BAILEY, J.
D.B. (“Father”) appeals an order of the Hendricks Circuit Court terminating his parenting time with the children of his marriage to M.B.V. (“Mother”) and requiring his payment of Mother’s attorney’s fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
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. . . [A]lthough a court may modify a parenting time order when the modification would serve the best interests of the child or children, a parent’s visitation rights shall not be restricted unless the court finds that the parenting time might endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional development. Id. (citing Ind. Code § 31-17-4-2). Even though the statute uses the word “might,” this Court has previously interpreted the language to mean that a court may not restrict parenting time unless that parenting time “would” endanger the child’s physical health or emotional development. See Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956, 960 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), trans. denied. A party who seeks to restrict a parent’s visitation rights bears the burden of presenting evidence justifying such a restriction. Farrell v. Littell, 790 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
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Here, the trial court articulated no specific finding that parenting time would cause harm to the children. The record disclosing the past interaction between Father and his children does not approach the egregious circumstances in which we have previously found that parenting time may be terminated, such as when a parent sexually molests a child. Clearly, our parenting time statute does not provide for the elimination of parenting time because reunification counseling has proved unusually challenging or because teenagers do not wish to interact with a parent while accepting substantial financial benefits from that parent.
However, while the complete termination of parenting time is not supported by the evidence, the record would support an order for supervised parenting time. Such an order would be appropriate given the volatile relationship between the parties, the ages of the children, and the concern of one therapist that supervision of parenting time would protect Father from unfounded accusations. On remand, should the trial court restrict Father’s parenting time upon entry of the requisite statutory finding of endangerment, we encourage the trial court to order that the parenting time be supervised.
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The denial of parenting time is contrary to statutory authority. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Mother attorney’s fees.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
VAIDIK, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.