MAY, J.
In every habitual offender charge, there are three relevant convictions: the conviction to which the habitual offender enhancement is attached (the “instant conviction”), and two prior felony convictions. Each conviction must be “unrelated,” meaning each offense must be committed after sentencing for the prior offense. Generally, this is sufficient to permit the habitual offender enhancement for the instant offense.
But when any of the convictions are drug offenses, additional requirements must be satisfied. If the instant offense is a drug offense, subsection (b)(3) applies. If all the conditions of subsection (b)(3) are satisfied, the instant conviction cannot be enhanced. If a prior conviction is a drug offense, subsection (d)(3), which includes the same language as (b)(3), applies. If all the conditions of subsection (d)(3) are satisfied, the prior conviction cannot be included as one of the two prior convictions necessary for the instant conviction to be enhanced.
We have interpreted this “confusing” statute to mean “[i]n other words, a trial court is prohibited from enhancing a drug offense . . . where the underlying offense is not delineated in Indiana Code § 35-50-2-2(b)(4) and the defendant has not accrued two or more unrelated dealing convictions.” Johnican v. State, 804 N.E.2d 211, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Subsection (d)(3) imposes the same criteria for determining when a substance abuse offense may be used as a prior unrelated felony conviction.
The parties disagree on only one point: how to calculate the total number of unrelated dealing convictions Peoples has accumulated. [Footnote omitted.] Peoples argues the habitual offender enhancement cannot be attached to the instant conviction under subsection (b)(3) because the instant conviction is a drug offense, satisfying subsection (b)(3)(A); it was not aggravated because guns or children were involved, satisfying subsection (b)(3)(B); and “the number of priors for dealing” does not exceed one, satisfying subsection (b)(3)(C)(i)-(v). (Appellant’s Br. at 6) (emphasis supplied).
But the language of subsection (b)(3)(C) does not say more than one “prior,” nor does the identical language in subsection (d)(3)(C) – rather, it requires that “the total number of unrelated convictions” for certain drug offenses “does not exceed one (1).” Peoples’ instant conviction of dealing cocaine and his prior conviction of cocaine possession with intent to deliver are undoubtedly “unrelated” and the two convictions undoubtedly “exceed one.”
The State argues the statute is not limited to “only prior convictions but requires the summation of the ‘total number of unrelated convictions’ Defendant has accumulated for dealing drugs,” . . . and notes Peoples “inserts the word ‘prior’ before ‘unrelated convictions’ where it does not exist.” (Id.) We agree. There are numerous references throughout the statute to the word “prior,” but the references to unrelated convictions in subsections (b)(3)(C) and (d)(3)(C) are not modified by the word “prior”: “Had the legislature intended such a limitation, they [sic] could have easily included the term ‘prior’ as they [sic] did elsewhere in the statute.” (Id.) We decline to read such a limitation into subsections (b)(3)(C) and (d)(3)(C) when the plain language of the statute does not include it, and when nothing suggests the legislature intended such a limitation.
BAKER, C.J., and BARNES, J., concur.