VAIDIK, J.
Austin C. Weatherspoon appeals his conviction for Class B felony robbery, contending that the jury was improperly instructed. Specifically, Indiana Jury Rule 20(a)(8) provides that jurors, including alternates, are permitted to discuss the evidence among themselves in the jury room during recesses from trial when all are present, as long as they reserve judgment about the outcome of the case until deliberations commence. Under Indiana law, alternates are not allowed to deliberate with the jury. Weatherspoon argues that discussions are the equivalent of deliberations and therefore he was denied his constitutional and statutory right to a jury of twelve when the alternates were instructed that they were permitted to discuss the evidence during recesses from trial. Because Jury Rule 20(a)(8) makes a clear distinction between discussions and deliberations and because there is no evidence that the alternates participated in the deliberations, we affirm Weatherspoon’s conviction.
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. . . [T]he Indiana Supreme Court adopted and amended the Jury Rules, including the recent amendment to Jury Rule 20(a)(8), which provides that alternate jurors are permitted to discuss the evidence among themselves in the jury room during recesses from trial when all are present, as long as they reserve judgment about the outcome of the case until deliberations commence. We acknowledge Weatherspoon’s argument that during discussions, alternate jurors talk about issues of credibility, highlight and discount certain evidence, and narrow and broaden the issues, all of which may affect the final judgment or verdict, yet these discussions are the very discussions that alternate jurors may not have during deliberations. Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has unambiguously made a distinction between discussions and deliberations. We are not at liberty to rewrite the rules promulgated by our Supreme Court.
As for Weatherspoon’s constitutional challenge to Jury Rule 20(a)(8), we simply note that, as Weatherspoon himself acknowledges, there is authority from this Court which provides that “there is no constitutional limit to the maximum number of jurors.” See Taylor v. State, 687 N.E.2d 606, 610 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added), trans. denied. As for Weatherspoon’s statutory entitlement to a jury of twelve, he received just that. See id. Moreover, since our Supreme Court has created a distinction between discussions and deliberations and there is no evidence that any of the alternates deliberated, this argument also fails. We therefore affirm the trial court.
Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.