RILEY, J.
As we have stated above, Indiana Code section 35-48-4-14.7(d) prohibits persons, subject to certain exceptions, from purchasing drugs which contain more than three grams of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or both within one week. Sub-Section (i) provides that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally violates this section commits a Class C misdemeanor.” The State conceded during final arguments that the evidence which it had presented was not sufficient to prove that Slone acted intentionally, but contended that the evidence proved Slone had knowingly violated Indiana Code section 35-48-4-14.7(d).
Our legislature has provided guidance for interpreting the culpability requirements of knowingly and intentionally: “(a) A person engages in conduct “intentionally” if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so. (b) A person engages in conduct “knowingly” if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2. Knowledge, like intent, is a mental state of the actor; therefore, the trier of fact must resort to reasonable inferences based on the examination of the surrounding circumstances to reasonably infer its existence. Jernigan v. State, 612 N.E.2d 609, 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied.
Slone acknowledged, somewhat reluctantly, that she had consumed the drugs containing pseudoephedrine faster than the recommended rate. When asked if she consumed the medicine as directed, she first testified that she was taking “one to two a day so about two a day.” (Tr. p. 21). She later testified that she took about two at a time, twice a day. But when directly asked how many pills she took a day, she amended her testimony again to say “I kind of took a little extra when I went to work because I don’t have time to blow my nose when I’m at work.” (Tr. p. 21). On cross-examination, Slone admitted that she “double[d] up” on the dosage at times, but stated that she did not know what the recommended dosage was. (Tr. p. 26). She also testified that she gave her mother a couple of pills to take.
Therefore, the State presented evidence that proved Slone was aware that she had purchased two packages of drugs containing pseudoephedrine within one week, and that she had taken those drugs at a rate more quickly than the recommended dosage for one person. However, the State has presented no evidence which would prove that Slone was aware of a high probability that two packages of drugs contained more than three grams of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or both. We might conclude that the purchase of several packages of drugs within one week may be sufficient evidence, standing alone, that someone is aware of a high probability that they have exceeded the limit of Indiana Code section 35-48-4-14.7(d). Or, evidence that the individual was personally involved in, or associated with a person involved in, the manufacture, distribution, or possession of methamphetamine would be strong circumstantial evidence that the individual was aware of a high probability that multiple packages of drugs containing ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or both contained more than three grams of those substances. However, the State proved only that a person bought two twenty-count packages of pseudoephedrine within one week during cold season.
Furthermore, the State did not enter into evidence either of the packages of drugs which Slone purchased, so we cannot review what information regarding the contents those drugs was contained on the packaging or how such information was displayed on the packaging. The trial court took judicial notice of Food and Drug Administration regulations generally without citation to any specific regulation, but we have no indication in the record that those regulations were being followed. Moreover, 21 Code of Federal Regulations § 201.66(c), which we believe the trial court may have been referring to, provides that active ingredients be listed “per dosage unit,” giving examples in metric units. Thus, consumers may be required to use the metric system making unit conversions and multiply quantities in order to ascertain the total amounts of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or both that they have purchased, none of which has the State proved Slone capable of doing. For these reasons, we conclude that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Slone knew that the drugs she purchased contained more than three grams of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or both.
KIRSCH, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.