SHEPARD, C.J.
Employing an arrangement relatively common to dissolution decrees, the trial court awarded the marital residence to the wife and ordered her to pay husband a share of its value when any one of certain later events occur. Husband argues that the statute on civil judgments entitles him to post-judgment interest running from the date of the dissolution decree. We hold instead that the dissolution statutes authorize a court to assess interest, or not, in the course of fashioning a just division of assets.
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Robert argues that the trial court erred when it reduced his monetary award to judgment without judgment interest. (Appellant’s Br. at 9-10.) He specifically contends is that he is entitled to post-judgment interest as a matter of law in accordance with Ind. Code § 24-4.6-1-101 (2008). Ann Marie argues, by contrast, that an award of interest is within the court’s discretion and that here the court’s decision was made in a just and reasonable manner pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(b)(2) (2008), which provides that the court shall divide the property by “setting the property or parts of the property over to one (1) of the spouses and requiring either spouse to pay an amount, either in gross or in installments, that is just and proper.” (Appellee’s Br. at 2.)
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Cleanly put, the question is whether the statute directing interest on money judgments compels post-judgment interest be paid whenever money changes hands pursuant to a dissolution decree, or whether the dissolution statutes grant a court discretion to impose interest, or not, in the course of fashioning what the latter calls a “just and reasonable” division of property. I.C. § 31-15-7-4.
In the law’s historic divide between law and equity, there may be few purer illustrations than a civil judgment for money damages on the one hand and a dissolution decree on the other. We see little reason for transporting the post-judgment interest statute into the equitable world of dissolutions, where some court orders look a good deal like civil judgments and others bear no resemblance.
In a straight civil judgment, post-judgment interest and the time value of money bear such a straightforward relationship that courts are led to deploy adages like “interest goes with the principal as the fruit with the tree.” Reese v. Reese, 696 N.E.2d 460, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). By contrast, judicial decrees that assign debts, personal property, and real estate represent a more complex allocation of economic values. To these are added orders that reflect social objectives, such as enabling children and the leading custodian to continue living in the marital residence.
In such judicial decrees (and we rate the one before us as quite typical), where courts allot everything from physical objects to responsibility for debts of differing character to conditional rights of residence, the time value of money acquires a much more nuanced meaning than it does when a court hears a credit card collection case and says, “Judgment for $5,800.”
We conclude that the statute on civil post-judgment interest does not compel that interest run on the various internal elements of dissolution decrees. Rather, the dissolution statutes confer upon trial courts the authority to order interest or not in the course of fashioning a just and reasonable division of property.
The Court of Appeals having appropriately disposed of Robert’s other allegations of error, Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A), we affirm the trial court.
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.