopts the correct legal standard, I disagree with the majority’s view of the facts reasonably inferrable from the designated evidence. Specifically, I agree with the majority that Indiana law confers a broader qualified privilege than some jurisdictions, and requires more than reckless disregard of the truth to support a claim of defamation or false imprisonment based on an inaccurate report to a law enforcement agency of potentially criminal activity. Moreover, for the reasons the majority gives, I agree that it is appropriate to protect citizens from the expense and risks of litigation based on an incorrect report, even if the citizen should have known of the falsity of the report. But here, I believe the facts in the aggregate support the conclusion that Mr. Tharp first recklessly or knowingly made false statements to a private citizen and then knowingly repeated false allegations to law en-forcement officers. The statements to the passerby were not subject to any privilege, and their later repetition to the police was privileged only if the statements were not made with knowledge that they were false. Without a qualified privilege, summary judgment as to the claims for defamation and false imprisonment was wrongly granted, and I believe the designated evidence precludes summary judgment on those issues.
The majority separately examines each fact the plaintiffs advance and concludes that none of them is sufficient to overcome the privilege. I believe the majority overlooks some salient facts and the reasonable inferences from the aggregation of these facts. It is not insignificant that Tharp exited the store and told a passerby that one of the plaintiffs had “pulled out a gun,” then returned to the store and repeated his claim to a fellow employee, but made no effort to contact the police. The passerby, having no reason to question Tharp’s claim, called the police. When an officer arrived in response to the passerby’s report, the passerby was still present. If the statements to the passerby were not true, Tharp either had to retract his story or repeat it to the officer. Tharp then misrepresented his name and repeated his allegations to the officer. While the officer was in the store interviewing other employees, only to find that none of them had perceived any problem, Tharp fled.
As the majority observes, it is a jury question whether the privilege has been abused where more than one inference can be drawn from the evidence. Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 601 (2007). Although Tharp’s conduct allows an inference that Tharp was merely mistaken, it supports the inference that Tharp knowingly repeated false accusations. We frequently note that flight is admissible evidence of guilt in a criminal case. Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001). Tharp had already offered inconsistent descriptions of the alleged gun. Tharp now explains he fled because he had outstanding warrants, but his explanation does not preclude an inference that he was concerned his statements might be exposed by further questioning.
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I agree with the Court of Appeals that summary judgment in favor of the defendants should be reversed, and this case should be remanded for trial.
RUCKER, J., dissenting.
I agree with Justice Boehm that “the facts in the aggregate support the conclusion that Mr. Tharp first recklessly or knowingly made false statements to a private citizen and then knowingly repeated false allegations to law enforcement officers.” Slip op. at __, (Boehm, J., dissenting). And I do so largely for the reasons Justice Boehm articulates. I write separately how-ever to underscore events occurring after the trial court entered summary judgment in this case and after the plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal that seem to undermine completely Tharp’s claim of qualified privilege. On June 2, 2008, Tharp pleaded guilty to three offenses arising out of his employment at Papa John’s, one of which was the offense of false reporting. . . .
. . . At an absolute minimum Tharp’s admissions raise a genuine issue of material fact on the issue. In light of what fairly may be characterized as newly discovered evidence surfacing after the trial court entered summary judgment in Tharp’s favor, this Court at the very least should reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this cause for further proceedings. For this additional reason I respectfully dissent.